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INTRODUCTION 
 
Why should I be moral? This question gets to the heart of the normative problem, that is, 
the problem of grounding the normative force of moral obligations. People who take the 
normative problem seriously think that even once we have determined which actions are 
right or which objects are good there is still a question to be raised – why should we 
perform right actions? Why should we pursue good objects? In some cases what morality 
asks of us can be hard and the normative problem there seems particularly pressing. 
 
Christine Korsgaard has used the normative problem to launch arguments against two of the 
most popular metaethical accounts – moral realism and expressivism. She argues that 
reflection on the normative problem forces us to reject moral realism and expressivism, and 
adopt a position which „transcends‟ or „goes beyond‟ metaethics as it is traditionally 
conceived. We can call this positive view neo-Kantian constructivism. 
 
This thesis is a sustained examination of both of these parts of Korsgaard‟s work – the 
negative attacks on moral realism and expressivism; and her own neo-Kantian 
constructivism. I have two ambitions for it. First, I want to get clear formulations of and 
evaluate Korsgaard‟s arguments against her metaethical competitors and for her own 
position. Second, by engaging in the first task I hope to offer some results that will be 
independently interesting to people who are interested in metaethics. 
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Views similar to the ones Korsgaard defends have been advocated by other philosophers. In 
this thesis I have concentrated almost exclusively on Korsgaard‟s own view. This is in part 
because extracting a clear formulation of Korsgaard‟s arguments from her work is not 
always easy, and requires some amount of space. Also, I am more interested in how a view 
like neo-Kantian constructivism contrasts with completely different views in metaethics 
than in the details of different types of neo-Kantian constructivism (This is, of course, to 
some extent a false dichotomy. One way to explore how neo-Kantian constructivism hooks 
up with the rest of metaethics is to explore differences within the constructivist camp. I can 
only say this: it is only to some extent a false dichotomy – I have felt that the best way to 
pursue the issues I‟m interested in is to concentrate on a single view. I hope that the things 
that I say about metaethics are sufficiently independently interesting to compensate for this 
somewhat narrow focus). 
 
My conclusion will be that Korsgaard‟s position, although worth engaging with, ultimately 
fails. Her arguments against moral realism can be resisted if we formulate the right type of 
moral realism. However, her complaints about expressivism, when charitably interpreted, 
do cause problems for the expressivist. I give a new way of interpreting her own 
metaethical position, but argue that it ultimately fails in its ambitions.  
 
I begin in chapter one with an examination of attempts to dismiss the normative problem 
and the questions stemming from it as confused and thus safely ignored. I argue there that 
such attempts rely upon an overly austere conception of the tasks of metaethics, and a 
questionable thesis about the relationship of metaethics to normative ethics. I also begin to 
outline Korsgaard‟s argument against realism. 
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In chapter 2 I argue that we can get a clearer grip on Korsgaard‟s argument against realism 
if we construe it as a problem to do with the alleged motivational import of moral 
judgements. Variations of the claim that moral judgements are inherently motivating are 
often made (a claim we can call „internalism‟), and this claim causes problems for realism 
(against suitable background assumptions). Seeing Korsgaard‟s argument this way allows 
us to explain the affinities she claims her argument has with G.E. Moore‟s open question 
argument and J.L. Mackie‟s argument from queerness. I argue that the lesson we should 
draw is that internalism is a troubling claim for moral realism, and that we should 
investigate whether there are compelling reasons to accept it. I first argue that Michael 
Smith‟s two-pronged manoeuvre in favour of internalism fails, before going on to consider 
Mark van Roojen‟s more recent case for internalism – again arguing that it fails. What 
moral realists need to do, I claim, is establish a viable form of externalist realism, and hence 
they will be able to dodge Korsgaard‟s argument when it is construed in this manner. 
 
I then go on (chapter 3) to offer a second interpretation of Korsgaard‟s argument where she 
ends up offering what we can call, following Mark Schroeder, a generalised anti-voluntarist 
argument. The upshot of this argument is that moral realism, to avoid the argument, should 
be reductionist. I then go on to consider two versions of moral realism: one externalist and 
non-reductionist (Cornell realism); and the other externalist and reductionist (Stephen 
Finlay‟s analytic reductivism). If either of these views is viable then moral realism is able to 
dodge one or both of the construals of Korsgaard‟s argument. I argue that Finlay‟s position 
does well along a number of dimensions, but that it invokes a methodology that is not 
licensed by the account of analyticity he adverts to. Cornell realism can resist two of the 
major lines of attack typically launched against its semantic programme and its ontological 
claims. Both views, I think, offer us ways to circumvent Korsgaard‟s arguments.  
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Chapter 4 looks at Korsgaard‟s engagement with expressivism. I flesh out her complaints 
against expressivism in a way that has them as getting at something like the Frege-Geach 
problem – the problem of explaining how the semantic properties of complex expressions 
are built up out of the semantic features of their simpler constituents. I survey the most 
popular attempts to deal with this problem and argue that they are all unpromising. This 
motivates a study of a new type of position – hybrid expressivism – which combines 
elements of cognitivist and non-cognitivist semantics in order to deal with the problems that 
attend each type of semantic theory individually. I argue that hybrid expressivism either 
fails, or is best construed as a more sophisticated version of moral realism.  
 
Finally, I turn to Korsgaard‟s positive proposal, neo-Kantian constructivism. I propose a 
novel way of interpreting this position, where we construe constructivism as a form of 
cognitivist anti-realism along lines inspired by Crispin Wright‟s work on judgement-
dependent qualities. Doing things this way allows us to both give Korsgaard most of what 
she wants from a metaethical theory as well as generating a clear proposal to evaluate. 
When things are put this way the viability of constructivism depends upon being able to 
give the right sort of argument for the categorical imperative. When we try to do this, we 
see that neo-Kantian constructivism ultimately fails.  
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CHAPTER ONE: THE NORMATIVE QUESTION AND MORAL 
REALISM 
 
 
When investigating morality, it seems as if we are not just looking for a list of things that 
we should or should not do. In addition, we expect to find out why we are beholden to the 
dictates of morality – to find out how morality gets its normative force. This question – why 
should I be moral? – Christine Korsgaard calls „the normative question‟ and it provides the 
basis for her moral thinking. She uses this question to attempt three manoeuvres: first, to 
show that traditional metaethical theories like moral realism and expressivism are 
inadequate – they lack the resources to answer the normative question satisfactorily; second, 
that this failure is in part a result of the inadequacies of the typical distinctions (e.g. between 
cognitivism and non-cognitivism) made in contemporary metaethics; and third, that neo-
Kantian constructivism (a position which „goes beyond‟ traditional metaethics) does have 
the resources to provide a satisfactory answer to the normative question, and so we should 
accept it.  
 
The normative question, then, is at the heart of Korsgaard‟s moral philosophy. Here I will 
try to get clear on precisely what the normative question is asking for (§1.1), before laying 
some additional groundwork (§1.2) that will be required for showing how Korsgaard tries to 
use the normative question to undermine moral realism (§1.3). 
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1.1 The Normative Question 
 
Korsgaard contends that there are two major tasks involved in systematic moral theorising. 
First we want to come to understand three features of moral concepts: 1. The meaning of 
moral concepts, or to use Korsgaard‟s metaphor “what they contain” (1996, 10) – what does 
it mean to say that something is good or bad, or to call a person vicious or virtuous etc. 2. 
We want to know to which objects these concepts are appropriately applied – just which 
things are good or bad, which people are virtuous or vicious. 3. Where do these moral 
concepts come from? That is, how did we come to possess them?  
 
In addition to these tasks (providing what Korsgaard calls a „theory of moral concepts‟) the 
nature of moral concepts also means that there is another account we need to provide. We 
don‟t just use moral concepts to describe the world, but also to make demands upon one 
another: 
[E]thical standards are normative. They do not merely describe a way in which we 
in fact regulate our conduct. They make claims on us; they command, oblige, 
recommend, or guide. When I say that an action is right I am saying that you ought 
to do it; when I say that something is good I am recommending it as worthy of your 
choice... it is the force of these normative claims – the right of these concepts to 
give laws to us – that we want to understand. (Korsgaard, 1996, 9) 
 
Morality does not just make these claims upon us, these claims sometimes have a practical 
effect – it seems as if we sometimes alter our behaviour on the basis of what morality 
7 
 
demands, sometimes to a radical degree: fiction and everyday life offer us examples of 
people who purportedly sacrifice their own lives for the sake of doing the right thing. 
Furthermore, either failing or succeeding to meet these demands can have psychological 
effects upon us – failing to fulfil what we take to be our duty can cause distress, for 
example.  
 
Korsgaard takes these observations to demonstrate the need for two criteria of adequacy for 
an account of the nature of morality. First, it must be explanatorily adequate – it must be 
able to explain the seeming importance of morality in our lives, and the practical and 
psychological effects it can have on us. Second, it must be justificatorily adequate – it must 
be able to explain whether we are justified in giving morality such importance; whether we 
should make the judgements that we do; whether we should allow those judgements to have 
the practical and psychological effects that they do; and why morality has the practical 
significance that it seems to possess. Asking whether a theory of morality fulfils this second 
criterion is what asking the normative question involves.  
 
We can see how these two criteria diverge in a case where the explanation of our moral 
practices works to debunk those practices in some way – an explanation where once we see 
how our moral practices are explained, we no longer feel they have any justification. For 
example we might discover that morality has some kind of genetic basis, what Korsgaard 
calls „the evolutionary theory‟. According to this theory: “right actions are those which 
promote the preservation of the species, and wrong actions are those which are detrimental 
to this goal.” (14). Further, suppose that: 
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The evolutionary theorist can prove, with empirical evidence, that because this is so, 
human beings have evolved deep and powerful instincts in favour of doing what is 
right and avoiding wrong. (14.) 
If this theory were true, then it could give an account of our moral practices which was 
explanatorily adequate – no wonder we place such huge importance on morality, we have 
“deep and powerful instincts” that incline us to act morally. However, would such a theory 
be good enough to justify those moral practices? 
Suppose morality demands that you yourself make a serious sacrifice like giving up 
your life, or hurting someone that you love. Is it really enough for you to think that 
this action promotes the preservation of the species? You might find yourself 
thinking thoughts like these: why after all should the preservation of the species 
count so much more than the happiness of the individuals in it? Why should it 
matter so much more than my happiness and the happiness of those I care most 
about? Maybe it‟s not worth it. (14-15).  
So, once we see that our moral practices are explained by a theory like this, we start to 
doubt whether they really are justified. Such a theory exhibits, as Korsgaard puts it, 
„normative failure‟. It is the existence of the second criterion (justificatory adequacy) that 
allows the possibility of moral scepticism. It should be obvious, even to a sceptic, that 
people apply moral concepts quite regularly – a moral sceptic does not deny that people 
utter sentences like „Tony Blair was a morally base individual‟ or „There is nothing wrong 
with telling a white lie.‟ Instead, the sceptic can simply deny that the effects these 
judgements have are justified – we have no good reason to take my judgement of Tony 
Blair‟s character to influence my behaviour. This is because we need an account of why I 
should pay attention to the demands of morality. If we can formulate an adequate answer to 
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the normative question then we can have something to say in response to the moral sceptic 
who claims that we have no reason to pay attention to morality.  
 
Another way to get clear on what the normative question is asking us for is to distinguish it 
from other, closely related, questions with which it might be confused. Korsgaard does this 
by looking at H.A. Prichard‟s argument that the question „why should I be moral?‟ is 
confused. Briefly put, Prichard claims that there are two possible types of answers to the 
question: 1. We give an answer involving moral notions (e.g. „because it is your duty‟), in 
which case we have argued in a circle; 2. We could give an answer from outside of morality 
(e.g. „because doing so would make you happy‟) but now our answer looks irrelevant – we 
feel as if the reason why we should be moral can‟t be because it would be good for us1. So, 
the question „why should I be moral?‟ only admits of answers that are either irrelevant or 
circular. Prichard takes this to indicate that although the normative question looks coherent, 
it is not (see Prichard 1912 and Korsgaard 1996, 32).   
 
Korsgaard argues that one way to see how this is confused, and show that the normative 
question is live, is to look at what Prichard advises us to do in the case where someone asks 
„why should I be moral?‟ According to Prichard, a question like this is a disguised way of 
                                                             
1
 This answer is both extensionally inadequate – morality seems to diverge from self-interest, at least in 
some cases – and inadequate in another sense: if we say that we should be moral in order to further our 
self-interest, we haven’t yet explained why morality is binding on us, for now we need an explanation of 
why we should feel bound by our self-interest. The fact that people often do act in their self-interest, 
and that it seems obvious that one should, we can imagine Prichard saying, does not actually explain 
why self-interest is normatively binding. 
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asking whether a particular criterion with moral significance applies to a particular object.2 
So, suppose that someone argues that the correct moral theory is some form of 
consequentialism with the relevant consequences restricted to psychological states of 
pleasure or pain. This theory demands that we maximise the amount of pleasure in the 
world and minimise the amount of pain. According to this theory, good states of affairs are 
those with the greatest balance of pleasure over pain3, and right actions are those that 
promote such state of affairs. Now, suppose somebody asks of some action that they agree 
to be right whether they should perform it. Prichard claims that this person is really asking 
whether the action promotes the greatest balance of pleasure over pain. In order to answer 
their question we don‟t have to do anything mysterious; instead we simply remind them that 
the morally significant criterion applies – we say to them „But look, the action promotes the 
greatest balance of pleasure over pain, it must be right!‟ This answer is appropriate, because 
anyone asking such a question is confused – they are not really asking whether they should 
be moral, instead they are wondering whether the criterion they use to distinguish the moral 
really applies in this case. Korsgaard‟s normative question then, is, for Prichard, a 
generalised confusion – asking „why should I be moral?‟ is to ask whether a particular 
moral concept ever applies to any object, it is not to ask for an explanation of the normative 
force of morality (see Korsgaard 1996, 38-9). 
 
However, Korsgaard argues that the confusion is all Prichard‟s. The answer Prichard offers 
to our putative sceptic “addresses someone who has fallen into doubt about whether an 
                                                             
2
 It seems here as if what Prichard is doing is offering a charitable re-interpretation of our question – the 
question, as literally stated, is confused. However, there is a nearby question that is significant that we 
can interpret people who ask the confused question as trying to get at.  
3
 Of course Prichard himself, being a non-naturalist, would not identify goodness with the distribution of 
pain and pleasure. Instead, he would claim (if he accepted this particular moral theory) that goodness 
was just necessarily connected with the distribution of pain and pleasure.  
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action is really required by morality, not someone who has fallen into doubt about whether 
moral requirements are really normative” (38). Korsgaard‟s diagnosis of this misfire is that 
Prichard takes words like „right‟ and „obligatory‟ to be essentially normative, by definition. 
They are, as Korsgaard labels them, normatively loaded. If we accept this view, then the 
two questions: „Is this action really obligatory‟ and „Is this obligation really normative?‟ 
collapse into one another – in order for an action to obligatory it must have normative force. 
We would only ever need to answer the first question. However, this invites confusion for 
the question „Is this action really obligatory?‟ admits of a reading under which it is simply a 
question about the correct application of some moral notion – about whether the action does 
promote the greatest amount of pleasure over pain. Because of this potential reading, and 
the collapse of the second question in to the first, we imagine that once we have answered it 
we have completed our work. Once we know that an action promotes the greatest balance of 
pleasure over pain, there is no more that needs to be said about it. Korsgaard contends that 
this is a mistake. There is another reading of „Is this action really obligatory‟ available – one 
where we are asking not if it promotes the greatest balance of pleasure over pain (which 
would make it right) but whether we should be bothered about performing right actions. So, 
Korsgaard argues: 
Prichard‟s way of approaching the matter therefore leads us to confuse the question 
of correct application with the question of normativity. And this actually happened 
to Prichard himself. For it led him to think that once we have settled the question of 
correct application, there can be nothing more to say about the normative question. 
(39) 
To put it another way, Prichard‟s collapsing of the distinction between the question of the 
correct application of a moral criterion and the normative question depends upon the 
assumption that morality really does have normative force. But this is precisely the 
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assumption that the normative question is asking for an explanation, or defence, of. It is 
illegitimate to use this assumption as a way of showing the normative question to be 
incoherent, as Korsgaard‟s reading of Prichard has him doing.  
 
Of course, it could turn out that something like Prichard‟s conclusion is right. That there is 
something wrong with the normative question. However, I suspect this is the sort of 
conclusion we could only reach after seeing where attempts to answer it get us. Is it really 
true, for example, that the question only admits of answers that are either circular or 
irrelevant? It seems rather hasty to accept this on the basis of what we have seen from 
Prichard so far. For example, Korsgaard thinks that she does have a good answer to the 
normative question, and it would be better to examine it in detail rather than dismissing the 
claim in advance. In addition, this Prichardian move may be unnecessary, depending upon 
our purposes. Korsgaard wants to use the normative question not just as a way of promoting 
neo-Kantian constructivism (her own view) but also to attack moral realism, non-
cognitivism and the metaethical distinctions upon which these views rest. If we examine 
these criticisms and find that, in fact, moral realism (for example) does have the resources 
to provide a satisfactory answer to the normative question then we might lose interest in 
attempting to dismiss the question from afar. Even if we are troubled that there is some kind 
of incoherence concealed within the normative question, it would still be an interesting 
finding if the conclusions that Korsgaard draws from the question do not follow. Then we 
could remain agnostic about the status of the normative question whilst resisting 
Korsgaard‟s manoeuvres for other reasons.4   
                                                             
4
 There is another line according to which Korsgaard’s project is entirely misguided, found in the work of 
Nadeem Hussain and Nishi Shah (2005, 2006a, 2006b). However, they argue not against the legitimacy 
of the normative question, but against its use by Korsgaard against certain metaethical views. The 
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We have seen then that the normative question seems to provide a criterion of adequacy on 
any systematic moral theorising. The example of the evolutionary theory of morality 
demonstrates that we need not only an explanation of how morality has the effect that it 
does (in broadly psychological terms) but also an account of normative force. Also, we have 
seen that the normative question needs to be distinguished from other, closely related 
questions, such as the correct application of moral concepts. Once we do this, we see that 
the most obvious kind of attack on the coherence of the normative question is potentially 
misguided. This gives us, I claim, good reason to examine the uses of the normative 
question before we reach any grand conclusion about its status.  
 
Below we begin this process by first setting up a distinction we need in hand (§1.2) in order 
to see how Korsgaard launches an attack on moral realism (§1.3). 
 
 
1.2 Substantive vs. Procedural Realism 
 
Moral realism, as I shall use the term in this thesis, is a view identified by three claims:  
(1) Moral judgements purport to be true or false.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
normative question is coherent, but not pitched at the right theoretical level for Korsgaard to derive her 
conclusions. I tackle this argument for the irrelevancy of Korsgaard below.   
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(2) Sometimes these judgements are true (in other words, their truth-conditions are 
sometimes fulfilled and the judgements in question accurately represent moral 
facts). 
(3) These facts hold independently of our best judgements concerning them.  
 
There are a number of different types of moral realism, and one could design a number of 
taxonomies to divide them. A useful one is given by Alex Miller (2003), which I will be 
following here. First we can ask whether the facts that our moral judgements purport to 
represent are natural facts. If not, then our view will be non-naturalist, a position inhabited 
by G.E. Moore (1903) who claimed that moral properties are sui generis, simple and 
indefinable, but also includes the work of John McDowell (1998) who tries to shed non-
naturalism of its objectionable epistemological baggage. If instead we decide that moral 
facts are natural facts, then we face another choice – between positions which claim that 
moral facts reduce to other natural facts, and positions that view moral facts as irreducible 
natural facts. In the first camp we have the revising definitions strategy of Peter Railton 
(1989); and the non-revisionist strategies of Frank Jackson and Philip Petit‟s analytic 
functionalism (1995), Stephen Finlay‟s analytic naturalism (forthcoming) and others. The 
main proponents of the second view (that moral facts are irreducible to other natural facts) 
have been the so-called „Cornell realists‟ – philosophers like Nicholas Sturgeon (1985, 
1986) who argue that moral facts earn their keep by featuring in some of our best 
explanations of natural phenomena.  
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In addition, moral realists are also usually cognitivists – moral judgements express belief-
like mental states which when true conceptually guarantee that the judgement is true5. It is 
easy to see how cognitivism sits well with the three claims above – if moral judgements 
have descriptive content, and this content concerns the holding of mind-independent moral 
facts then it seems natural to hold that moral judgements are belief-like mental states rather 
than desire-like non-cognitive states (which don‟t seem like the kinds of things capable of 
having descriptive content). The close link between realism and cognitivism will become 
relevant when we consider Korsgaard‟s attack on the distinction between cognitivism and 
non-cognitivism.  
 
Korsgaard offers another way of distinguishing between moral realisms – between 
procedural and substantive realism. Both views agree that there are answers to moral 
questions, and that there are right and wrong ways of going about answering them – some 
procedures are better for arriving at answers to moral questions. The substantive realist adds 
the claim that there are correct procedures for answering moral questions because there are 
independently existing moral facts that those procedures ask about.6 So both views think 
that there are good and bad procedures for going about answering moral questions, but they 
disagree about what underpins those procedures. The substantive realist thinks the best 
procedure is best because it tracks the independently existing moral facts that we are aiming 
for in correct moral judgements. The merely procedural realist claims that there is no need 
for these independent moral facts: 
                                                             
5
 Note that there is nothing here saying that moral judgements only express beliefs. This is to allow 
space for so-called ‘hybrid’ views where moral judgements express both beliefs and desires. The clause 
about a conceptual link between the truth of the belief expressed by the judgement and the truth of the 
judgement will become relevant when discussing those views in chapter 4.  
6 Korsgaard does not have the independence clause in her presentation of the distinction, but it is clear 
that she does embrace this condition see 1996, 34-37 
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Procedural Realism (PR): there are right and wrong ways of answering moral 
questions (good and bad procedures for answering them).  
Substantive Realism (SR): there are right and wrong ways of answering moral 
questions (good and bad procedures for answering them) because there are 
independently existing moral facts that those procedures aim to track.  
Mere Procedural Realism (MPR): there are right and wrong ways of answering 
moral questions (good and bad procedures for answering them), and this does not 
depend upon the procedures tracking independent moral facts. 7 
So procedural realism claims that there are good and bad procedures for answering moral 
questions. Substantive realism then offers an explanation of why those procedures are good 
or bad (because they track or fail to track the independently existing moral facts). Mere 
procedural realism denies the need for these moral facts. To put it another way, PR claims 
that there are answers to moral questions because there are good procedures for arriving at 
answers to them. SR adds the claim that this “because” is underwritten by another, more 
fundamental “because” – the procedures are good because they track the independently 
existing moral facts accurately. MPR denies the need for this second “because” 
underpinning the first. As I have laid it out here, SR is a subset of PR. MPR is what is left 
of the PR set after you take out the SR views. Given this, „moral realism‟ as I mean it will 
denote substantive realism.  
 
                                                             
7 Korsgaard does not distinguish between PR and MPR. However, this appears to be a harmless 
clarification – Korsgaard wants to defend mere procedural realism (the view that denies the substantive 
realist’s additional claim) under the banner of ‘procedural realism’ but her description of procedural 
realism is in fact compatible with substantive realism.  
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Procedural realism, despite its expansiveness, is not a trivial claim. It is denied by the moral 
nihilist, who claims that there are no answers to moral questions. However, it does include 
views which look slightly nihilistic. For example, an error theorist claims that all positive 
atomic moral judgements are false – whenever we utter one, we are in error. Typically 
though, the error theorist will offer us some way of going about answering moral questions.8 
In other words, a non-eliminativist error theorist will hold that there are „right‟ and „wrong‟ 
ways of answering moral questions that do not have to correspond to true and false moral 
propositions – as all positive, atomic, moral claims are false. If they can do this, then they 
would count as a procedural realist. Procedural realism also encompasses non-cognitivist 
views (for a non-cognitivist, there is an answer to the question „Is murder wrong?‟, just one 
that does not involve the notion of independent moral facts), Korsgaard‟s neo-Kantian 
constructivism, and some forms of cognitivist anti-realism.  
 
Korsgaard accepts procedural realism. When she offers an attack on moral realism, it is not 
intended as an attack undermining the claim that there are answers to moral questions. 
Instead, she means to attack the substantive realist claim that those answers are only 
available because our procedures for answering moral questions aim to track independently 
existing moral facts. This leaves her with the need to accept MPR if she wants to avoid 
nihilism. So, her attack is, in one sense not against realism. However, all of the above listed 
versions of moral realism (those positions that accept my 1- 3 above) do form a target for 
her attack. They are all committed to the truth of substantive realism. 
 
 
                                                             
8
 See, for example Mackie 1977 
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Thus we can see how wide-ranging Korsgaard wants her attack on moral realism to be. She 
claims that substantive realism does not have the resources to answer the normative 
question, and for this reason should be rejected. This means rejecting all of the above types 
of realism – naturalist, non-naturalist and so on, alike.  
 
 
1.3 Korsgaard Against Moral Realism 
 
Korsgaard contends that we can see where moral realism goes wrong if we first look at how 
voluntarism deals with the normative question. Voluntaristic theories about obligation claim 
that obligations are grounded in the commands or choices of a legislator. The most well-
known variant is theological voluntarism where obligation derives from the commands or 
will of God. However, voluntarism has space to slot in any particular legislator – for 
example, for Thomas Hobbes (1651) the relevant legislator was an earthly sovereign. All 
unsophisticated variants of voluntarism would endorse a claim like the following: 
VOL:  If agent x is obligated to perform action a then this is because the legislator 
commands, or in some other way wills, a.  
With the role of legislator being taken by different entities. Korsgaard argues that such an 
account of obligation fails because it cannot provide an adequate answer to the normative 
question. 
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The voluntarist tells us that all our obligations stem from the commands of some legislator. 
We can then pose the following question: why am I obligated to obey those commands? 
According to the theory, all obligations come from the commands of the legislator, so it 
must be because she commands my obedience. But this cannot be right: the legislator 
cannot make it the case that I should obey their commands just by commanding that I do so 
– unless I‟m already obligated to obey their commands then such a command will make no 
difference. The answer that the voluntarist offers to the normative question is thus circular – 
commands inheriting their normative status from being the commands of a particular 
legislator would depend upon the commands of that legislator already having normative 
significance. This significance can be established only by a further command. We can then 
repeat our question of „what‟s so special about that command?‟ indefinitely. Thus this 
answer to the normative question is incoherent. 
 
One way to avoid this incoherence would be to claim that our obligation to obey the 
legislator lies in something else. Pufendorf (1672), another voluntarist, claims that we have 
an obligation to obey the legislator when they have legitimate authority over us. But if we 
follow this path, we have in effect given up on our voluntarism. Our obligations are now 
explained by, or consist in, something else – the legitimacy of the legislator‟s authority in 
Pufendorf‟s case. And now the normative question can be just reiterated. First we will ask 
what is it about the legislator that gives them legitimacy, and then we can ask why that 
means I should obey their commands. 
 
So, in summary, the voluntarist tries to answer the normative question by saying that the 
obligations stemming from the commands of a suitable legislator are justified. However, 
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voluntarism fails because we can ask why these commands are justified – if it is just 
because the legislator has commanded that we obey them, then the position is inadequate; if 
they inherit their justification from something else then we have given up on being a 
voluntarist. 
 
Considering this shows up a dilemma when looking for the authority of obligation from a 
substantive realist. We can claim either: 
i.) Its authority comes from morality, in which case we have argued in a circle. 
ii.) Or, its authority comes from something else. In this case we can ask where that 
something else‟s authority comes from, and we are on the road to some kind of 
infinite regress of justification.  
 
The voluntarist account of obligation fails because we can always ask why we should obey 
the legislator‟s command. It cannot be because they have commanded us to, because the 
same question arises about that command. The voluntarist thus fails to tell us why we 
should feel obligated to obey the legislator‟s commands, and thus fails to give an adequate 
account of obligation. 
 
So the voluntarist faces a problem – attempting to root obligation in the commands of a 
legislator without generating a regress of justification (a „normative regress‟). Korsgaard 
contends that substantive realism fails as it attempts to end this regress illegitimately. The 
substantive realist brings the threatened normative regress to an end by fiat by positing 
intrinsically normative entities (facts or truths that exist independently of our procedures for 
answering moral questions) that are supposed to stop a repetition of the normative question. 
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For Korsgaard, this is a way of avoiding answering the question at all. Instead of telling us 
why some actions are obligatory, the realist posits intrinsically normative entities or 
relations found in the world – some actions are simply right, and this is because these 
actions are intrinsically obligatory. These normative entities are supposed to forbid further 
questioning – once we have discovered that certain actions are intrinsically obligatory, that 
will be the end of the matter. 
 
 
Korsgaard holds that this does not engage with the normative question at all. What is at 
issue is whether there are any obligatory actions, and if there are whether they are the ones 
we are traditionally asked to do. In this, realism seems to be of little help. For the realist 
answer to the question „why should I perform such-and-such an action?‟ appears to be 
„because that action is intrinsically obligatory.‟ But this is the very thing the person asking 
the normative question is questioning. It appears as if the realist‟s answer can only be 
backed up by their confidence that such entities exist, whereas the person asking the 
normative question is asking it because they lack such confidence. 
 
Therefore, the realist‟s answer to the normative question is inadequate because it is no 
answer at all – it merely restates the realist‟s confidence in the existence of intrinsically 
normative states of affairs or relations. The inadequacy of this line of response is revealed 
by asking how a realist would respond to someone who had lost their confidence in the 
normativity of morality. At best they would be able to explain whether a particular action 
was demanded by morality, not why you should act in line with the dictates of morality at 
all. 
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To summarise, Korsgaard argues that moral realism lacks the resources to generate an 
adequate answer to the normative question. The voluntarist attempts to answer that question 
by citing the commands of an appropriate legislator. But we can ask of these commands 
how they earn their normative justification. If the voluntarist uses some consideration other 
than the commands of the relevant legislator then they have given up being voluntarists 
(and we can, in any case, simply ask how that other consideration earns its normative 
force). If instead the voluntarist simply claims that the commands of the legislator are 
authoritative because the legislator commands that we obey them, then our question has not 
been properly answered – we can reiterate our question and ask why that command should 
matter. Korsgaard claims that at this point the moral realist engages in something akin to 
foot-stamping – they merely insist that obligation exists by positing intrinsically normative 
entities. Such a move is illegitimate (according to Korsgaard) because it completely ignores 
the normative question – instead of explaining why you are obligated to perform a 
particular action, the moral realist simply insists that you are so obligated.  
 
In this thesis I will explore two types of response to Korsgaard‟s argument against moral 
realism. First, I will investigate whether after we bracket considerations to do with the 
motivational force of moral judgement Korsgaard‟s problem remains (§2.2). Second, we 
will see if there is a solution to Korsgaard‟s dilemma for the voluntarist which can be used 
by the moral realist as well (§3.2). In addition, I will explore Korsgaard's own answer to the 
normative question (Chapter 5). If this answer to the normative question fails then we may 
suspect that Korsgaard‟s question is illegitimately posed, and something like Prichardian 
scepticism towards it is merited. At the very least we will have established that the moral 
realist is in no worse position than the neo-Kantian constructivist.  
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Before we get this far, however, it is worth considering whether there is any potential for 
Korsgaard‟s argument to have any force against moral realism. Nadeem Hussain and Nishi 
Shah (2005, 2006a, 2006b) have argued that Korsgaard‟s argument cannot undermine moral 
realism as it is pitched at the wrong level of theoretical generality to have that consequence. 
I will consider this claim in the next section and hope to demonstrate that there is at least a 
prima facie case for taking Korsgaard‟s argument seriously.  
 
 
 
1.4 Korsgaard‟s Rejection of Realism and the Distinction Between Normative Ethics and 
Metaethics 
 
Hussain and Shah are interested in Korsgaard‟s project of attempting to transcend or „go 
beyond‟ the distinctions of traditional metaethics. Against this project they argue that 
Korsgaard‟s arguments do not have any metaethical conclusions at all so do not license 
either a) rejecting any particular metaethical view or, b) attempting to transcend the 
traditional distinctions. If they are right, then Korsgaard‟s argument against moral realism 
must fail – moral realism is a view within metaethics, and if Korsgaard‟s claims cannot 
generate any metaethical consequences she has no reason to reject it. Hussain and Shah 
couch their argument in terms of Korsgaard‟s dissatisfaction with the non-naturalist realism 
advocated by G.E. Moore (1903) and H.A. Prichard (1912) so I will follow them in taking 
this type of moral realism as our test case. 
 
 
Hussain and Shah lay out their complaint against Korsgaard as follows:  
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Our general strategy will be to argue that what are supposed to be claims that 
conflict with realism in fact fail to do so. We will rarely attack the arguments for 
these claims. What we will attack instead is the argument against realism based on 
these claims. These claims (and arguments for them) fail, in general, to undermine 
realism because Korsgaard fails to show that they actually conflict with realism in 
the first place. They often fail to conflict because though they appear to be 
metaethical claims they in fact are not obviously so and indeed are most charitably 
interpreted as either claims within normative ethics or normative psychological 
claims in the philosophy of action, claims compatible with several metaethical 
accounts of those same claims including non-reductive realism.  
(Hussain and Shah 2006a, 266) 
 
So then, their strategy seems clear. They wish to show that Korsgaard‟s rejection of realism 
is based on a mistake about the scope of her claims. Korsgaard‟s objection to non-
naturalism fails because it is an objection with no metaethical implications, and as such 
cannot undermine realism (a metaethical position). Once we have seen the mistake in 
question, we will realise that Korsgaard cannot differentiate her position from non-
naturalism (or any other metaethical position – e.g. non-cognitivism; see Hussain and Shah 
2006b); she cannot successfully offer an account to rival traditional metaethical theories, or 
succeed in attempting to „go beyond‟ traditional metaethics.  
 
The mistake in question is “a failure to appreciate all the consequences of the traditional 
distinction between normative judgments and metaethical interpretations of normative 
25 
 
judgments.” (Hussain and Shah 2006a, 266). So what is the traditional distinction, and 
which consequences of that distinction does Korsgaard fail to take account of? 
 
On the first question, Hussain and Shah give us the following account. In the domain of 
normative ethics, they place two differing philosophical tasks: 
i.) “To construct a set of principles that systematize and ground our correct moral 
judgments”  
ii.) “To place morality within practical reason, explaining whether we have reason 
to do what morality demands and, if so, whether these reasons are derived from 
another branch of practical reason” 
(Hussain and Shah 2006a, 266-7) 
 
In contrast, the job of metaethics is to give us an interpretation of the normative claims 
made in the process of carrying out the above tasks. Specifically, to spell out the semantic, 
metaphysical and epistemological commitments entailed by our normative claims (so, for 
example a non-naturalist offers us a fact-stating semantics for moral discourse, an ontology 
of non-natural properties and some kind of intuitionist epistemology. In contrast a non-
cognitivist claims that moral judgements express desires, offers an ontology of natural 
properties, and as they don‟t think there is such a thing as moral knowledge they do not 
need to offer a substantial epistemology. Obviously these are very crude caricatures of the 
most simple versions of those positions). Of course, Hussain and Shah acknowledge that 
discourse in either domain can impact on the other. Nevertheless, they contend that 
Korsgaard‟s failure to fully appreciate the different tasks of the two domains leads to her 
rejection of non-naturalism on spurious grounds. 
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The consequence of this distinction that Korsgaard fails to notice is an ambiguity in what 
the normative question is asking for. We can make a distinction between what makes an 
action wrong, and what constitutes the normativity in question. The example Hussain and 
Shah consider is brushing one‟s teeth:  
Thus, the fact that brushing my teeth regularly will reduce plaque may make 
brushing my teeth good (for me); however, we do not want to claim, presumably, 
that the property of goodness itself just is the property of reducing plaque. 
(Hussain and Shah 2006a, 270). 
To extend our shaky analogy further, we could say that the fact that brushing teeth reduces 
plaque places the claim „you should brush your teeth‟ within practical reason (it gives us 
reason to do what the imperative demands), but it does not give a „metaethical‟ account of 
the goodness of brushing teeth (it tells us nothing about the metaphysical, semantic and 
epistemological commitments of the practice of ascribing goodness to tooth-brushing). Here 
we have two different notions on the scene: loosely speaking the „normative-making 
properties‟ of teeth brushing; and what constitutes that normativity.  
 
It is Korsgaard‟s failure to notice this consequence of the distinction between normative and 
metaethics that lies behind her dissatisfaction with Moore‟s non-naturalist realism. 
Korsgaard claims that the reason that the open-question has any force is because of the 
force of the normative question:  
That is, when the concept of good is applied to a natural object, such as pleasure, we 
can still always ask whether we should really choose or pursue it. 
However: 
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This should not lead us to conclude that the concept of good, or any other normative 
concept, cannot be defined in a way that guides its application. Conflation of the 
normative question with other questions is what drives Moore and others to the view 
that moral concepts must be simple and indefinable, and as a result to intuitionism.  
(Korsgaard 1996 43) 
 
The problem with this conflation and the Moorean answer it leads to would be that such a 
conclusion would be of no help to someone asking the normative question. Such a person 
wants to know if the claims of morality really are justified, and to say that they are justified 
by the existence of intrinsically normative entities is of no help ( it is exactly the existence 
or relevance of such entities that the questioner is doubting).  The problem in the case of 
non-naturalism is even stronger, as the answer to the normative question appears even 
sketchier. The bones of Korsgaard complaint appear to be: 
[T]hat Moore, like Pritchard, failed to distinguish the question whether a normative 
concept has been correctly applied from the „normative question,‟ and thus that 
Moore mistakenly thought that because no naturalistic answer can be given to „the 
normative question,‟ there can be no naturalistic criteria given to guide the 
application of a normative concept.  
(Hussain and Shah 2006a, 273)  
 
However, Hussain and Shah point out that Moore did claim that there are synthetic 
necessary truths connecting normative and natural properties, and thus could accept a 
naturalistic account of the normative-making properties (see Moore 1903, 9). For example, 
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according to them, Moore could accept that it was a synthetic necessary truth that pleasure 
is good, and thus what makes a certain action good is that it produces pleasure. 
Nevertheless, he rejected a naturalistic account of what constitutes that goodness – good is 
not identical to any natural property, but instead is simple and indefinable. What this 
example illustrates, is that one can give an account of the normative-making properties in 
play, without yielding any metaethical conclusions. In this case, Moore could give a 
naturalistic account of normative-making properties, whilst holding a non-naturalistic view 
about the ontology of moral properties. By failing to distinguish between what makes an 
action good, and what constitutes goodness, Korsgaard misdirects her efforts. In her 
discussions of Moore and Prichard she attacks them for offering inadequate accounts of the 
placing of duty and good within practical reason, on the grounds that realism in general 
answers the normative question with a statement of its confidence in the existence of 
intrinsically normative entities, which is of no help to the person who has fallen into doubt. 
However, this does not show that they do not have reasonable accounts of the semantical, 
metaphysical and epistemological commitments of our normative claims – her arguments 
have no impact within that domain. 
 
So, in summary, Korsgaard fails to comprehend the full implications of the traditional 
distinction between normative and meta-ethics. Thus she fails to distinguish between the 
question of what makes an action right, and what constitutes that normativity. Her 
dissatisfaction with the non-naturalists can be pinned to the fact that she believes that their 
answer to the metaethical question is intended to tell us something about the placing of a 
particular normative claim within practical reason. It may well be the case that the way in 
which the non-naturalist places our normative claims within practical reason is inadequate, 
but this does not mean that they are wrong about the metaethics. Thus Korsgaard‟s 
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objection that non-naturalism cannot adequately place our normative claims within practical 
reason has no metaethical import – she is wrong to reject non-naturalism on the grounds of 
justificatory inadequacy in the normative domain, for such questions stand apart from the 
metaethics. 
 
Now, put like this, Hussain and Shah‟s argument may appear slightly strange. We would 
only expect to be unable to reject certain metaethical positions on the basis of inadequacy in 
the normative domain if we felt that the two areas did stand apart in such a sharp fashion. 
You may even start to wonder whether Hussain and Shah are securing their conclusion via a 
very austere conception of the tasks of metaethics. 
 
On this second point, it‟s worth noting that other taxonomies dividing metaethics from other 
philosophical tasks give much more of an expansive role to metaethics (e.g. Miller 2003). 
These more expansive conceptions of the tasks of metaethics are borne out if we consider 
one of the implications of Hussain and Shah‟s own division between metaethics and 
normative ethics. One of the 20th century‟s most pervasive arguments in favour of non-
cognitivism cites the motivational import that moral judgements have. In brief, the non-
cognitivist argues that: 
(4) Moral judgements are inherently motivating 
(5) Beliefs have no motivational important, and beliefs and desires are distinct 
existences with no necessary connections between them 
Therefore: 
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(6) Moral judgements do not express beliefs. Instead they express non-cognitive desire-   
like states (which are inherently motivating). 
 
Now, if Hussain and Shah are right then this argument is not metaethical – it uses 
considerations to do with the motivational force of moral judgements (a consideration 
outside of the remit of metaethics, as they conceive it) to derive its conclusion. But this is 
surely absurd – this is a paradigmatic metaethical argument, used frequently to drive non-
cognitivism, and if a taxonomy rejects it as non-metaethical then that is reason to reject that 
taxonomy.  
 
Hussain and Shah could argue that this argument is metaethical because its second premise 
relies upon taking a view on the metaphysics of belief – about what kind of thing they are, 
and what they can do. However, if this is the way of making the argument above fall within 
the domain of metaethics, then we could make a parallel claim for Korsgaard‟s own 
argument against moral realism. We could represent Korsgaard‟s argument, very 
schematically, as follows: 
(7) At least some moral judgements are justified. 
(8) The entities available to a moral realist are incapable of justifying any moral 
judgements.  
Therefore 
(9) Moral realism is false. 
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As in the argument for non-cognitivism the first makes a claim about some feature of moral 
judgements. The second premise makes a claim about what the resources available to a 
moral realist can and cannot do. If we wish to spare Hussain and Shah blushes by calling 
premise 5 of the argument against cognitivism metaphysical, there seems no obvious reason 
to not treat premise 8 of Korsgaard‟s argument against moral realism in a similar manner. 
 
Returning to the first point – of whether normative ethics and metaethics really do stand so 
far apart that we cannot use considerations of justificatory adequacy as a criterion of 
success for a metaethical theory – it seems implausible to think that metaethics and 
normative ethics really do stand apart in such a fashion. The claim that conclusions about 
what the normative-making properties are has no bearing on what constitutes that 
normativity only seems plausible if considering a single case.  
 
What do I mean by this? Suppose you were considering some action φ, generally accepted 
as good. You want to know first what it is that makes φ-ing good (what its normative-
making properties are) and second what constitutes that normativity. Now, if the answer to 
the first question was that what makes φ-ing good was the fact that it promotes the greatest 
balance of pleasure over pain, we wouldn‟t (presumably) want to say that gave us an answer 
to the second question – we wouldn‟t have given an account of what „good‟ means, or its 
metaphysical characteristics, or how we gain knowledge about it. However, suppose now 
that we continued our enquiry, looking at more and more different good actions, and in each 
case found that what makes x, y or z-ing good was the fact that they promote the greatest 
balance of pleasure over pain. Would it not now seem more reasonable to conclude not that 
we have given no account of the metaethics of „good‟, but rather that good just is the 
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property of promoting the greatest balance of pleasure over pain? Suppose that after an 
extensive enquiry over many different cases we get the same answer – what makes φ-ing 
good is the fact that it promotes the greatest balance of pleasure over pain. Have we still not 
reached something with metaethical implications? I am tempted to say that we have done 
quite a lot to unearth such implications, and it would be reasonable to accept a utilitarian 
realism about moral properties.  
 
The example need not be so simple. Suppose instead that we found that actions x,y,z… 
possessed 4 or 5 different natural properties a,b,c… such that some proportion of x,y,z… 
had natural property a in common, some b in common and so on. And suppose that every 
action examined so far was made good by its possession of a or b or a & b and so on. I 
believe the obvious conclusion to draw would be that good is some disjunction of those 
properties. Suppose instead that what makes actions good is wildly heterogeneous – there is 
no natural property or disjunction of natural properties that unifies them. Then it would be 
tempting to conclude that goodness was some indefinable non-natural property.9 Or, if what 
unified the good actions was that we were inclined to express approval of them, some 
version of subjectivism would be on the scene. Or, more relevantly to this case, suppose 
that the characteristic that all good actions shared was that to perform them would be to act 
                                                             
9 The most obvious comparison here is with the case in the philosophy of mind. There multiple 
realisability of mental states by physical states is usually taken to block reduction of the mental to the 
physical. Wild heterogeneity could also give a prima facie case for non-reductive ethical naturalism of 
the type proposed by Sturgeon (1985). The wild heterogeneity indicates that moral properties may be 
irreducible. If we combine this with Sturgeon’s argument that moral facts have a distinctive role to play 
in our explanation of people’s moral beliefs (and earn their non-reductionist stripes because of this), 
then we might be drawn towards non-reductive naturalism. Without this second claim (about the role of 
moral facts in empirical explanation) we might be tempted to stick with the idea of the irreducibility as 
lending support to non-naturalism. In the case of the mind, we can note that some have claimed that, 
given the overwhelming evidence in favour of physicalism (e.g. the causal closure of the physical world, 
see Papineau (unpublished) multiple-realisability forces towards a version of non-reductive naturalism. 
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upon a maxim that could be willed as a law by someone acting as a universal legislator in a 
Kingdom of Ends (the answer Korsgaard gives), then we might be inclined to accept some 
formulation of neo- or plain Kantianism. 
 
Of course, care must be taken here. There are senses in which it is arguable that the 
scenarios presented above are all compatible with error theory or certain types of non-
cognitivism.10 However, I think the point still stands, that - in the absence of further 
argumentation - our answer to „what makes this action good?‟ does have some implications 
for the kind of answers we could give to the question „what constitutes that normativity?‟ 
Thus, returning to Moore, it turns out that Moore may have given too much ground in 
admitting the existence of synthetic necessary truths linking normative-making properties to 
moral properties. It seems as if the natural conclusion to draw would be that the moral 
property of goodness is identical to the normative-making properties (singularly or in some 
disjunction). It then turns out that Moore was wrong in his rejection of naturalism for the 
same well worn reason – the possibility of synthetic identification between moral properties 
and natural properties, which the open-question argument (even if meets its intended target) 
does nothing to undermine.  
 
Another way to see the force of my criticism is to consider the recent exchange between 
Frank Jackson (1998) and Jussi Suikkanen (2010). Jackson argues, against the non-
naturalist, that commitment to supervenience restrictions forces the non-naturalist to admit 
                                                             
10 The non-cogntivist can claim that the properties that we find are correlated with our judgements are 
the ones which we humans, as a matter of empirical fact, tend to disapprove or approve of. The error 
theorist too will happily admit the relevant natural properties to their ontology, but claim that thinking 
of these as moral cannot be sustained. 
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that it is in principle possible to generate a disjunctive description of all right (for example) 
acts. Then we can refer to the property using the predicate „being D1, or D2, or D3, or... Dn‟ 
(where D1-n are completely naturalistic descriptions of right acts). This conjunctive property 
will also be naturalistic. So, „being right‟ and „being D1, or D2, or D3, or... Dn‟ will refer to 
the same set of acts. Jackson claims that, for a number of reasons, we cannot have 
necessarily co-instantiated properties. This means that there is only (at most) one property 
for „being right‟ and „being D1, or D2, or D3, or... Dn‟ to refer to. As the second predicate is, 
by hypothesis, naturalistic, there isn‟t space for there to be an additional non-natural 
property of rightness.  
 
The non-naturalist can reply that there are cases where we seem to have necessarily co-
instantiated distinct properties (e.g. the property of God willing it be light, and the property 
of it being light – given God‟s omnipotence he can‟t will it to be light without it being light, 
but these are not (presumably) the very same property. See Philip Goff‟s (2007)). However, 
Jackson‟s worries about permitting necessarily co-instantiated properties11 are still in play, 
so the non-naturalist that takes this line needs to find a way of distinguishing between cases 
where we have two predicates designating the same property, and those where (like, they 
suppose, the case of rightness) where two necessarily co-extensive predicates designate 
distinct properties. 
 
                                                             
11 Basically centring around being unable to come to a determinate answer of how many properties are 
instantiated at any time if there can be a distinct property for each predicate that truly applies – we can 
gerrymander up many predicates that truly apply, but suspect that not all of them are distinct, and if we 
give up the ban on necessarily co-instantiated properties we need a new way of counting the properties. 
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This prompts Suikkanen to undertake an investigation of how and when the non-naturalist 
can distinguish necessarily co-extensive properties, and offers other reasons to conclude 
that Jackson is begging the question against the naturalist. I wish to claim here that Jackson 
attempts, in effect, a shortcut version of the strategy I am pursuing here. Instead of claiming 
that „rightness‟ and „being D1, or D2, or D3, or... Dn‟, because necessarily coinstantiated, 
must be the same property I merely claim that if „being right‟ is coinstantiated with some 
naturalistic predicate or suitably short disjunctive naturalistic predicate then this is prima 
facie (absent further argument) evidence that being right just is that naturalistic property. 
Thus, I hope to offer a weaker (and hence more plausible) argument that shares something 
in common with the Jackson strategy. What I think this reveals is that Hussain and Shah‟s 
complaint is off-beam. Suikkanen does not respond to Jackson merely by adverting to the 
difference between good-making features and what constitutes goodness. Instead he 
undertakes a sustained investigation of when the non-naturalist is licensed to distinguish 
between necessarily co-instantiated properties.  
 
Sure enough, the non-naturalist may be able to make use of this distinction, but Jackson‟s 
argument puts some pressure on the ease with which they can do this. Suikkanen responds 
by trying to show where the non-naturalist has the right to this distinction, thus rendering 
Jackson‟s objection inert. I am calling attention to the fact that although Suikkanen‟s 
response to Jackson is fair enough, it does not completely close off the strategy I‟m 
advancing here – where correlations between naturalistic properties and moral properties 
are taken as prima facie evidence in favour of their identification. Furthermore, the debate 
between Jackson and Suikkanen makes no sense if Hussain and Shah are right – the non-
naturalist does not have to bother showing that they are entitled to the distinction between 
the necessarily coinstantiated properties they posit, they can instead merely state it as a bald 
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assertion. I think this is more evidence that Hussain and Shah‟s assault on Korsgaard is 
misplaced.  
 
If this is right, then the distinctions that Hussain and Shah use to undermine Korsgaard‟s 
argument against moral realism are not robust enough to bear the weight required. They 
need to provide us with some positive reason to think that the ability of a metaethical theory 
to provide resources capable of meeting standards of justificatory adequacy is an unsuitable 
criterion. At present, there seems to be a case for claiming that providing resources that 
offer justificatory adequacy is an important test of a metaethical theory‟s viability. If 
Korsgaard is right about the inability of moral realism to deal with the normative question, 
that appears, at this stage, to be a mark against moral realism, absent any further 
argumentation about the relevance or otherwise of the normative question. 
 
In summary, we have been attempting to get a grip on what Korsgaard‟s normative question 
is, what it is asking for, and what consequences follow if we start to take it seriously. 
Korsgaard claims that moral realism cannot take the normative question seriously and that 
gives us reason to abandon moral realism (where moral realism is construed as substantive 
rather than merely procedural). I have attempted to rebut an argument to the effect that 
Korsgaard‟s question is confused. In the next chapter we will move on to seeing how the 
moral realist can respond to Korsgaard‟s challenge, beginning with what happens to the 
normative question if we clear up issues to do with moral motivation.  
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CHAPTER TWO: INTERNALISM 
 
As we have seen, Korsgaard‟s normative question presents some kind of problem for moral 
realism, one that cannot be resisted through pointing to the distinction between normative 
ethics and metaethics. However, neither have we seen that the normative question cannot be 
answered by the moral realist – simply that providing such an answer could be a criterion of 
adequacy for a metaethical theory. Also, it is not yet clear precisely what the normative 
question is asking for and what an adequate answer to it would look like. This chapter 
investigates whether Korsgaard‟s concerns are grounded in the motivational effects that 
moral judgements are typically felt to have, and in the next chapter we will look at how the 
moral realist can best respond if these are genuinely the neo-Kantians concerns. An 
alternative way of reading Korsgaard is to see her as offering the generalised anti-
voluntarist argument identified by Mark Schroeder. I will explain this argument and how it 
relates to Korsgaard‟s work, before seeing how the moral realist can respond. I will be 
attempting to force a dilemma on the neo-Kantian constructivist: either their concerns are 
rooted in the motivational effects of moral judgements (in which case the moral realisms 
canvassed in the next chapter provide a viable response to those concerns) or they are 
getting at the generalised anti-voluntarist, an argument to which the moral realist and neo-
Kantian constructivist are equally vulnerable, and to which the moral realist has a response.  
 
Here, I will first illustrate some connections between Korsgaard‟s concerns and issues to do 
with the motivational force of moral judgements. She claims that her normative question 
explains the force of Moore‟s open question argument and Mackie‟s argument from 
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queerness – two arguments where we can give an interpretation in terms of motivational 
force. 
 
  
2.1 The Normative Question: Moore, Mackie and Internalism  
 
We saw above how Korsgaard thinks that the normative question causes trouble for the 
moral realist. When we ask the realist „why should I be moral?‟ they cite the existence of a 
moral fact, a fact that some action or another is intrinsically obligatory. This fact is not 
suitable for answering the normative question, however, so the realists answer to the 
normative question fails. Because the cited fact is not suitable, and can‟t get a grip on the 
agent asking the normative question in the right kind of way, we need to cite another to 
ground that fact and then we are on the way to some kind of infinite regress.  
 
However, it is not yet entirely clear what the unsuitability of the moral realist‟s moral facts 
consists in. What is it about a moral fact that stops it being an appropriate response to the 
normative question? Here I will suggest that we can offer an interpretation of Korsgaard‟s 
challenge to the realist that makes the problem clearer, and is commensurate with her 
remarks on Moore‟s open question argument and Mackie‟s argument from queerness.  
 
I will begin by laying out the connections Korsgaard believes obtain between the normative 
question and the open question argument (§2.11) and the argument from queerness (§2.12). 
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Then I will offer an outline of judgement internalism (§2.13) and its connection to the open 
question argument (§2.14) and the argument from queerness (§2.15). With these elements in 
place I will be in a position to explore the connection between them and show how the 
moral realist can attempt to escape from Korsgaard‟s argument against them (§2.16).  
 
 
2.11 The Normative Question and Moore‟s Open-Question Argument 
 
Korsgaard contends that the normative question explains the force of both the open question 
argument and the argument from queerness. Turning to the open question argument first: 
Moore (1903) argued that „good‟ could not be synonymous with any naturalistic predicate12, 
for whatever definition you give of „good‟ in naturalistic terms it is always an open question 
whether „good‟ applies to a state of affairs to which that naturalistic  predicate does. 
Therefore, „good‟ cannot be equivalent to any naturalistic predicate as a matter of 
conceptual necessity. Moore can be criticised on a number of grounds – that he begs the 
question against the naturalist, that he presupposes a very austere notion of what conceptual 
analysis can achieve, and that the argument can be avoided by moving away from 
definitional naturalism to synthetic naturalism (see Miller 2003, 15-18 for a good 
discussion). However, Korsgaard argues that his argument has some merit, and what merit 
it does have it acquires from the force of the normative question. 
 
                                                             
12 Moore also argues that the argument works for ‘metaphysical’ predicates. Here he has in mind 
supernatural theories that link morality to God’s commands.  
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Moore argues from a particular datum, that the question „Is this action, which falls under the 
naturalistic predicate N13, really right?‟ is open. That is, sincerely asking the question does 
not betray any conceptual confusion. Compare this question to the similar one in the case of 
a potentially analytic truth: „Is this man, who is an unmarried eligible male, really a 
bachelor?‟ in that case, if any, competence with the terms involved suffices to provide an 
answer, and if you sincerely asked the question that would betray some conceptual 
confusion on your part. Moore then goes on to derive a metaphysical conclusion from this 
evidence against conceptual connections between moral and naturalistic terms (that 
goodness is a non-natural property). Korsgaard agrees that the question „Is this action, 
which falls under the naturalistic predicate N, really right?‟ appears to be open. However, 
she argues that the openness of this question is not due to the lack of a conceptual 
connection between rightness and the naturalistic analysis. Even if such a connection held, 
the open question would still appear open. This is because when we ask the open question 
what gives the appearance of openness is not the openness of that question, but the 
openness of a nearby question with which it is confused. 
 
 
This question is „Is this action, which is right, really obligatory?‟. This is, in effect the 
normative question. Although Korsgaard is never explicit on this, she must be thinking that 
when we ask the normative question we are making something like the mistake she 
attributes to Prichard. What we are doubting, in asking the question, is whether the action in 
question is really obligatory. Like Prichard, we confuse „being right‟ with „being really 
obligatory‟, and thus express our question by asking whether the action in question is really 
right. But this is not what we are interested in – instead, we are interested in whether I 
                                                             
13
 Where N is the naturalist’s analysis of rightness.  
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should choose to perform right actions, in whether they are normatively binding for us. In a 
way, Korsgaard is arguing that Moore‟s diagnosis of the normative question is superficial – 
it doesn‟t get at what is really driving our scepticism over whether the action in question is 
to be performed. 
 
 
Were the normative question closed we could still get into a dispute over the question: „is 
this action, which is N, really good?‟ However, it would be because we were arguing about 
whether we have the right definition of „good‟, not over whether such a definition is 
possible: so I suggest a naturalistic definition and you disagree about that particular 
proposal – perhaps you think another naturalistic definition is right, or that we should adopt 
some kind of supernatural definition (perhaps that „good‟ means „commanded by God‟). 
However, what you would not suggest is that we give up on the whole enterprise (at least 
not for the reasons Moore thinks we should: we might still think that „good‟ was 
unanalysable, but for different reasons – perhaps because we don‟t think there are any 
general principles linking moral facts to natural facts.14 
 
 
It is the lack of attention to the relationship between the normative question and the 
question in the open question argument that leads Moore to his non-naturalism, where 
goodness is a simple, indefinable, sui generis non-natural property:  
 
                                                             
14
 See Dancy (2000, 2004 and 2006) for something like this position, and Jackson, Pettit and Smith (2000) 
and McKeever and Ridge (2004) for replies on this point).  
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Moore argued that no matter what analysis we give of „good‟, it is an open question 
whether the objects picked out by that analysis are good. And he concluded that 
„good‟ must therefore be unanalyzable, and further that therefore we can only know 
which things are good through intuition. But the force of the open question 
argument clearly comes from the pressure of the normative question. That is, when 
the concept of the good is applied to a natural object, such as pleasure, we can still 
always ask whether we should really choose or pursue it. This should not lead us to 
conclude that the concept of the good, or any other normative concept, cannot be 
defined in a way that guides its application. Conflation of the normative question 
with other questions is what drives Moore and others to the view that moral 
concepts must be simple and indefinable, and as a result to intuitionism. (Korsgaard, 
1996 43). 
 
If Moore had realised what the open question was trying to get at – the normative question – 
he would realise that it is not naturalism that is faulty, but moral realism more generally. 
There is the problem of explaining the normative force of our obligations, and citing moral 
facts to ground those obligations doesn‟t help – whether the facts in question are natural or 
non-natural.  
 
 
 
2.12 The Normative Question and Mackie‟s Argument from Queerness 
 
 
John L. Mackie (1977) advances an error theory of moral judgements (that is, a theory that 
claims that all positive, atomic moral judgements are systematically false) via two claims: 
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one conceptual and one metaphysical. The first, conceptual claim, is that moral discourse is 
cognitive – moral judgements express beliefs which are about the instantiation of moral 
properties. However if such moral properties existed they would be metaphysically „queer‟. 
Mackie‟s metaphysical claim is that no such entities exist. So, we have an area of discourse 
that is in the business of expressing beliefs about the instantiation of a type of property that 
does not exist. Therefore the discourse is radically in error, and all positive, atomic moral 
judgements are false.  
 
 
But what does the queerness of moral properties consist in? What makes them so outlandish 
that we know that they cannot exist? Mackie claims that moral properties, if there were such 
things, would have to have built in „to-be-pursued-ness‟ or „not-to-be-done-ness‟. Some 
kind of magnetic force that pulls creatures like ourselves towards and away from objects 
and actions that instantiate them. Such features of a property cannot be made to fit into a 
naturalistic conception of the world, Mackie argues, so if we are serious about naturalism 
we must abandon our commitment to them and accept an error theory.  
 
 
Korsgaard argues that the point Mackie makes is a real one, but not the one he intends to 
make. The realist, in answering sceptical challenges has to build intrinsic obligation15 into 
the fabric of the world. However, this is inadequate as: 
 
                                                             
15
 Korsgaard’s analogue of Mackie’s ‘to-be-pursued-ness’ and ‘not-to-be-doneness’ 
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If someone falls into doubt about whether obligations really exist, it doesn‟t help to 
say „ah, but indeed they do. They are real things‟. Just now he doesn‟t see it, and 
herein lies his problem.  (Korsgaard, 1996 38). 
 
The realist way of responding to the sceptic who doubts whether anything is obligatory 
doesn‟t really engage with their worry at all. It is of no help to tell them that obligation is a 
real part of the world. So Mackie is right to note that there is something wrong with trying 
to build obligation into the world. He thinks that doing so would add something 
irredeemably weird to our ontology, and is not worth the cost. However, if Korsgaard is 
right, then the real point that the argument from queerness gets to is the inadequacy of 
trying to build morality into the world at all. It wouldn‟t help us with what we need an 
account of obligation to do – placate someone who has fallen into doubt over whether the 
requirements of morality are obligatory.  
 
If Korsgaard is right, then Mackie‟s problem would remain even if moral properties did not 
have to be so metaphysically queer. John McDowell (1998) argues that secondary qualities 
have something like the „magnetic‟ element Mackie finds objectionable in moral properties 
– redness has „to-be-seen-as-red-ness‟ built into it, for example. Using this comparison you 
can try to develop a companions in guilt style defence of moral properties16: moral 
properties would be no more weird than properties that you already believe exist (e.g. 
redness), so unless you drop your commitment to the existence of those properties you 
already believe in, you have no reason to think that moral properties don‟t exist. If this 
                                                             
16 For a fuller explanation of companions in guilt strategies and their application to the moral domain 
see Lillehammer 2007.  
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method did work17 then we would have shown that moral properties did not have to be any 
more queer than more metaphysically hygienic properties like redness18. However, 
Korsgaard must claim, even if we managed this manoeuvre, we still wouldn‟t have solved 
the problem Mackie is getting at – what is wrong with building morality into the fabric of 
the world is not what it would look like if we got there, but the fact that such an attempt is 
redundant, it doesn‟t help us at all.  
 
So, we have seen that Korsgaard thinks that the open-question argument and Mackie‟s 
argument from queerness both gain any force they have from the force of the normative 
question. I will suggest that there is one way to interpret Korsgaard‟s argument against 
realism that makes sense of all these claims (although we will see that it is an interpretation 
that Korsgaard would not accept – my aim is not to produce something Korsgaard would 
agree with whole-heartedly, rather merely a way of taking her complaint that could appeal 
to people who feel there is something in what Korsgaard says, but do not want to follow her 
all the way to the rejection of realism). All three arguments (Korsgaard‟s argument from the 
normative question, the open question argument and the argument from queerness) could be 
intimately tied up with the stance we take on the link between moral judgement and 
motivation. In the next section I will outline one stance that could underlie all three 
complaints – judgement internalism. I will then draw the connections between that stance 
and the three arguments before showing how a realist can start to respond to all three 
arguments. 
 
 
                                                             
17 I take no stand on whether it does here – instead I am concerned with what would follow for Mackie’s 
problem if it did and Korsgaard was right about what Mackie’s problem really reveals.  
18
 Of course, you still might think there is something queer about redness. 
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2.13 Judgement Internalism 
 
 
Judgement internalists about motivation claim that there is a conceptual (or internal) 
connection between making a moral judgement and being motivated to act in accord with 
that judgement.19 That is, it is conceptually impossible for an agent to make a moral 
judgement (say that something is good) without being appropriately motivated (in the case 
of goodness, towards obtaining that good thing). As Michael Smith puts it: “believing I 
should seems to bring with it my being motivated to” (Smith 1994, 60, emphasis in 
original). The internalist places great emphasis on the action-guiding nature of moral 
judgement – to be a moral judgement at all, it seems, a judgement must have practical 
import. 
 
                                                             
19 Many types of internal connections have been proposed. The main division is between internalism 
about motivation, and internalism about reasons for action. I will be focussing on the former type. In 
addition, some internalists defend a connection between something other than moral judgements and 
motivation. Belief internalism claims there is a conceptual connection between moral belief and 
motivation (see Stratton-Lake 1997). Existence internalism posits a connection between the existence of 
a moral obligation and motivation (see Brink, 1989). Hybrid internalism claims the connection is 
between the recognition of a genuine obligation and motivation. I avoid discussing these distinctions 
between internalism, and instead focus on the more schematic ‘judgement’ for five reasons. 1. Some of 
these internalisms are prejudicial against some metaethical views – you cannot be a non-cognitivist and 
a belief internalist, for example. As I wish to use judgement internalism when it comes to discussing 
non-cognitivism and hybrid metaethical views (views which incorporate elements of cognitivism and 
non-cognitivism) in chapter 4 it is better to stick with the more agnostic judgement formulation. 2. 
Existence internalism is prima facie implausible – it seems hard to see how the mere existence of an 
obligation could motivate someone if they were ignorant of the existence of a moral obligation. 3. 
Hybrid-internalism also face a problem with ignorance – it is possible to be motivated by a moral 
judgement, even if you are wrong about what morality requires and thus there is no genuine obligation 
corresponding to the judgement. 4. I will go on to argue that there is a certain type of conceptual 
possibility that militates against all forms of internalism, so the details of what type of thing is linked to 
motivation (judgement, beliefs, moral obligations or the recognition of a genuine obligation) is not 
important here, and so it is better to lay the groundwork using the metaethically neutral judgement 
formulation. 5. Giving serious space to these different types of internalism would give us an 
unmanageably large taxonomy of internalisms and if the details can be passed over safely, then we 
should do so.   
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Internalism comes in varying degrees of strength. Strong internalists claim that moral 
judgements provide over-riding motivation. Weak internalists claim that moral judgements 
merely provide some motivation, that can be over-ridden by other (prudential, aesthetic, etc) 
concerns. For the weak internalist there is no problem acknowledging that people can fail to 
act in accord with their moral judgements when they have other motivations which over 
power the motivation brought by the moral judgement. In this sort of case, the strong 
internalist would have to claim that the agent never made a genuine moral judgement at all. 
Weak internalism is thus easier to defend. What I shall have to say in this thesis will apply 
equally well to both types of internalism, so when I use the term „internalism‟ I will mean 
the weaker, more prima facie plausible claim.  
 
 
We also need to get clear on the scope of the internalist claim. Smith admits that agents can 
fail to be motivated by their judgements under certain circumstances – if they are suffering 
from weakness of will or “other similar forms of practical unreason” (61). The connection 
between judgement and motivation he advances is a defeasible one – it can fail when we are 
in the grip of some factor that threatens our practical rationality. In light of this Smith offers 
the following, which he labels the practicality requirement:  
PRAC: If an agent judges that it is right for her to φ in circumstances C, then either 
she is motivated to φ in C or she is practically irrational.20 
                                                             
20 One issue I do not have space to get into is how the internalist should characterise this practical 
irrationality clause. They must say something substantive, or we will be worried that the PRAC ends up 
being trivial – simply stating that people will be motivated by their moral judgements unless something 
stops them being motivated by their moral judgements. However, when internalists like Korsgaard and 
Smith do give a substantive characterisation of conditions that threaten practical rationality they merely 
gesture towards conditions like depression and great anxiety. This, arguably, fails to engage at all with 
the relevant philosophy of psychology literature (see, for example, Levy 2011).  
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This seems more plausible than claiming that the link between moral judgement and 
motivation is indefeasible – it allows for the possibility of an agent making a genuine moral 
judgement without feeling the typically associated motivation. Thus I will be mainly 
directing my efforts at the defeasible version of internalism.  
 
Nevertheless, PRAC is a strong claim. The internalist holds that this is not merely a 
contingent matter of fact about typical human psychology (the claim is not that as a matter 
of empirical fact the motivational states of practically rational human agents are in line with 
their moral judgements). Instead it is a claim of conceptual necessity – it is conceptually 
impossible to make a moral judgement without being motivated to act in accordance with 
that judgement (absent any practical irrationality).  
 
The externalist simply denies the internalist‟s claim. They believe that one can make a 
moral judgement, fail to be motivated by that judgement, and such a case would not 
(necessarily) be a mark of practical irrationality. They admit the existence of two sorts of 
conceptual possibility that the internalist cannot. First, an amoralist: an agent that makes a 
genuine moral judgement without feeling any motivation to act in accordance with that 
judgement, where that judgement does not betray any practical irrationality. Second, the 
internalist also makes a claim about the direction of the associated motivation, and not just 
its mere existence. So it is not possible to judge that something is evil, say, and find that that 
gives you motivation to pursue it. Thus the internalist cannot accept the conceptual 
possibility of an immoralist, or an agent we could call (following Richard Joyce, 2001) 
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„pure evil‟21. The immoralist makes genuine moral judgements, which provide them with 
motivation to act in a contrary way to typical moral agents (they pursue evil and avoid 
good), where these judgements do not betray any practical irrationality. Denying the 
coherence of these conceptual possibilities is bold22, but it is something that the internalist is 
committed too.  
But what does this have to do with the open-question argument?  
 
 
 
2.14 Internalism and the Open Question Argument 
 
 
Recall that Moore argues that we cannot give a naturalist account of moral properties (that 
is, an account that identifies moral properties with natural properties, however we construe 
„natural‟ properties) due to the force of the open question argument. What ever naturalistic 
analysis we give of goodness, it‟s always possible to doubt that analysis, and falling into 
such doubt does not betray any conceptual confusion. Thus goodness must be a non-natural 
property. 
 
                                                             
21 You might suspect that this possibility is ruled out by the fact that for an internalist a moral agent has 
to be motivated to act in accordance with their moral judgements, and Joyce’s satanic character does 
not do that. However, Joyce could say that his agent of pure evil does act in accord with his moral 
judgement – he responds with the right direction of motivation for his view on the world. Whether or 
not the agent of pure evil is distinct from the amoralist will not matter here. 
22 They look, prima facie, like quite plausible conceptual claims – even if we thought that facts about 
human psychology meant that there never actually are any amoralists or immoralists 
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Now the problems with this argument are legendary – chief among which is the move from 
showing that no definition of goodness in terms of natural properties can be right, to 
claiming that goodness cannot be some natural property, or collection of natural properties. 
If we thought, with Moore, that in order for a proposition to be necessary it also had to be a 
priori and analytic then this move would be licensed. However, the philosophical history of 
the twentieth century has taught us that we need to treat these three notions (a priority, 
necessity, analyticity) with care, and they may not exhibit the close connection Moore needs 
for his argument to work.23 
 
If we leave this aside it does seem that Moore was on to something even though he 
exaggerates the force of his argument. Contemporary meta-ethicists have claimed that 
Moore gives us something like an argument structure, which needs to be filled in with some 
detail. James Lenman (2006) suggests that “naturalistic understandings of moral concepts 
do indeed omit something central to them” (1). So, there is something wrong with a 
naturalistic account of moral properties, but as of yet Moore hasn‟t told us what this is. 
Stephen Darwall, Alan Gibbard and Peter Railton (1992) suggest that the missing ingredient 
is judgement internalism. With this in mind, they offer a revised open question argument 
which can be represented like so:  
(1) There is a conceptual or internal link between making a moral judgement and 
being motivated, ceteris paribus, to act as that judgement prescribes [judgement 
internalism]. Absent some weakness of will or other psychological affliction, 
judging that a type of action is morally good entails being motivated to perform 
                                                             
23
 For a survey of other problems with Moore’s argument see Miller (2003) ch. 2; for a detailed 
explanation of how Moore’s historical position blinded him to the deficiencies of his argument see 
Soames (2003). 
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actions of that type. Someone with no psychological afflictions etc who 
apparently judges that a type of action is morally good but consistently claims 
that he has no motivation to perform actions of that type doesn‟t grasp the 
concept of moral goodness.  
(2) Competent and reflective speakers of English are convinced that they are able to 
imagine clear-headed (and otherwise psychologically healthy) beings who judge 
that R (some naturalistic property) obtains but who fail to find appropriate 
reason or motive to act in accordance with that judgment. 
(3) If there were no conceptual link between judging that R obtains and being 
motivated to act accordingly, we would expect competent and reflective 
speakers of English to have the conviction described in 2. 
(4) So, unless there is some other explanation of the conviction described in 2, we 
are entitled to conclude that there is no conceptual link between judging that R 
obtains and being motivated to act accordingly.  
(5) So, unless there is some other explanation of the conviction described in 2, we 
are entitled to conclude that the judgement that R obtains isn‟t a moral 
judgement.  
(6) So, unless there is some other explanation of the conviction mentioned in 2, we 
are entitled to conclude that the property of being morally good is not identical 
or reducible to the property of being R as a matter of conceptual necessity. 
(adapted from Miller, 2003) 
 
This revised open-question argument has some attractive features. First, it gives us the 
missing ingredient in Moore‟s argument (judgement internalism); second, it is less strong 
than Moore‟s argument, in a favourable way – the argument does not definitively establish 
that naturalism is false, it just sets out what the naturalist would have to do to defend their 
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position (find another explanation of the conviction mentioned in 2); third it has long been 
suspected that Moore‟s own meta-ethical position falls prey to his argument, and we can see 
why using the revised argument – substituting „sui generis, indefinable, non-natural 
property Q‟ for „naturalistic property R‟ seems to make not a jot of difference to the 
argument.  
 
This third feature is particularly germane for attempting to generate an interpretation of 
Korsgaard‟s rejection of realism where it is underwritten by a commitment to judgement 
internalism. Korsgaard intends her own argument to have force against both naturalist and 
non-naturalist moral realism, and that is precisely what the revised open question argument 
offers us. Now we can turn to the connection between Mackie‟s argument from queerness 
and judgement internalism. 
 
 
 
2.15 Internalism and the Argument from Queerness 
 
 
We saw that Mackie thinks that we should embrace an error theory about moral judgements 
because moral properties would have to be untameably queer. But we can ask Mackie, what 
is so queer about them? After all, don‟t coloured objects have a „to-be-seen-as-coloured-
ness‟ built into them? Well, one reason to think that the kind of obligation the realist 
supposes is contained in the fabric of the world would be queer is if it were intrinsically 
motivating – just perceiving that it is there would be enough to motivate you to act in 
accordance with its prescriptions. And this does appear rather odd – how can merely 
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believing that some state of affairs obtains, by itself, move you to action? But, why should 
we accept this picture of what moral properties are like? It seems as if such a picture is 
motivated by some sort of commitment to judgement internalism. If we decide to rid 
ourselves of this commitment, then it starts to look like moral properties could be the 
perfectly ordinary, everyday properties the naturalist realist claims they are. Thus, by 
embracing externalism, we can generate a decent response to Mackie‟s argument from 
queerness, whilst retaining our realist leanings (if we have them).24  
 
 
In fact, we do not have to speculate about whether Mackie intends the queerness of the „to-
be-pursued-ness‟ of moral properties to consist in their motivational import. Richard Joyce 
(2001) has recently argued for an error theory using precisely this strategy. His first move is 
to show that moral discourse is committed to judgement internalism, then show how this 
would make moral properties irredeemably queer, forcing us to reject their existence and 
accept an error theory. However, as should be plain, this move only works if we are 
compelled to accept judgement internalism. 
 
 
Now we have the elements in place to connect up judgement internalism, the argument from 
queerness, the open question argument and Korsgaard‟s normative question.  
 
 
                                                             
24
 Another way to gloss Mackie’s objection is that he objects to the contention that the instantiation of 
moral properties can generate categorical reasons for actions (a thesis called ‘rationalism’). However, 
we can then ask ‘what’s so queer about categorical reasons for action?’. One plausible answer to this is 
that, given a form or reasons internalism, categorical reasons necessitate a particular motivational 
effect. In other words, if we accept a form of reasons internalism then rationalism entails judgement 
internalism, which is in turn problematic for the reasons outlined above.  
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2.16 The Normative Question, Internalism, the Argument from Queerness and the Open-
Question argument 
 
We have seen above that the argument from queerness and the open question argument may 
depend upon judgement internalism to get their force. The argument from queerness relies 
upon judgement internalism either directly (if we follow Richard Joyce‟s reading of the 
argument) or indirectly if we think that it is rationalism causing moral realism problems. 
The revised open-question argument solves some of the problems of its unrevised ancestor 
– we do not end up begging the question against the naturalist, instead we point to a feature 
of morality that requires explanation: the conviction that clear-headed, competent speakers 
have that the open question really is open. But this revised argument crucially depends upon 
judgement internalism. Both arguments share a feature in common – they point to some 
aspect of moral discourse which is deeply connected with motivation, and claim that moral 
realism does not have the resources to explain that feature of moral discourse. The moral 
facts required to explain the motivational force of moral judgements would be too queer 
(according to the subscriber to the argument from queerness) or we could imagine a 
competent judge making the judgement without feeling the appropriate motivation (move 2 
in the revised open-question argument). 
 
We have also seen how Korsgaard thinks that the force of the open question argument and 
the argument from queerness depend upon the force of the normative question. So we have 
two arguments that plausibly are given their force by judgement internalism. Korsgaard 
thinks that what gives them both their force is the normative question. However, what it is 
precisely that the normative question is asking for is fairly unclear. We are looking for an 
interpretation of it that will allow us to get a better grasp on Korsgaard‟s problem with 
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realism. My suggestion is that the normative question gets its force from judgement 
internalism.  
 
The assimilation is easiest to see if we compare Korsgaard‟s normative sceptic to an 
amoralist. Korsgaard‟s normative sceptic is the agent who asks „why should I be moral?‟ in 
general, and „but why should I do that?‟ of any act they judge to be a moral duty in 
particular. The normative question is asking us to provide a response to that kind of 
question, asked by someone who has fallen into doubt about the demands of morality. The 
amoralist is an agent who makes a genuine moral judgement but fails to feel motivated to 
act in accord with that judgement.  
 
We can see the similarity between the two cases if we consider how the internalist moral 
realist responds to both cases - the normative sceptic and the amoralist - starting with the 
latter. The internalist does not concede that an amoralist is a genuine conceptual possibility. 
The agent who lacks motivation cannot be making a genuine moral judgement. Once 
someone makes a moral judgement, in effect, there is no more work to be done in 
explaining why they will be motivated to act in accordance with that judgement – that they 
are follows by conceptual necessity. Now, the normative sceptic, as presented by 
Korsgaard, is an agent that appears to make a genuine moral judgement, but then asks why 
they should act in accord with that judgement in particular, or with moral judgements in 
general. The internalist moral realist, it seems, will treat this kind of question in the same 
way as they treat the putative amoralist – by stonewalling it. Once you have made a moral 
judgement, the internalist moral realist will say, you will have the appropriate motivation as 
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a matter of conceptual necessity, so what are you asking for? You‟ve made the right 
judgement, and you want to do what the judgement prescribes, so what‟s the big deal? 
 
To someone who takes the possibility of normative scepticism seriously this manoeuvre 
will look altogether too quick. We find ourselves faced with a real problem, it seems – if the 
normative question has any force, and yet the realist simply ignores it. The best they can do 
is restate the normative fact that obtains in any particular case. Now it looks like 
Korsgaard‟s charge against the realist – that they simply ignore the normative question – is 
vindicated. Of course, it is open to the realist to claim that they ignore this kind of question 
for good reason – that their conceptual claim is true. But if you start from the opposite 
direction – by acknowledging the force of the normative question – you could instead doubt 
whether the internalist moral realist‟s conceptual claim is true, or whether they have the 
resources at their disposal to underwrite it: whether citing another fact to the amoralist will 
get them to see that that fact has practical significance. 
 
This manoeuvre – of responding to both the normative sceptic and the amoralist by 
repeating the internalist‟s conceptual claim – will look equally inadequate to someone 
convinced of the genuine conceptual possibility of an amoralist. Far from retreating from 
the claim that an amoralist is possible when told the internalist‟s conceptual claim, instead 
they will simply doubt the truth of that claim.  
 
So then, the case of the amoralist and the normative sceptic share some features – the 
internalist moral realist responds to both by adverting to their claim that there is a 
conceptual connection between moral judgement and motivation to act. This means that the 
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case of the amoralist is not a genuine possibility, and that the normative sceptic can be 
answered by simply resupplying them with the relevant moral fact – if they come to judge 
matters aright, they will see the pointlessness of their question. It looks, then, that what 
grounds the internalist moral realist‟s dismissive treatment of the normative question and 
the sceptic who asks it is the same thing that grounds their dismissive treatment of the 
conceptual possibility of amoralism – judgement internalism.  
 
Two points need to be stressed here – although there are parallels between the realist‟s 
treatment of amoralism and normative scepticism, such that it‟s reasonable to diagnose 
these treatments as reflecting their commitment to internalism, what Korsgaard thinks is 
wrong with this realist treatment is slightly different to what the externalist thinks is wrong. 
I said above that taking the normative question seriously could lead you to make one of two 
moves against the internalist moral realist: either you could question the internalist‟s 
conceptual claim; or you could argue that moral realism doesn‟t have the resources 
available to underwrite that claim. The externalist concerned with amoralism takes the first 
option – they take the possibility of amoralism to militate against the internalist‟s 
conceptual claim. Korsgaard, on the other hand, would have to take the second option – it‟s 
not that internalism is false, it‟s that moral facts aren‟t suitable materials for explaining the 
intimate connection between moral judgement and the will.  
 
In this, Korsgaard‟s normative question again parallels the argument from queerness and the 
revised open-question argument. The argument from queerness and the revised open 
question argument are not, as they stand, arguments against the internalist‟s conceptual 
claim – instead they argue that moral realism cannot explain that claim. The only resources 
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moral realists have available to explain the motivational force of moral judgement are moral 
facts and the instantiation of those facts. If what I am saying here is right then the normative 
question, the argument from queerness and the open question argument are all ways of 
making the same point – these resources aren‟t adequate. 
 
The second point is that this reading of what Korsgaard‟s normative question is getting at 
may not be one that Korsgaard would share, a point I shall return to at §2.3. However, to 
some extent this may not be too damaging for my case. I started by acknowledging that the 
normative question has some force – it feels live, and seems to require some answer. If the 
interpretation I offer is viable, then we have secured an explanation of these seemings. In a 
way, my diagnosis of what the normative question is getting at is structurally similar to 
Korsgaard‟s diagnosis of what the argument from queerness and the open question 
argument are getting at. Both of these arguments, Korsgaard contends, are making a point. 
However, what underwrites the point they are getting at is the force of the normative 
question, and not what the authors concerned thought was involved. So, we have an 
explanation of why the argument from queerness and the open question argument look 
compelling – they are getting at something important, in a roundabout way. What I am 
advising is that we extend this sort of story to Korsgaard‟s normative question – it is getting 
at something important, but it is not really clear what that is supposed to be. If we read it as 
concerning the ability of moral realism to account for judgement internalism, then we have 
an explanation of why the normative question looks compelling. So, although this line of 
reasoning may not be welcome to Korsgaard herself, I hope readers of Korsgaard who 
initially find her normative question compelling might consider this interpretation 
illuminating.  
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We can now present my interpretation of Korsgaard‟s argument against moral realism, from 
the normative question, (very schematically) as follows: 
(7) Moral realism is committed to judgement internalism. 
(8) Moral realism does not have the resources to account for judgement 
internalism. 
Therefore:  
(9) Moral realism is false. 
This is very schematic as, if I‟m right above, we could fit any of the argument from 
queerness, the open question argument or Korsgaard‟s argument against realism into this 
framework. The normative question, like the considerations from queerness and the open-
question argument, apply at premise 8.  
 
The important point is that we have gotten clear on what Korsgaard‟s complaint against 
realism might be. This allows us to understand how a moral realist could start to respond. 
They could try to deny premise 8 – perhaps there are some resources available to a moral 
realist that haven‟t been considered. For example, perhaps moral judgements have both 
belief like and desire like components, capable of explaining the judgement internalist‟s 
conceptual claim.25 However, there is a simpler method available to the moral realist – they 
could simply deny premise 7 by claiming that there is no conceptual connection between 
moral judgement and motivation to act.  
 
                                                             
25 Discussion of this possibility and a similar looking proposal called hybrid expressivism are found in 
chapter 4.  
60 
 
Such a move would not be ad hoc. We have already seen that the internalist‟s conceptual 
claim rules out the possibility of an amoralist. This seems implausibly strong. And if we do 
have good reasons to reject judgement internalism then moral realism will be impervious to 
not only Korsgaard‟s argument from the normative question, but also the revised open-
question argument and the argument from queerness. 
 
The picture would look like this – just as the externalist moral realist can accept the genuine 
possibility of amoralism, they can also take the normative question seriously. They can 
accept that the job of  explaining why we should obey the demands of morality is a serious 
one, and attempt to give such an explanation. What they are not forced to do is what 
Korsgaard argues they are – ignore the normative question.  
 
This strategy will only begin to work, however, if externalism is viable. Is there any reason 
to think that moral realism must be committed to internalism? If it were then the strategy 
I‟ve just sketched would be unavailable and, for all I‟ve shown, Korsgaard‟s argument from 
the normative question would have the scope and strength she claims for it. 
 
 
2.2  Internalism vs. Externalism 
 
So we have seen how it would be really great if we could do without internalism – it would 
give the moral realist a strategy against Korsgaard, Moore and Mackie. But can we go one 
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better, and give reasons for thinking we can? We can settle this issue via two routes – are 
there any internal problems with internalism, and are there any compelling reasons to ignore 
the externalist‟s hypothesis?  
 
Michael Smith (1994, 1997) argues against externalism via two steps: first by attempting to 
deflate the worry about the conceptual possibility of an amoralist; and second by arguing 
that the externalist about motivation can only explain why the motivation of a good and 
strong-willed person falls in line with their judgements by turning them into a moral 
fetishist. Responses to Smith have mainly focussed on the second half of this strategy26. In 
the next section I will instead attack the first part of Smith‟s manoeuvre by arguing that the 
amoralist gives us prima facie evidence against judgement internalism, which Smith‟s 
argument does not dispel. Then I will consider his „fetishism‟ argument and how the realist 
should respond, before finally detailing a number of residual problems beyond the 
conceptual possibility of an amoralist for judgement internalism. I hope to show that we 
have no good reason to accept internalism (the fetishism argument fails), and that 
internalism should be rejected. 
 
In section 2.21 I will lay out the case against internalism based on the amoralist (and how it 
has traditionally been responded to). In 2.22 I will outline Smith‟s response to the amoralist 
before showing how he missteps in section 2.23. 
 
 
                                                             
26
 See, for example, Brink (1997), Lillehammer (1997), Miller (1996), Stratton-Lake (1999). 
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2.21 The Amoralist and the Inverted-Commas Response 
 
So we have seen how it would be really great if we could do without internalism. But we 
can go one better than that – there are good reasons to suspect that internalism is false. 
Recall the strength of the internalist‟s claim – it is one of conceptual necessity. It is 
conceptually impossible to make a moral judgement without being motivated to act in 
accordance with that judgement (absent any practical irrationality).  
 
It is at this point that the externalist steps in with their amoralist challenge. Imagine, they 
ask us, a practically rational agent who makes some moral judgement (e.g. that meat-eating 
is wrong) but who feels no motivation to act in accordance with that judgement (they feel 
no pull towards refraining from eating meat – we will call such a person an amoralist). 
Now, you might think that such people do actually exist; but remember the strength of the 
internalist‟s claim – it is one of conceptual necessity. Thus, it is compatible with 
externalism for there never to actually be any amoralists. But, it doesn‟t seem that there is 
anything conceptually impossible about such an agent existing. So, here we have the 
challenge to the internalist‟s thesis. If the amoralist is conceptually possible, then 
internalism is false.  
 
One way of defending internalism against this attack is to claim that when the amoralist 
uses the moral terms that we do they are using them in a different way to us: in some kind 
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of inverted-commas27. So when the amoralist says that some state of affairs is good, they 
don‟t mean the same thing as we do when we say that a state of affairs is good. Instead they 
mean that that state of affairs is “good”, where “good” has a different semantic content to 
„good‟. So, for instance, when the amoralist says that a state of affairs is “good” they might 
mean something like it is „judged to be good by others‟. They are using the same linguistic 
token as us (the symbol „good‟), but it possesses different meaning, depending upon 
whether we are an amoralist or moralist. Under this analysis, it turns out that the amoralist 
isn‟t really making any moral judgements at all, so there is as yet no counterexample to the 
claim that moral judgement conceptually necessitates motivation. By giving this „inverted-
commas‟ account of the amoralist‟s use of (seemingly) moral terms, we can preserve the 
truth of internalism. 
 
Brink (1989) contends that this does not take the amoralist challenge seriously enough, a 
point which I will extend here. We can modify the example a little to one where the 
amoralist distinguishes between what other people judge to be right and wrong, and what 
they think is really right or wrong. The amoralist‟s ability to make this distinction (between 
what others judge to be wrong, and what they think is really right and wrong) gives us 
prima facie evidence that the proposed inverted commas account does not accurately 
capture the content of the amoralist‟s judgements. In fact, we could strengthen Brink‟s case 
even further by imagining an amoralist who has the inverted-commas account explained to 
them, but then rejects that as a description of their own practice. There doesn‟t seem to be 
anything conceptually impossible about these cases and if that is right then the inverted-
commas account fails – we have an amoralist making judgements about what they think is 
                                                             
27 This strategy was first suggested by R.M. Hare (1952) in reply to a possible attack on his claim that all 
moral language had imperative content – those using moral terms without imperative force were really 
only using them within inverted-commas. 
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really right or wrong, but yet feeling no motivation to act in accordance with those 
judgements. It seems as if it is possible to do this with any suggested interpretation of the 
amoralist‟s use of moral terms. If this is correct, then the inverted-commas response to the 
amoralist challenge fails. 
 
 
2.22 Smith‟s Response to the Amoralist Challenge  
 
Smith claims that what these latter amoralist examples are relying upon is the failure of one 
particular account of how the amoralist is using moral terms. The inverted-commas theorist 
offered one possible way in which the amoralist could be failing to make real moral 
judgements – by “good” they mean „judged to be good by other people‟28, for example. It‟s 
making this further analysis of the judgements involved which causes trouble for the 
inverted-commas theorist, as at this point the externalist can point to an amoralist who 
distinguishes between judgements of that particular type, and the judgements they make 
when they use moral terms. What was important about this type of reply to the amoralist 
was the claim that the amoralist is not really making moral judgements at all; the inverted-
commas theorist creates a hostage to fortune when they then go on to try and offer an 
informative account of what exactly it is that the amoralist is doing. Instead, Smith contends 
“the very best we can say about amoralists is that they try to make moral judgements but 
                                                             
28 Another problem with this account is that ‘good’ features in the analysis of the amoralist’s judgement. 
But the amoralist does not grasp the meaning of ‘good’ – they only understand the meaning of ”good”, 
the meaning of which we are attempting to characterise! Smith could fix this problem by making the 
amoralist’s practice more obviously anthropological – the amoralist by “good” means ‘people utter the 
sound *good+ when called upon to make a judgement of the object’s moral status’, or similar.  
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fail.” (1994, 68). To insist that the amoralist is making a genuine moral judgement would be 
to beg the question against the internalist. Smith offers the following comparison to 
demonstrate that this move is not ad hoc. 
 
Imagine, he asks, someone who is blind from birth (and thus incapable of having visual 
experiences) but is able to distinguish between differently coloured objects reliably (perhaps 
the sensitivity of their fingers allows them to discern the different surface-reflectance 
properties involved). This person uses colour terms with the same extension as our colour 
terms – they apply, for example, the predicate „green‟ to the same set of objects as us. Now, 
it appears to be a live issue whether this person is really making colour judgements or not. 
This debate, Smith contends, parallels the one between the internalist and externalist. Here 
it is worth quoting Smith‟s remarks at length: 
One side says that a subject has mastery of colour terms (moral terms), and really 
makes colour judgements (moral judgements), only if, under certain conditions, 
being in the psychological state that we express when we make colour judgements 
(moral judgements) entails having an appropriate visual experience (motivation). 
The other side denies this holding instead that the ability to use a term whose use is 
reliably explained by the relevant properties of objects is enough to credit her with 
mastery of colour terms (moral terms) and the ability really to make colour 
judgements (moral judgements). Having the appropriate visual experience 
(motivation) under appropriate conditions is an entirely contingent, and optional, 
extra The debate is a real one, so how are we to decide who wins? 
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Imagine someone objecting that those who say that the capacity to have certain 
visual experiences is partially constitutive of mastery of colour terms do not take 
„seriously‟ enough the challenge posed by people who can reliable say „Grass is 
green‟. „Fire-engines are red‟, and so on, while yet being completely blind. Suppose 
the objector insists that since blind people can reliably use colour terms in this way, 
it just follows that they have full mastery of colour terms. Would the objection be a 
good one? I do not think so. For the objection simply assumes the conclusion it is 
supposed to be arguing for. It assumes that blind people have mastery of colour 
terms, something that those who think that mastery requires the capacity to have the 
appropriate visual experiences under the appropriate conditions deny. 
 
It seems to me that Brink‟s amoralist challenge is flawed in just this way. He puts a 
prejudicial interpretation on the amoralist‟s reliable use of moral terms. He assumes 
that the amoralist‟s reliable use is evidence of her mastery of those terms; assumes 
that being suitably motivated under the appropriate conditions is not a condition of 
mastery of moral terms. But those who accept the practicality requirement do not 
accept the account of what it is to have mastery of moral terms that makes this 
prejudicial interpretation of the amoralist‟s use of moral terms appropriate. (69-70) 
 
So, the inverted-commas theorist got themselves in trouble when they attempted to tell us 
precisely what it is that the amoralist does when they say that something is „good‟. Instead, 
we should merely claim that they are trying to make a moral judgement and failing. This 
move is not ad hoc, because if the externalist insists that the amoralist is making a genuine 
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moral judgement, that is only because they are putting a prejudicial spin on the amoralist‟s 
use of moral terms. 
 
 
2.23 The Strength of the Amoralist Challenge 
 
This seems to misrepresent the strength of the amoralist challenge. Smith expects us to 
consider the colour case and then conclude that the externalist is giving the amoralist‟s use 
of moral terms a prejudicial interpretation. We are expected, I think, to conclude that the 
amoralist case leaves the two parties all square: the externalist will interpret the amoralist as 
making genuine moral judgements, whereas the internalist will interpret them as failing to 
make genuine moral judgements29. This, though, merely reflects their pre-standing 
commitment to their respective positions. The example itself doesn‟t carry any independent 
weight. To insist that it does refute internalism is to merely presuppose the truth of 
externalism, so will be entirely unconvincing to the internalist.  
 
However, this seems to underestimate the force of the amoralist challenge. This is because 
of Smith‟s admission that the „acolourist‟ (the person using colour terms without having 
visual experiences) can use colour terms with the same facility as a person with normal 
colour vision: “she uses colour terms with the same extension as our colour terms” and “we 
                                                             
29 In parts of his (1994) Smith seems to be suggesting that the considerations he raises not only leave 
the externalist and internalist all square, they in fact favour the internalist. I can see no motivation for 
having this reaction, so I will restrict myself to the weaker, more obviously motivated claim that the 
considerations leave the matter a tie.  
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can even imagine, if we like, that her colour judgements are far more accurate and reliable 
than those made by sighted folk” (p. 69). By analogy the same should go for the amoralist – 
they apply „good‟, „bad‟, „right‟, „wrong‟ etc to the same cases as the moralist (someone 
who makes moral judgements and feels the associated motivation).  
 
Smith thinks that the possibility of this amoralist does nothing to militate against his 
internalist thesis. But, it does seem that the conceptual possibility of such an agent does at 
least give us prima facie evidence that there is something amiss with the internalist‟s main 
claim. It seems reasonable to endorse the following principle: 
If a subject S reliably applies „F‟ to items that fall within its extension then this is 
prima facie evidence that S grasps the concept expressed by „F‟ 
 I suspect it would be possible to mount a good defence of this principle from any particular 
account of what constitutes grasping a concept.30 To allay any fears, let me stress the 
weakness of the claim. The principle does not claim that speakers‟ use of terms are our 
only, or even our best evidence for whether or not their use of those terms is in part 
explained by their grasping a particular concept. All it claims is that, absent any 
confounding variables, if someone can reliably use a term (that is, apply it with regularity to 
the items that actually do fall under its extension) then this gives us some evidence that they 
grasp the concept that the term expresses. In effect, I am simply claiming that ascribing 
conceptual competence to the amoralist is the best explanation of their linguistic practice.  
                                                             
30
 For example, on a Fregean way of doing things the concept F will be a sense which determines an 
extension. Then, if a speaker applies a term to the same objects as are within the extension of that 
sense then this indicates that they have grasped some sense that determines that their use of the term 
applies to those objects. As this sense determines that the exact same objects fall under its extension as 
the genuine sense of ‘good’ then we have good grounds to conclude that they are identical, and the 
amoralist does really grasp the meaning of ‘good’.  
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But of course this principle is explicitly defeasible – reliable use of a term only gives us 
prima facie evidence of concept possession. One way to defeat the evidence the reliable use 
of a term gives us is to tell some sort of story about how S is applying the term accurately 
(this would be to try to offer a better explanation than the one that cites the amoralist‟s 
conceptual competence). Consider the colour case again. In the analogy as Smith sets it out 
we are told what it is that the acolourist is doing when they are making a seemingly 
standard colour judgement (they are using their tactual sensitivity to pick out the surface-
reflectance properties of objects). It is this alternative story that increases the plausibility of 
the analogue of the internalist‟s claim in the colour case. Absent this story about what the 
acolourist (or amoralist) is actually doing it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
possibility of an amoralist, who applies moral terms with the same facility as a moralist, 
gives us some evidence against the plausibility of the internalist‟s position.  
 
I am not claiming that the case of the amoralist definitively proves the falsity of internalism, 
instead I am advancing a weaker claim. If the internalist wants to agree with the externalist 
that you can have an agent who applies moral terms to the same class of things as a moralist 
but who lacks any motivation to act in accord with those judgements, then it seems as if 
they have already given too much ground. The existence of such an agent would give some 
grounds for doubting the internalist claim. It would be different if the internalist were 
prepared to give us an alternative account of what precisely the amoralist is doing. Then we 
would have an analogue of the explanation given in the colour case. This explanation would 
give us good reason to overturn the prima facie evidence provided by reliable term 
application. However, Smith has explicitly abandoned such a strategy – on the grounds that 
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it creates a hostage to fortune: the externalist can merely retell their amoralist story, 
modified to take into account the internalist‟s suggestion.  
 
So it seems as if the internalist is stuck between the horns of a dilemma. If they give us a 
detailed account of what exactly it is that the amoralist is doing, then they open themselves 
up to a revised amoralist case. If they refrain from offering such an explanation (as Smith is 
keen to do) then their admission that the amoralist can apply moral terms with the same 
facility as a moralist gives us prima facie evidence against the internalist position. Smith‟s 
claim that the externalist begs the question against the internalist by presenting the amoralist 
as a counterexample to the practicality requirement is particularly harsh. You may think that 
the challenge presented by the possibility of amoralism is not particularly strong, but if we 
are not given an explanation of what the amoralist is actually doing, then it seems perfectly 
legitimate for the externalist to use the case in this way. 
 
It seems as if Smith is trying to plot a course between two, irreconcilable, positions. He 
does not want to assign incoherence to the amoralist case too glibly- he is at pains to reject 
the externalist charge that internalism doesn‟t take the amoralist seriously enough. On the 
other hand, he does not want us to take the amoralist (as the externalist presents it) as a 
genuine conceptual possibility. In the end he may simply be forced to insist that the case, as 
set out by the externalist, is simply incoherent. Whether this is an adequate response to the 
externalist is not my main concern here (although I am about to try and assess it in a rather 
sketchy manner). However, it has notably less dialectical force than Smith‟s original 
positioning of the amoralist challenge.  
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One cost of being forced into taking this line (that the amoralist case is simply incoherent) 
is that the internalist then faces an obligation they need to discharge – to explain what gave 
us the mistaken impression that the case was coherent. The internalist might be tempted to 
fall back on their claim that the amoralist is trying to make a moral judgement, but fails. 
However, absent any explication of how they are failing, to pin the blame on the amoralist‟s 
conceptual competence strikes me as ad hoc.  
 
To sum up so far, I have argued that a lot can be gained from reconsidering our 
commitment to any form of judgement internalism. In addition, we have a positive reason to 
abandon it – the conceptual possibility of the amoralist. Smith attempts to deflate this 
argument, but I hope to have shown that the way in which he does this fails – the 
amoralist‟s facility with moral terms gives us prima facie evidence that they are making 
genuine moral judgements. Finally, I presented a sketch of a worry about Smith‟s 
description of the amoralist case. If he says too much about it, he opens himself up to a 
revised amoralist case (which he tacitly acknowledges in his own treatment of the inverted-
commas theorist) if he says too little, then it becomes hard to see where he gets the 
resources to explain away our mistaken judgement about the conceivability of the amoralist.  
 
 
2.24 The Argument from Fetishism 
 
I have shown that the seeming conceptual possibility of an amoralist gives us prima facie 
evidence against internalism. However, if externalism has unacceptable consequences this 
would give us reason to revise our previous judgement – we would say that we were wrong 
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about the conceptual possibility of amoralism. It looked plausible to start with, but now we 
see that it leads to certain untenable consequences we will be forced to admit that the 
amoralist is not a genuine conceptual possibility and that internalism is true. With this 
conclusion in hand we could not offer externalist moral realism as a response to 
Korsgaard‟s concerns. So does externalism have unacceptable consequences? 
 
Smith claims that externalism cannot give an adequate explanation of the fact that “a 
change in motivation follows reliably in the wake of a change in moral judgement, at least 
in the good and strong-willed person” (1994, 71). In fact, he argues that the only 
explanation available to the externalist turns the virtuous and strong-willed into moral 
fetishists. Suppose, Smith asks, that I engage you in a discussion about which party I am 
going to vote for in the next election. I start by thinking I should, and feeling motivated to, 
vote for the libertarian party. After our discussion, I realise that what I should do is vote for 
the social democrats – not because they will better enact the policies I agree with, but 
because our discussion has changed what I value in a political party; my moral judgement 
about the values of the parties has changed. In good and strong-willed people, we would 
expect my motivation to change accordingly – I should now want to vote for the social 
democrats. Why does this change reliably occur? 
 
The internalist has a rather straightforward explanation – there is a conceptual connection 
between judgement and motivation, so if my judgement changes, my motivation must too.  
Moreover, and importantly, note that defenders of the requirement [the practicality 
requirement, which the internalist endorses] are in a position to insist that what an 
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agent is thus motivated to do when she changes her moral judgement is precisely 
what she judges it right to do, where this is read de re and not de dicto. (73) 
 But what of the externalist? For them, they cannot make an appeal to the contents of moral 
judgement:  
The externalist says the connection between moral judgements and motivation is 
contingent, so he cannot say that it obtains in virtue of the contents of the moral 
judgements themselves. What accounts for an agent's moral motivation must then be 
that agent's motivational dispositions, more specifically the contents of her desires 
(Lillehammer, 1997 188) 
What we would need to explain why there is a reliable connection between judgement and 
motivation in the good then would be some kind of standing desire to do what the agent 
judges to be right. The motivational content which explains the reliable link between 
judgement and motivation must be “a motivation to do the right thing, where this is now 
read de dicto and not de re.” (Smith, 1994, 74).31 
 
In other words, the internalist who endorses the practicality requirement can explain how 
one can change the contents of one‟s moral judgements, and then care non-derivatively 
about those contents. So I change my opinion on who the best party to vote for is and my 
motivation follows straightforwardly from that new judgement – I now care directly about 
the values of the social democrats. This is because it is a conceptual constraint on making a 
sincere moral judgement that I have the appropriate motivation. The externalist however has 
to say that my concern for the contents of my new judgements can only be derivative – that 
                                                             
31 Smith originally sets out the case in terms of de re versus de dicto desires, but later uses a distinction 
between derived and underived desires. I stick with the original terminology.  
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is, following from my general desire to do the right thing (where this desire is read de 
dicto). So I don‟t care about social democratic values directly in themselves, only as a way 
of satisfying my more general desire to care about the right kind of things.  
 
But, Smith claims, this picture cannot accommodate certain platitudes which are essential 
elements of the structure of moral discourse. We should care about the contents of our 
moral judgements directly, in a non-derivative kind of way. To only care about them 
because of our more general desire to do the right thing “is a fetish or moral vice, not the 
one and only moral virtue” (75) 
Good people care non-derivatively about honesty, the weal and woe of their 
children and friends, the well-being of their fellows, people getting what they 
deserve, justice, equality and the like, not just one thing: doing what they believe to 
be right, where this is read de dicto and not de re. (75) 
So externalism when explaining the reliable connection between judgement and motivation 
in the good and strong-willed has to make recourse to a general standing desire to do the 
right thing, not directly as whatever that thing is in itself, but derivatively as being the thing 
that happens to fall under the description „the right thing to do‟. This is a type of moral 
fetishism, and so externalism fails to explain this reliable connection in a way that is 
compatible with central platitudes about the moral psychology of virtuous agents. This is 
because “[j]ust as it is constitutive of being a good lover that you have a direct concern for 
the person you love, so it is constitutive of being a morally good person that you have direct 
concern form what you think is right.” (76). As in Bernard Williams‟ (1981) famous 
example where the advocate of impartiality ascribes to the man considering saving his 
drowning wife a thought too many, the externalist does this with every moral motivation of 
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the good person, which ends up “alienat[ing] her from the ends at which morality properly 
aims” (Smith, 1994 76).32  
 
Lillehammer (1997) responds by 1.) rejecting the claim that caring about the right thing, 
where this desire is read de dicto is a kind of moral fetish and 2.) pointing out that the 
externalist is not barred from making reference to a desire to do the right thing read de re. 
 
On the first point, imagine a woman (Lillehammer asks us) who feels her affection for her 
husband waning. Attending a party, an opportunity to pursue an affair presents itself. She 
realises that pursuing this relationship would be wrong, because of the effect on her 
husband‟s feelings – but right now she has no concern for her husband‟s feelings. 
Fortunately, she has a standing desire to do the right thing (where this is read de dicto) and 
refrains from being unfaithful to her husband. This demonstrates that a desire to do the right 
thing (where this is read de dicto) can play an important role in the psychology of the good 
and strong willed. (192) 
 
                                                             
32 To put it another way for the externalist who explains the reliable connection between virtue and 
being motivated to pursue right actions there will be an extra step between noting an action’s right-
making features and acting – the agent will notice that an action is an instance of helping their children, 
say. They also accept that helping one’s own children is the right thing to do. They can then conclude 
that that act is the right thing to do, and this judgement combined with their standing desire to do the 
right thing (whatever that is) leads them to perform the action. Smith thinks this is unduly fetishistic, for 
the virtuous person should be moved to act by the action in question being an instance of helping their 
children, not by it being an instance of helping your children which is an instance of a right action. The 
internalist does not need this last step, and it’s the externalist’s reliance on it which leaves them open to 
the charge of fetishism.  
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We can also imagine scenarios where it would be close to obscene to require an underived 
concern for the contents of a moral judgement:  
Consider next the case of the father who discovers that his son is a murderer, and 
who knows that if he does not go to the police the boy will get away with it, 
whereas if he does go to the police the boy will go to the gas-chamber. The father 
judges that it is right to go to the police, and does so. In this case it is not a platitude 
that a desire to do what is right, where this is read de re, is the mark of moral 
goodness. If what moves the father to inform on his son is a standing desire to do 
what is right, where this is read de dicto, then this could be as much of a saving 
grace as a moral failing. Why should it be an a priori demand that someone should 
have an underived desire to send his son to death? (192) 
 
However, this looks unfair to Smith if we consider the objection as a way of clarifying 
what, for Smith, the relevant desires are directed towards. Smith‟s claim is that moral virtue 
requires caring non-derivatively about a whole range of things: honesty, justice, equality, 
the well-being of family and friends, and so on. So, moral virtue requires a non-derivative 
concern for the right-making features of actions. What it does not require is a non-derivative 
desire for the death of your son. Instead, you need to have a non-derivative concern for the 
relevant right-making features. In this case, these will be concerns to do with justice as well 
as the well-being of your offspring. In this way we can avoid, when offering a style of 
explanation Smith would class as non-fetishistic, attributing to the father a desire which 
looks morally repugnant. 
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If this is the way that Smith avoids this objection (by arguing that the relevant desires that a 
virtuous agent possesses should be directed towards the right-making features of action, 
thus avoiding the need to attribute a de dicto desire to do the right thing in cases where a de 
re desire would look monstrous) then this opens up space for another objection, or rather 
two closely related objections. First: we began by being told by Smith that externalists turn 
virtuous agents into fetishists by having to attribute to them a very narrow, but general, 
moral concern – they only care about doing the right thing (whatever that thing happens to 
be). Instead, being virtuous involves responding to a range of morally significant features, 
and caring non-derivatively for a number of particular things. So we should care about our 
friends‟ and family‟s well-being, equality, honesty, justice, and so-on. But it turns out that 
really what we should care about are the right-making features of our actions.  
 
In the case of the father reporting his son to the police we should not attribute to the father 
the desire to have his son executed. Instead, he should have the desire to promote justice, or 
some other suitably similar desire. Now it seems as if the internalist is not too far away 
from fetishism themselves. The desires they need to attribute to the virtuous agent are 
themselves directed towards fairly abstract, and general, ends – like promoting justice, 
equality and so on. We can imagine someone balking at the following scenario: suppose 
that the father in the example above in the end decides not to report his son to the police, 
perhaps because he feels that considerations to do with his son‟s well-being outweigh the 
fact that justice would be served by reporting his son (it could be that the father thinks that 
the death penalty is wrong, so justice would not be very well-served by reporting the son, 
and he‟s convinced that his son‟s actions would not be repeated), and tells his son about the 
dilemma he went through. Although his son may be happy that he has evaded death, would 
he be impressed with his father‟s reasoning? When his father explains that he chose to not 
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report his son, and thus protect his life, because justice wouldn‟t be well served by reporting 
him can‟t his son complain that he should have acted out of love? Or, when a friend tells 
you that your partner is being unfaithful to you because they have a strong commitment to 
honesty, would it be inappropriate to respond „What, you only told me this because you 
want to do the honest thing whatever that happens to be?‟. The point is that if only caring 
about a right action under its aspect as „the right thing to do‟ (where this is read de dicto) is 
unacceptably fetishistic, then is caring about a right action under its aspect as „the honest 
thing to do‟ (read de dicto) significantly less fetishistic? 
 
This leads directly to the second, related, objection. The first objection was that it is hard to 
see how replacing a commitment to doing the right thing (read de dicto) with a greater 
number of commitments directed at similarly abstract ends can halt a charge of fetishism (if 
one is warranted). This problem is amplified if we consider what happens when we plug in 
different moral theories to the case. Compare two theories of value: a hedonist claims that 
the only right-making feature is maximising pleasure and minimising pain. In contrast, a 
pluralist about value will claim that there are many different ways for an action to be made 
right – they can value friendship, love, benevolence, beauty etc in themselves: not merely as 
things that increase overall pleasure. According to the hedonist a virtuous agent is one who 
maximises overall pleasure, and the most effective way to do this may be for that agent to 
only have a concern for maximising overall pleasure (if they are quite rational and 
proficient at working out consequences). In contrast the pluralist will claim that being 
virtuous involves caring about a lot of different right-making features (whichever ones their 
theory of value posits). Now it seems like the hedonistic virtuous agent is closer to fetishism 
than the pluralist. The hedonist only cares about doing one thing – the action that maximises 
pleasure, whatever that is. The pluralist cares about all kinds of different values. It could be 
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that this tells against the hedonist theory – that just caring about maximising pleasure is 
fetishistic. However, this sort of objection would miss the target. It ignores the possibility 
that the hedonist theory is true. If it really were the case that the only thing that matters, 
morally speaking, is maximising pleasure then it seems hard to see how caring only about 
pleasure would be fetishistic. So, let‟s take an agent who only cares about maximising 
pleasure. If hedonism is true then it would be strange to describe them as fetishistic. But 
now it seems like a question in moral psychology (whether externalism commits us to 
making the virtuous fetishistic) depends upon which value theory is true. This creates a 
hostage of fortune for Smith – allegations of fetishism only make sense against a 
background value theory. The point is not that the hedonist theory might be true – it may be 
that the hedonist theory is implausible on independent grounds. Instead, the point is that it is 
unfortunate to have this kind of dependency underwriting Smith‟s charge of fetishism. 
Smith is trying to lay out an argument against externalism in general. As such, if the 
argument from fetishism depends upon externalism being coupled with a particular kind of 
value theory than the argument has failed in that attempt. If we can avoid the fetishism 
argument by merely altering our theory of value then we may do that rather than commit 
ourselves to internalism and all the problems that entails.  
 
To summarise, Lillehammer alleges that there are cases where having a de dicto desire to do 
the right thing can either be a component of a robust moral psychology (as in the case of the 
wife considering betraying her husband) or can actually be a „moral saving grace‟. Smith 
can argue that there aren‟t any cases where having the de dicto desire is such a saving grace 
– the way to do this is to clarify Smith‟s picture. The non-fetishistic desires that the virtuous 
agent needs are ones directed towards the right-making features of actions. However, now 
the contrast between the characterisation of the virtuous agent offered by the internalist and 
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the one offered by the externalist starts to look less stark. A concern with realising abstract 
moral ends is central to both their accounts. Just as someone could complain when a person 
they are close to does something for them out of a desire to do the right thing, they could 
also complain when they do it out of a desire to increase their friend‟s well-being, whatever 
that involves (you can imagine the friend asking „But didn‟t the fact that you were doing it 
for me matter?‟ The reply „No, I did it because you are a friend, and I want to do whatever 
makes my friends happy [where this is read de dicto]‟ is hardly satisfying). The point can be 
put another way – if it is fetishistic to just care about doing the right thing, is just caring 
about doing the just thing, or the benevolent thing any less fetishistic? In addition, it also 
turns out that the case against externalism now depends on which theory of value is correct. 
A certain formulation of hedonism would identify a virtuous agent by their possession of a 
desire to do whatever maximises pleasure, whatever that action is. This looks, structurally, 
similar to Smith‟s fetishist. However, if this theory of value is correct, then it seems bizarre 
to call such an agent a fetishist. The source of this problem is the same as before – to avoid 
the objection that having a de dicto desire to do the right thing can sometimes be required 
Smith has to claim that the non-derivative desires of a morally virtuous agent are non-
fetishistic when directed at the relevant right-making features. But this makes the argument 
from fetishism depend upon our account of what the right-making features are. Both 
objections rely on the same point – that it is hard to see how merely varying the number of 
right-making features can make a difference to an accusation of fetishism. The fetishistic 
agent (according to Smith) only cares about one type of alienatingly general and abstract 
thing – doing the right thing, whatever that is: that‟s what makes them a fetishist. The non-
fetishistic agent in contrast cares about a number of general and abstract considerations. It 
seems implausible to suggest that it is the mere number of considerations an agent cares 
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about that makes caring about them alienating (and hence fetishistic) or not. This is what 
both objections seek to expose33. 
 
What of Lillehammer‟s second point - that Smith has not shown that the externalist cannot 
attribute to people desires to do the right thing, where this is read de re? Externalism claims, 
remember, that there is no conceptual connection between moral judgement and moral 
motivation. What this means is that it is not a mark of irrationality if my moral judgement 
changes and my motivational contents remain the same, but: 
Externalism is also consistent with the fact that de re concerns for what is right can 
be acquired by experience, education and reflection. I might change my previously 
mercenary attitude towards human life after experiencing the horrors of war and 
thus come to care in an underived way about other people's suffering. I might be 
brought to love my country after having its values inculcated in me at school. Or I 
may undergo a process of reflection and acquire a belief that it is right of me to 
perform a certain action, whereupon that belief causes a desire in me to do what I 
now think is right, where this is read de re, not de dicto. The externalist does not 
deny that moral beliefs directly cause desires to act in accordance with those beliefs. 
Sometimes they do and sometimes they don't. The crucial point is that it is not 
necessarily a mark of irrationality when they don't. (193) 
 
                                                             
33
 We also might be concerned that if Smith’s argument turns on the number of sources of value a non-
fetishistic should bear in mind then the argument makes pluralism about value a platitude about moral 
discourse rather than the substantive thesis it is.  
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To put it another way, it is unclear why we should think that the externalist makes virtuous 
agents into fetishists by elevating a vice (caring for the good only derivatively) into the “one 
and only moral virtue” (Smith, 1994, 75). Remember that this desire (for doing the right 
thing, where this is read de dicto) is only posited by the externalist to explain why their 
motivations reliably follow their moral judgements. That is, to explain what happens when 
the virtuous person changes their mind. Does this mean that they only care about doing the 
right thing derivatively in all cases? It seems unlikely – we should only think this if the 
externalist is committed to thinking that the only non-derivative desire that a virtuous agent 
has is to do the right thing (where this is read de dicto). If this were the case then we would 
have to make use of the de dicto desire to explain all of the virtuous agents moral actions – 
they are all motivated by their de dicto desire to do the right thing, whatever that may be, 
along with the belief that a particular action is the right thing to do. However, there is no 
reason to think that the externalist is committed to supposing that the only non-derivative 
desire a virtuous agent has is the desire to do the right thing, whatever that may be. 
Externalism is compatible with the virtuous agent having any number of non-derivative 
desires – what they are committed to is merely the claim that they also have a standing 
desire to do the right thing (where this is read de dicto) in order to explain what happens 
when their moral commitments change.  
 
This gives us an alternative picture to the one offered by Smith. It seems as if Smith thinks 
that the externalist can only attribute one non-derivative desire to the virtuous agent. It is 
the fact that explanations of all their moral decisions have to go via this desire that makes 
such an agent look fetishistic – the non-derivative desire taints all the desires which depend 
upon it. However, this is not the picture the externalist needs. Instead, they can claim that 
the de dicto desire to do the right thing is only one non-derivative desire amongst many. 
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True, the other non-derivative desires will be hostages to fortune – if they are found to be 
incompatible with the non-derivative desire to do the right thing (read de dicto) then it is 
them that will have to change. This does not mean, though, that these desires have their 
non-derivative status threatened – being revisable is not equivalent to being derivative.  
 
Perhaps Smith can claim that this picture is fetishistic enough to be unacceptable. The mere 
fact that your other non-derivative desires are capable of being overturned by the non-
derivative desire to do the right thing is a kind of fetishism. If we consider when other non-
derivative desires come into conflict with the non-derivative desire to do the right thing this 
charge will start to look a little strange. Conflict arises when you discover that securing one 
of the things you care about is incompatible with doing the right thing. The externalist 
claims that in the virtuous agent the non-derivative desire to do the right thing overpowers 
the other non-derivative desire. So, their picture entails that other non-derivative desires are 
capable of being overturned when those desires are incompatible with doing the right thing. 
This hardly looks fetishistic to me. 
 
In summary we have seen how Smith attempts to undermine externalism – it can only 
explain the reliable connection between moral judgement and motivation in virtuous and 
strong-willed agents by turning them into moral fetishists. We have looked at two clusters 
of arguments that militate against Smith‟s argument from fetishism. The first attempts to 
conclude that having a de dicto desire to do the right thing can be an element in a robust 
moral psychology, or even necessary to avoid having a monstrous desire. The second 
cluster attempts to conclude that externalists are not committed to using the de dicto desire 
to do the right thing to explain all a moral agent‟s moral actions – it is compatible with 
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externalism that a virtuous agent has any number of non-derivative desires for a number of 
morally significant things.  
 
I gave some reason to doubt the strength of the first type of arguments – Smith can avoid 
the objection that having a de dicto desire to do the right thing is sometimes required by 
clarifying what the contents or a virtuous agent‟s non-derivative desires should be. 
However, if we make the contents of these desires general and abstract enough to avoid the 
problem we face another – the contrast between Smith‟s characterisation of a fetishist and a 
genuinely virtuous agent starts to disappear. In any case even if this first set of 
considerations fails to defuse the argument from fetishism the second would be sufficient. It 
does not matter (for our purposes) whether internalism is committed to a mode of 
explanation that Smith deems fetishistic (although this would be enough to show that 
charges of fetishism shouldn‟t be taken seriously in the debate between externalists and 
internalists) if externalism can adopt a mode of explanation Smith endorses as non-
fetishistic quite freely. If externalism is compatible with a virtuous agent having any 
number of non-derivative desires, and having a standing desire to do the right thing does not 
betray any fetishism, as I believe is the case, then Smith‟s argument from fetishism fails.  
 
Where does this leave us vis-a-vis Korsgaard? I started to develop a line of interpretation of 
Korsgaard‟s argument against moral realism that depends for its success as an argument 
against moral realism on showing that moral realism is committed to judgement internalism. 
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We have seen that one widely discussed argument to that effect is defective. Are there any 
other reasons to suppose that moral realism is committed to internalism?34  
 
 
2.25 van Roojen on Rational Amoralism 
 
Mark van Roojen (2010a) has recently offered a battery of considerations designed to 
favour judgement internalism. His case, like Smith‟s, proceeds via two steps. First, he 
attempts to deflate the worry due to Brink‟s amoralist. Not, as Smith does, by attempting to 
show that there is something wrong with the amoralist as presented by Brink but instead by 
showing how judgement internalism can accommodate rational amoralism – the amoralist, 
as characterised by Brink, is practically rational and semantically competent which van 
                                                             
34 One argument we can extract from Korsgaard that I won’t go into is found in her (1997). There she 
seems to take issue with what we might call a hydraulic conception of action. What moves me, 
according to an externalist, is my having the right kind of belief and desire that fit together in the right 
kind of way to produce an action – my belief that my house is on fire together with my desire to not 
burn leads to me fleeing my house. The problem with this, Korsgaard contends, is it leaves the agent 
themselves out of the picture. There is no role for their recognition of their reasons in this picture. In 
effect, what we get from externalism is a causal explanation of why people act, but not an explanation 
that involves justification. Thus it seems that the problem with externalism and any other view that 
takes up the hydraulic conception of action is that they conflate causal explanation and justification (in a 
way that someone like Richard Rorty argues is repeated in various places in the history of philosophy 
(1979)). Against this we could assert that the alleged confusion is no confusion at all. Brian Leiter (2005) 
has made the point that philosophers like Marx, Freud, Nietzsche and Edmund Gettier debunk views in 
philosophy by showing that there is something wrong with their causal history (for example, Nietzsche 
explains the source of our moral beliefs in terms of feelings of ressentiment). These arguments, Leiter 
contends, have value – because one way for us to recognise that a view is unjustified is to see how it 
arose through a causal process that we think is unreliable. What this amounts to doing is denying that 
the genetic fallacy is always a fallacy, and thus we can learn useful things about justification by looking 
at causal explanations. In the moral case, we could say, on behalf of the hydraulic model, that the agent 
is included in the model, as their beliefs and desires form part of the causal story that produces their 
actions. This is merely to give the very broad outlines of how to develop a response to Korsgaard, but I 
shall not be able to pursue this line further. 
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Roojen accepts. Second, he makes a positive case for judgement internalism which revolves 
around the support judgement internalism can give to, and get from, rationalism35 – the 
thesis that moral requirements are rational requirements. If rationalism were true, according 
to van Roojen, it would explain how morality gets its rational authority. In addition we need 
to accept judgement internalism in order to account for „translation-style‟ thought 
experiments. So, if van Roojen‟s package works we‟d have a substantive conclusion – we 
could explain how morality gets its special authority and the data we get from certain 
thought experiments, but only if we accept judgement internalism. This package might be 
attractive enough for the moral realist to commit themselves to judgement internalism. 
 
I will argue that van Roojen‟s case fails. His attempt to accommodate rational amoralism 
leads him to weaken the judgement internalist‟s thesis in such a way that it is compatible 
with externalism (under one reading of one of the terms involved), and cannot fill the 
explanatory role that internalism is usually designed to fill. Also, the explanation offered for 
the rational authority of morality is shaky. I will conclude that van Roojen offers us little 
reason to give up externalism. 
 
In order to explain van Roojen‟s position some ground needs to be cleared. I will outline, 
very sketchily, the elements we need to get a clear enough picture of van Roojen‟s account: 
a statement of the major theses; van Roojen‟s conception of relativised rationality and 
rightness; and a (very) brief explication of how typical responses to Frege‟s puzzle work. I 
will first lay out these elements before then explaining how they add up to a case for 
                                                             
35
 This being a different thesis to the one under the banner ‘rationalism’ as used in laying out Mackie’s 
argument from queerness above. For the rest of this chapter I will use ‘rationalism’ in the way van 
Roojen does.  
87 
 
internalism. This means that the next section may seem rather disjointed and perhaps even 
irrelevant. Hopefully this appearance will dissolve in the section after.  
 
 
2.26 Rationalism, Internalism, Relativised Rightness and Frege‟s Puzzle 
 
van Roojen characterises rationalism as the claim that “the requirements of ethics are 
requirements of practical reason” (2010a, 495). Such a claim has implications for the 
connection between morality and motivation. If we take rationality to involve being 
motivated to do what is rational, and avoid the irrational, then rational agents will be 
motivated to perform the duties morality requires from them. It also seems to account for 
what we can call morality‟s „rational authority‟ – acting morally is an end for all rational 
agents, as acting morally is what being a rational agent involves. However, rationalism also 
seems to entail that those who act immorally are practically irrational. This claim comes 
under pressure when we consider two types of cases – those distant from us in terms of 
time, space or culture. They “often have a divergent conception of what morality requires. If 
we are right about what morality requires then they are wrong. Yet it seems unfair to accuse 
them of irrationality as opposed to some other sort of mistake.” (495). This is because they 
may have had no (easy) way of knowing what morality requires. The second type of case is 
the agent who claims to be unmoved by a moral judgement (Brink‟s amoralist). Such agents 
don‟t always seem (as Brink contends and van Roojen agrees) irrational to us.  
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van Roojen intends to show how these putative counterexamples to rationalism (cases 
where those who aren‟t motivated by moral requirements or judgements) can actually be 
accommodated by it, when rationalism is properly construed. Also, rationalism can explain 
two plausible forms of internalism, with the result that “a plausible internalism and a well-
formulated rationalism are mutually supporting theories” (496). 
 
What are the plausible forms of internalism? First we have existence internalism, which is 
the following thesis 
EX-INT: Having a moral obligation to φ is necessarily a reason to φ36 
This thesis connects moral obligations with reasons for action. It is supported by the fact 
that when someone asks for a reason to perform a particular act “it is appropriate and not 
obtuse to explain that the action is morally right... No further answer to the why question 
would normally appear to be needed” (498). One problem immediately looms – some 
rational agents won‟t be satisfied when you explain to them that some action is right: they 
may acknowledge that it is right, but ask „What is that to do with me? What reason do I 
have to do it?‟. van Roojen rightly points out that this does not have to be too troubling – 
just because someone is capable of ignoring a reason, or questioning is its existence, doesn‟t 
mean it doesn‟t exist. If they believed EX-INT then they would believe they had a reason: 
after all, they have acknowledged that the action is morally right and if they believed EX-
INT they would see that they therefore had a reason to perform it. However, the problem 
can be reiterated – the person unconvinced by the answer to the question „What reason do I 
have?‟ that cites the moral rightness of the action is a rational agent. If they are rational, 
                                                             
36 van Roojen also offers a formulation in terms of propositions: true moral propositions necessarily give 
us a reason to act in the way they commend. These niceties need not bother us here.  
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they should respond to the reasons they have. So the fact that they are not responding to the 
reason shows that they do not have one, and thus EX-INT is false. Part of van Roojen‟s 
ambition is to respond to this kind of worry. 
 
EX-INT is straightforwardly entailed by rationalism – if moral requirements are 
requirements of practical rationality then they will necessarily give us reasons (at least, as is 
plausible, rational requirements are reason-giving).  
 
The other plausible internalism is a version of judgement internalism. As we have seen 
already,  judgement internalism connects moral judgements with motivation. The 
formulation van Roojen favours (borrowed, with modifications (inspired by Korsgaard, 
1986), from Jamie Dreier, 1990) is: 
JUD-INT: If an agent judges that it is right to φ in circumstances C then normally 
she is  motivated to φ in C, or she is practically irrational.37  
JUD-INT posits a connection between mere moral judgement and motivation, so it admits 
cases that cause problems for linking it up to rationalism – where an agent makes a false 
moral judgement they will be motivated (according to JUD-INT) to act in accord with it, 
whereas the combination of rationalism and EX-INT makes that look irrational (they 
should be motivated to act the other way, if they were responding to the reasons they had 
properly). Also JUD-INT seems to be undermined by cases like Brink‟s amoralist and 
                                                             
37
 I have altered van Roojen’s statement of the thesis a little to make it closer to the practicality 
requirement (see 2.13) offered by Smith – the differences are ones that van Roojen endorses in the text. 
I have also changed van Roojen’s ‘believes’ to ‘judges’ – simply to keep the discussion neutral between 
cognitivists and non-cognitivists: it’s possible for a non-cognitivist to share the conclusions van Roojen 
offers if they are willing to construe accepting the requirements  of practical reason as involving some 
suitable non-cognitive attitude.  
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Joyce‟s agent of „pure evil‟. Both characters, remember, fail to be appropriately motivated 
by their seemingly sincere and genuine moral judgements. van Roojen hopes he has the 
resources to deal with these problems too.  
 
The next element in our picture is relativised rationality/rightness. One way to get a grip on 
this notion is to think about the familiar distinction between objective and subjective 
oughts. This is roughly the distinction between what you should do given full information 
and time to engage in reasoning, and what you should do given the information and 
reasoning capacities you have. A toy, so-called „mine case‟, will illustrate the point. 
Suppose you are an engineer working at a mine which is flooding. The mine has two shafts, 
A and B. You know a lot about this mine and the implications of its flooding but one thing 
you do not know is which shaft the team of ten miners employed by the mine is working in 
today. They are either all in A, or all in B. Now, you could block the bottom of one of these 
shafts, stopping the water getting into it. If you do this, the water will be diverted to the 
other shaft, filling it completely. If you block the shaft with the miners inside you would 
save all their lives. If you block the wrong shaft, though, all ten miners will drown. If you 
do nothing (block neither shaft) then water will fill up both shafts a little, but only enough 
to drown the miner at the bottom of the shaft – it won‟t reach high enough to drown the 
other nine. What should you do?  Block A, block B, or block neither? 
 
We can distinguish between two relevant oughts: what you objectively ought to do, and 
what you subjectively ought to do. In some sense, you ought to block the shaft with the 
miners in it – flooding the other and saving all ten miners. This is what you objectively 
ought to do. However, given your situation, it would be ridiculous to hold you to this 
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standard – you don‟t know which shaft the miners are in, so there is no way you can reliably 
pick out the right shaft to block: you‟d just be taking a wild guess. What you subjectively 
ought to do is block neither shaft: that is the safest course for you to take, given the 
information you have. We could say that that action has the highest expected utility, though 
that would be to commit ourselves to a type of consequentialism, whereas the distinction 
between objective and subjective oughts should be recognised by any moral theorist.38 
 
van Roojen notes that a simple binary division between objective and subjective oughts is 
too coarse-grained. This is demonstrated by the way I have talked about the cases above: I 
introduced the notion of a subjective ought by saying it was what you ought to do given the 
information you have. But then I moved to talking about the information you have available 
to you. These are two different notions – there could be readily available evidence that you 
could pay attention to, but which you glibly ignore – meaning it is not part of the 
information on which you base your decision. In fact we can make various grades of 
distinction, between: what you ought to do given the information you have; what you 
                                                             
38 It may look like what is bearing weight here is not a distinction between subjective and objective 
oughts, but instead an application of the principle that ought implies can. However, the relevance of 
ought-implies-can is not straightforward. It is within your power to do that which is objectively required 
– you can physically block the right shaft. It’s just that you’d be taking a wild guess at which shaft is the 
right one. It could be that ought implies can is relevant because in another sense of ‘can’ you can’t block 
the right shaft – you are not in an epistemic position to pick the right one. But, even if ought implies can 
is needed to explain why this distinction holds, it doesn’t mean that the distinction isn’t real. To get 
ought implies can into the picture we need to admit that what information we have available to us plays 
a role in determining what we should do, subjectively speaking, and this is all we need to make the 
distinction between objective and subjective oughts. It seems like in this case we can square two 
seemingly contradictory judgements: if someone blocked A, guessing (rightly as it happens) that the 
miners are there, then we could say that they did the right thing (at least in the objective sense) whilst 
heaping blame on their shoulders: a simple story about how this could happen is to say that certain 
judgements about rightness and wrongness can track the objective oughts involved, while judgements 
to do with blameworthiness track the relevant subjective oughts (of course, in any actual case how 
these two types of ought interact with our judgements is likely to be quite complicated).  
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should do given the information easily available to you; what you should do given the 
information that you can, in principle, access; and so on. Also relevant here are the 
reasoning and evidence gathering powers of the agent concerned – we could distinguish 
between what you should do given the information you have, and what you should do given 
the information you have plus a bit more cognitive effort put into working out what follows 
from the information you have.  
 
This point even applies to a priori reasoning. You may be in a situation in which you could 
work out something morally relevant if you engaged in some a priori reasoning. However, 
it‟s not generally true that you are obligated to work out what is entailed by what you 
believe: such an effort would be a waste of time, given that there is likely to be a number of 
trivial, true, propositions entailed by what you believe. It wouldn‟t even be worth your 
while if you just worked out the non-trivial implications – there is no guarantee you will 
have any use for this new knowledge and besides, don‟t you have better things to do? So 
you could find yourself in a situation where you fail to believe something a priori 
equivalent or entailed by something you believe yet where you are still rational – if you 
haven‟t actually gone through the relevant deductions yourself.39  
 
We can see how these considerations play out in our mining case. Objectively (what you 
should do given full information, sufficient time for reasoning and sufficient cognitive 
capacities) you should block the right shaft. Then there are a whole raft of subjective 
oughts. What you should do given the information you have. But perhaps you could work 
                                                             
39
 This point is well brought out in Fred Dretske and John Hawthorne’s (2004) discussion of epistemic 
closure principles. What this discussion reveals is how much is involved in working out what follows 
from the information you believe, even in cases dealing with direct entailment.  
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out which mine shaft the miners are in – then there will be an ought corresponding to what 
you ought to do given the information available. Suppose that the relevant test would take 
too much time to carry out – then we can identify another subjective ought: what you 
should do given the information available and the information you could gather given the 
time you have available. Or perhaps working out the right shaft involves some a priori 
reasoning – we could have oughts corresponding to what you should do given the cognitive 
capacities for reasoning you have, and another for what you should do given the cognitive 
capacities you should have made the effort to develop. Or perhaps you know that if you 
start down the path of a priori reasoning you will get distracted by maths problems, run out 
of time, panic, and then make a stupid decision. 
 
The point is that the distinction between objective and subjective oughts is too coarse-
grained. We need a far greater range of subjective oughts, corresponding to different 
dimensions to do with our reasoning powers and the information we have. In addition, as 
sometimes what information we can access and what deductions we have made will depend 
upon historical factors – the experiences we have been through – these factors can act as 
another dimension to distinguish yet more types of subjective ought. What it makes sense to 
do in a given situation depends upon the agent‟s personal history, what information they 
have available, what time they have available and their reasoning powers. We also need to 
recognise that there are second order rational requirements – requirements to do with 
reasonable evidence gathering, which again will be conditional upon the agent‟s personal 
history, mental capacities and so on. 
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We are not in the business, though, of constructing a taxonomy of subjective oughts. What 
is relevant for our purposes is to recognise that rationality – what it makes sense to do – can 
be relativised to a whole gamut of factors. If van Roojen is right about the close connection 
between rationality and moral rightness, then the same will be true for rightness.  
 
The final element we need is a grasp of Frege‟s puzzle and traditional responses to it. Frege 
noted that identities involving co-referring expressions can have cognitive significance. 
Being told that a = a does not seem to us to be any kind of cognitive advance. But being told 
that a = b does seem cognitively significant (at least sometimes), even though „a‟ and „b‟ 
refer to the same object. So, being told that „The Morning star is the Morning star‟ doesn‟t 
hold any cognitive significance; being told „The Morning Star is the Evening Star‟ does – 
it‟s a discovery that took some empirical work, after all. Another phenomenon which points 
towards this feature of identities involving co-referring expressions is the fact that it is 
rational to doubt the identity. In fact, you could believe contradictory propositions involving 
the co-referring expressions: you might believe that you went to school with Robert 
Zimmerman, whilst believing that you didn‟t go to school with Bob Dylan, even though 
both names designate the same object. How is this possible? 
 
There are two general pictures van Roojen is interested in: Millians hold that the meanings 
of referring expressions are the referents those expressions refer to. So the sentences „I went 
to school with Bob Dylan‟ and „I went to school with Robert Zimmerman‟ have the same 
meaning as the constituents of those sentences have the same referents and thus the same 
meaning. If someone were to accept the second but deny the first then they would have 
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contradictory beliefs. But, for the Millian, this will be a fairly widespread and benign 
phenomenon40. 
 
In contrast, the Fregean will argue that „Bob Dylan‟ and „Robert Zimmerman‟ present the 
same referent under different modes of presentation. They have different senses which play 
a role in determining the meaning of the sentences involving these expressions. So someone 
who accepted the truth of „I went to school with Robert Zimmerman‟ but denied the truth of 
„I went to school with Bob Dylan‟ would not, necessarily, have inconsistent beliefs. Their 
beliefs would have different contents. However, given that „Robert Zimmerman‟ and „Bob 
Dylan‟ refer to the same object, one of their beliefs would be false. There is nothing 
necessarily irrational about having false beliefs. So on the Fregean account the rationality of 
wondering whether, and the cognitive significance of learning that, the Morning Star = the 
Evening Star is preserved and explained.  
 
Now we have all the materials necessary – a statement of the relevant theses, an account of 
relativised rationality/rightness and a brief sketch of responses to Frege‟s puzzle – to 
explicate van Roojen‟s defence of rationalism and the two internalisms.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
40 Or they could attempt a ‘guise-theoretic’ explanation of the phenomena. See Sainsbury and Tye 
(2011).  
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2.27 Internalism and Rational Amoralism 
 
Remember the main problems that the package of rationalism, EX-INT and JUD-INT had: 
there seem to be cases where people rationally ignore what is morally required – either 
because they are not in a position to know what is really morally required and instead are 
moved by a false moral theory, or because they are unmoved by their sincere moral 
judgements (as in the case of Brink‟s amoralist). van Roojen wants to apply the machinery 
just detailed to solve these problems and show how internalism is compatible with rational 
amoralism and immoralism. 
 
First we can use the ideas of relativised rightness and relativised rationality to explain the 
first type of case, rational immoralism, where an agent is moved to do the wrong thing 
when they believe it right (because they are not in a position to know what is really morally 
required). van Roojen sets out how a sprinkling of relativised rationality can help here, and 
is worth quoting at length: 
The general idea is to account for various kinds of rational immorality by noting 
that judgements of irrationality are usually or often made relative to one of the 
subjective senses of rationality. People who do what is objectively wrong will not 
be counted as irrational in one good sense so long as what they did made sense 
relative to the information that they have. Thus there is a sense in which those who 
do what is objectively wrong can still be rational though in one of the subjective 
senses. 
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One sort of rational immorality which a rationalist should have no trouble admitting 
involves actions which are rational because the agent lacks certain empirical 
information which would, if available, have changed what made sense to do. 
Clearly such agents are not subjectively irrational; they are doing what makes sense 
given the evidence they have. But this result is compatible with the chosen action 
being irrational relative to fuller information that the agent might have possessed. 
By equating what is right with what is objectively rational in light of full 
information, we can truly say of such cases that the agent did something objectively 
morally wrong, but rational given what she knew.                                        
(512) 
Given that agents rarely (if ever) have full information it‟s easy to explain why we feel that 
there is a sense in which those not in a place to know what is genuinely morally required are 
nevertheless decent people – they did what made sense to them, given what they knew at 
the time. We have an explanation of why, in cases like the mining case, our intuitions about 
the wrongness of an action and the blameworthiness of the agent can diverge.  
 
We can extend this solution to the problem of squaring EX-INT with our intuitions about 
those within the grip of a false moral theory by involving the other dimensions along which 
we relativise rationality. For example, knowing what is objectively required could be a 
priori accessible from information you actually possess. However, you might not be 
blameworthy for not acting on what is a priori entailed by what you know if you haven‟t 
gone through the relevant deductions. Though there will be another sense of rationality 
(rationality relative to what you know and what is entailed by what you know) under which 
what you do is irrational. Another dimension we can relativise rationality along is according 
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to requirements on evidence gathering – you could be subjectively rational relative to the 
information you have, yet subjectively irrational relative to the information available to you 
if you don‟t make a reasonable effort to gather relevant information. 
 
It‟s van Roojen‟s contention that a defender of rationalism should make use of all of these 
notions of rationality when they posit a connection between the requirements of morality 
and reasons to act. They just need to be careful about which notion they are using at any 
particular time. Thus they can build a connection between subjective rationality and 
subjective rightness – the agents who are rationally immoral still did what made sense to 
them given their position, so there is no threat to the connection between rationality and 
morality here.  
 
There is one worry that immediately looms: I began by claiming that one of the attractions 
of the package that van Roojen offers is that it explains the rational authority of morality. 
You might gloss the rational authority of morality as the claim that it always makes sense 
(or is always a requirement of rationality) to do what is objectively right. This claim is 
compatible with what we have said so far in most cases – for some agents it makes sense to 
intend to do what is objectively morally required, as this is one of the aims they have. But 
there are cases that cause problems. van Roojen offers what we can call the ice-cream case 
modelled on Smith‟s ill-tempered squash player (Smith 1995, 109-31; van Roojen 2010a, 
515). Imagine I am aware that I have a disposition to a certain type of irrationality – that I 
am weak-willed in the face of ice-cream. I am also attempting to lose weight, so it makes 
sense for me to avoid excessive quantities of ice-cream. Small quantities would be just fine, 
and in fact might even give me the psychological boost required to continue with my 
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otherwise dreary diet of porridge (with salt) and sugar-free Irn-Bru. However, I cannot 
manage small quantities – if I have any ice-cream in the freezer I will, in a moment of 
weakness, scoff the lot. Thus it makes sense for me to not have any ice-cream in my freezer. 
 
In this case, then, there is a divergence between what is rationally required subjectively 
speaking and what is rationally required objectively speaking. Given that I have a 
disposition to weakness of will when confronted with ice-cream I should not have ice-cream 
in my freezer; what makes sense given my position is to refrain from having any – this is 
what is subjectively rational. However, if I were more rational I wouldn‟t have this 
disposition to weakness of will in the face of ice-cream. Stocking ice-cream and consuming 
small quantities of it would further my aims better. So, what is objectively required is that I 
have ice-cream in my freezer (or, it is at least rationally permissible). 
 
If, then, we can have cases where what is objectively rationally required can conflict with 
what is subjectively rationally required then we seem to have a threat to the rational 
authority of morality: it won‟t always make sense to do what is objectively rationally 
required in cases where intending to do so would lead to an action worse than the one I can 
perform given my actual dispositions. 
 
van Roojen, after introducing these types of cases, argues they are no threat to the rational 
authority of morality: 
Rationalism continues to identify objective moral rightness with objective 
rationality and to recommend this as a rational end for agents, except in special 
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cases [like the ice-cream case]. It just recognises that sensible ways to aim at that 
goal are partly a function of facts about the agent‟s subjective situation. An agent is 
only rarely in a position that requires choosing between doing what makes sense to 
do in light of her evidence, time and so on and doing what she thinks would make 
sense to do if she had full information. In normal cases these questions collapse into 
one another from the first-person agential perspective; the agent is trying to do what 
she thinks is objectively right by doing what her subjective situation suggests it 
makes sense to do given that goal and her evidence, time, and so on. 
 
So while the abnormal cases are important because they block us from saying that it 
is always subjectively rational to intend to do what is objectively right, they are 
unusual and exceptional. In an overwhelming majority of situations subjectively 
rational agents will and should intend to do what is objectively right. And this gives 
objective rightness its rational authority and grounds rational criticism of agents 
who don‟t meet this requirement. 
Van Roojen seems to think that because the cases where what we should intend differs from 
what is objectively right are few and far between the truth of rationalism stands. It being 
typically the case that it makes sense (is rational) to do what is objectively right is enough to 
ground the rational authority of morality.  
 
I think this won‟t do. The problem is not that there might be a large number of cases where 
it does not make sense to do what is objectively right. Van Roojen may be right that such 
cases are rare (although a scenario like the ice-cream case doesn‟t seem preposterous 
enough to guarantee a low rate of incidence). The problem is that the way van Roojen 
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allows there to be such cases robs the combination of rationalism and EX-INT of any 
substantive content. The element in the ice-cream case that allows what it makes sense to do 
to diverge from what is objectively rational is one of my motivational dispositions – when I 
see ice-cream, my desire to eat it overcomes my other aims. It‟s this motivational 
disposition which means I shouldn‟t keep any ice-cream in my freezer. But, if we are 
allowed to include pre-existing motivational dispositions in our specification of an agent‟s 
subjective position then we run into trouble. For now what we are saying is that what it 
makes sense to do, and what reasons we have that (if rational) we will be motivated to 
respond to in the right way is a function (in part) of what motivational states we happen to 
have. But this is just to say that we will be motivated by our motivational states. This is a 
trivial claim that is compatible with externalism about motivation. This is what I mean 
when I say that the case for the rational authority of morality offered by van Roojen‟s 
package is shaky.  
 
van Roojen could respond that we cannot allow all motivational dispositions into our 
specification of the agent‟s subjective position. Only dispositions due to weakness of will, 
or other condition which threatens our practical rationality is allowed into the picture. Such 
a reply depends upon showing that there is a principled distinction available between 
motivational states owing to weakness of will, and those which are not connected to 
weakness of will in the right kind of way. The relevant motivational disposition, which 
causes me to eat lots of ice-cream when I have it, doesn‟t seem that different from other 
motivational dispositions. However, we can allow that this response is viable as I will argue 
that there are more serious problems accounting for JUD-INT. 
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van Roojen admits that the notion of relativised rationality/rightness will not be able to 
explain all cases of rational wrong-doing. Brink‟s amoralist, for example, has no problem 
admitting that they are morally required to do something. Instead they simply lack 
motivation to act in accord with their (seemingly) sincere moral judgements. We have seen 
how this type of amoralism can be used to press a case against internalism: the amoralist 
doesn‟t seem practically irrational, yet is unmoved by their sincere moral judgements. 
Smith responds by arguing that the amoralist‟s facility with moral terms is no indication 
that they genuinely grasp moral concepts. However, I argued that the amoralist‟s facility 
with moral terms does give us prima facie evidence that the amoralist is conceptually 
competent. This is a conclusion van Roojen endorses – it is possible for an amoralist to 
make a genuine moral judgement, as it is possible to be competent with moral concepts 
without having the appropriate motivation. He contends though that this conclusion is 
compatible with the plausible formulation of judgement internalism – JUD-INT.  
 
According to van Roojen, the belief that an action is morally required is „a priori 
equivalent‟41 to the belief that an action is rationally required. If we assume that it is 
irrational to act in a way that one thinks is irrational then this should mean that rational 
amoralism is impossible – if you believe something is obligatory, you will see that it is 
rationally required, and if you are rational you should be moved by that.  
 
However, it is possible for a rational person to be unmoved by their judgement that 
something is right if they are not in a position to recognise the identity between the property 
                                                             
41
 This is a priori presumably because the truth of rationalism is a priori. If the amoralist did a bit more 
armchair philosophy, then they could work out what they are rationally required to do from what they 
morally ought to do.  
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of rightness and the property of being rational, where the failure to recognise the identity is 
not due to any rational failing. And this is where the story about Frege‟s puzzle comes in: 
the solutions to Frege‟s puzzle show how it can be rational, even when conceptually 
competent, to doubt whether a = b even where „a‟ and „b‟ happen to be co-referential. The 
Fregean says that the two expressions have different senses, and learning that they co-refer 
is a substantial discovery. The Millian insists that anyone who doesn‟t believe the identity 
has contradictory beliefs. But, for them, having such contradictory beliefs does not betray 
any irrationality or conceptual incompetence.  
 
So, then, we have an explanation of how the amoralist goes wrong – they don‟t believe that 
the property of rightness is identical to the property of rationality, even though it is. This 
does not betray any irrationality though, as it‟s easy to see how they could think this. 
According to van Roojen‟s Fregeans „right‟ and „rational‟ will have different senses, and 
hence different meanings, even though they designate the same property. Thus you can be 
conceptually competent with the two concepts – grasp their meanings – without this 
guaranteeing that you will believe the relevant identity. For the Millian „right‟ and „rational‟ 
mean the same thing so if you didn‟t believe that they are identical you would be making a 
mistake, but this does not betray any irrationality.  
 
It is a consequence of this picture that if the amoralist did a bit of philosophy and came to 
believe the truth of these theses we should expect to see a change in them. Either they 
would start to feel motivated by their moral judgements, or they would give them up. If this 
picture looks strange, then this tells against the case van Roojen makes. But there are other, 
more significant problems looming. 
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van Roojen considers the possibility of all, or most of us, being ignorant of the relevant 
identity. Then it would not be true that “If an agent judges that it is right to φ in 
circumstances C then normally she is  motivated to φ in C, or she is practically irrational.” 
(JUD-INT). Normally an agent would not realise that being right is the same property as 
being rational, and so could very easily fail to feel motivated (I mean, we could interpret 
„normally‟ as „if they are up to date with the philosophical literature on internalism‟, taking 
metaethicists as the relevant comparison class. Such an interpretation would be stretching 
the meaning of „normally‟ far, far beyond breaking point.). Thus JUD-INT would be false 
in such a scenario (a sad fate for an allegedly conceptual truth).  
 
van Roojen argues that it is impossible for all of us to be unaware of the relevant identity, in 
a way that falsifies JUD-INT, as the coherence of ascribing conceptual competence with 
moral concepts to the amoralist (someone who lacks the appropriate motivation) depends 
upon a background of moral agents who do feel appropriately motivated by their moral 
judgements. How does this idea work?  
 
van Roojen makes an analogy with the cases taken by Tyler Burge (1979) to support social 
externalism about content. In our speech community „arthritis‟ refers to a painful disease in 
the joints. If someone believes „I have arthritis in my thigh‟ then they have a false belief. 
This is because the contribution a term like „arthritis‟ makes to the semantic value of a 
sentence is fixed by the practices of the relevant experts in our speech community – in this 
case most likely medical practitioners. However, if the person who believed „I have arthritis 
in my thigh‟ belonged to a different speech community, one where the practices of the 
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relevant experts made it the case that „arthritis‟ means a painful disease of the joints or the 
thigh, then they would be expressing a different thought. We can tell this is the case because 
their belief would then be true – the proposition that their propositional attitude is directed 
towards would be different, meaning that the sentence expressing that propositional attitude 
differs in truth value. In our community, someone who says „I have arthritis in my thigh‟ 
when they have a pain in the thigh expresses a false belief. In the other community, with 
different linguistic practices, they express a different, true, belief. Cases like this are 
supposed to demonstrate the social externalist‟s thesis that social context plays a role in 
determining the contents of thoughts and the sentences that expresses those thoughts. 
 
What does this show us about the moral case? Well, in both cases (the amoralist and the 
person misusing „arthritis‟) “we are willing to attribute a thought the truth conditions of 
which would seem to entail that the speaker is expressing something ruled out by the correct 
analysis of the terms used to express the belief.” But “in each case we are willing to do so 
against a background in which most competent speakers would not avow those attitudes... If 
the amoralist were isolated from communities in which the term „right‟ was used to 
commend we would not have attributed a thought about rightness to her, just as we would 
not have attributed a thought about arthritis to the medically ignorant patient in a 
community where doctors did not use the term „arthritis‟ to pick out exclusively a disease of 
the joints.” (van Roojen, 2010a 519). 
 
This analogy shares similarities with the cases Timothy Williamson (2007) uses in arguing 
against the existence of a certain type of analytic truth. Williamson‟s target is the thesis that 
there are some truths that competent speakers must assent to, merely in virtue of 
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understanding the terms involved, or to put it another way, merely in virtue of being 
competent with the concepts expressed by the terms involved. He uses as an example of a 
putative analytic truth the sentence „Every vixen is a vixen‟ (if anything was going to be an 
analytic truth, this looks like a fairly safe candidate). Then he introduces two competent 
English speakers, Peter and Stephen. Peter takes the universal quantifier to be existentially 
committing – he takes the truth of „Every F is a G‟ to depend upon the truth of „There is at 
least one F‟. In addition, Peter doubt‟s whether there really are any vixens – he has 
consulted various websites, and has concluded that the existence of foxes is a conspiracy 
masterminded by the government to encourage bolshie types to protest against fox-hunting 
rather than engage in more effective revolutionary action. Thus he denies the truth of „There 
is at least one vixen‟ and hence, given his deviant interpretation of the universal quantifier, 
also denies the truth of „Every vixen is a vixen.‟ Thus here we have a case of a competent 
English speaker who denies the truth of the supposed analytic truth „Every vixen is a vixen.‟ 
On what grounds can we say they are competent? Well, it looks like there isn‟t anything 
about Peter‟s grasp of the concept VIXEN that leads to Peter‟s denial of the sentence „Every 
vixen is a vixen.‟ Instead he merely has a wacky view about how the universal quantifier 
works (although a view advocated by some competent philosophers) and some dud 
empirical information (it‟s not really true that all the evidence for the existence of foxes has 
been manufactured by the government; although it could have been, for all our grasp of the 
concept VIXEN has to say on the matter). Williamson‟s point is that enough competence in 
other uses of a concept can convince us that that user grasps the concept involved, even if 
there are some cases where they go wrong. They count as a member of a speech community 
in virtue of the fact that they tend to get things right, making it possible for them to be 
credited with conceptual competence even where they personally diverge from that speech 
community. Thus we should not hesitate to attribute to Peter competence with the concept 
VIXEN even though he denies the truth of „Every vixen is a vixen.‟ Thus „Every vixen is a 
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vixen‟ cannot be an analytic truth in the relevant sense – it is not a sentence the 
understanding of which guarantees assent. Stephen also denies the truth of „Every vixen is a 
vixen‟, but because of a deviant view on vagueness42. (Williamson 2007, ch. 4).  
 
What Williamson‟s cases demonstrate is how it is possible to attribute to a speaker 
conceptual competence even where they make false judgements about the applications of 
those concepts – they count as being competent users of the concept by showing enough 
competence in other uses of the concept to entitle them to membership of a speech 
community that does get things right, by and large. Competence, for Williamson, is thus 
holistic.  
 
Now we can see the reason why van Roojen formulates JUD-INT as he does. JUD-INT 
tells us, remember, that “If an agent judges that it is right to φ in circumstances C then 
normally she is  motivated to φ in C, or she is practically irrational.” The reason for the 
„normally‟ constraint should now be clear – it is possible for someone (like the amoralist) to 
make a genuine moral judgement without feeling motivated to act by that judgement, but 
only against a background of a community who typically do feel motivated by their moral 
judgements:  
[W]e have a certain sort of necessary connection between the attitudes of normal 
speakers in a community but of a sort that does not require all members of that 
community share the attitudes. The explanation is that the designatum of a speaker‟s 
                                                             
42 Although see David Chalmers’ 2010 for theses closely related to the analyticity thesis which 
Williamson attacks which he argues are untouched by Williamson’s arguments, and Jonathan Schaffer’s 
2010 for a similar reply. We will also be returning to these themes when we come to discussion of 
Stephen Finlay’s analytic naturalism. 
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terms can depend on the practices of the community in which she is a member, and 
the content of her thoughts expressed using those terms can depend on the same 
facts about the same community. She may flout the norms of her community and 
yet harbour thoughts which are partly constituted by the very norms she flouts.  
(van Roojen, 2010a 519) 
 
However, all that has been shown so far is how it is possible to credit someone with 
competence with moral concepts even when their judgements are not accompanied by the 
motivation which is normally necessitated by making those judgements, not that judgement 
internalism is true. We have an argument for the compatibility of JUD-INT and Brink‟s 
amoralist, but no positive case for JUD-INT. Here the comparison with Williamson‟s cases 
is apposite – in those cases we have strong, independent ground to reject the interpretations 
offered by Peter and Stephen: most would agree that interpreting the universal quantifier as 
existentially committing is a bit silly. In addition we are offered a story about what the 
deviant speaker is doing when making his deviant judgement. What independent grounds do 
we have for supposing that JUD-INT is true?  
 
Well, van Roojen claims that “the actions and practices of most normal speakers in treating 
rightness as sufficient for rationalizing and justifying an action make it the case that 
„rightness‟ designates the same property as „practically rationally permitted‟.” (519-20). 
However, this will not be sufficient for van Roojen‟s case – the externalist can agree that 
the actions and practices of most normal speakers treat rightness as sufficient for 
rationalising and justifying an action. They just will not agree that this makes it the case that 
„rightness‟ designates the same property as „practically rationally permitted‟. Instead they 
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will claim that most normal speakers can take it for granted that they and their fellows share 
an interest in doing the right thing – being psychologically normal they will care about harm 
done to other people and so on. Another way to put the point is that an externalist can 
endorse the claim that “If an agent judges that it is right to φ in circumstances C then 
normally she is  motivated to φ in C”; it is just that they will not construe this as a 
conceptual constraint on making a moral judgement, and will read „normally‟ as being 
related to something like psychological or statistical normality. The point is that we have 
nothing like the strong reasons we have in the Williamson case to claim that it is the 
amoralist who is getting things wrong, as a matter of conceptual incompetence.  
 
So what does give us reason to accept JUD-INT? Van Roojen places a lot of weight on the 
results of thought experiments to do with the translation of seemingly moral terms.43 How 
do these thought experiments proceed? Richard Joyce lays out an example succinctly 
enough to be worth quoting at length: 
Suppose we have undertaken a radical translation of the language of an alien 
community very much like our own, and we have translated nearly all of it to our 
satisfaction, except for a few normative expressions. They have some words that 
operate rather like our moral terms „good,‟ „obligatory,‟ etc. (call their words 
„schmood‟ and „schmobligatory,‟ etc.). If something is schmood then it is thought 
probably to promote or sustain alien well-being. Schmood acts are expressive of 
concern and respect. Schmood things are considered important. People considered 
schmood are praised, an absence of schmoodness is disciplined. And so on. Yet we 
                                                             
43 In fact, in 2010b in reply to Russ Shaffer-Landau van Roojen appears to accept that it is mainly the 
considerations to do with translation of seemingly moral terms that is driving the case for JUD-INT.  
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find that this population has an aberrant twist: when someone is considered to have 
judged an action φ to be schmood, this is not considered to have a bearing on 
whether that person is motivated to see φ done. The agent who has convinced us 
that he sincerely judges φ to be schmood (and judges no other available action to be 
schmood), and yet, calmly and with no explanation, feels utterly unmotivated in 
favor of φ, raises no eyebrows, produces no puzzlement in this society. To judge 
something schmood, in short, is not necessarily to be in favor of it. 
(Joyce, 2001, 26-7) 
Joyce argues that we would be hesitant to translate „schmood‟ as „good‟. There is something 
weird about the prospect. This hesitancy that we feel in translating the alien‟s „schmood‟ as 
„good‟ shows that our „good‟ is intimately connected with motivation in the way that the 
alien‟s „schmood‟ as it stands.  
 
As it stands, this line of reasoning will not be convincing to the externalist as they have a 
ready explanation of our hesitancy to translate „schmood‟ as „good.‟ Something important is 
left underspecified by the case. The externalist holds that as a matter of psychological fact 
most moral agents are motivated by their moral judgements. We are not informed whether 
the alien community are psychologically similar to us. It would seem that they are, given 
that most of their practices involving schmoodness involve treating schmoodness as we do – 
it is connected up with judgements to do with human well-being, and practices involving 
praise and discipline in ways similar to goodness. So there is something strange about the 
fact that they lack the motivational element usually connected with human judgements of 
goodness. The case, as presented, pulls us in two different directions – the alien speakers 
are both psychologically like us, and yet psychologically unlike us. In fact, we may doubt 
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whether practices like punishing the unschmood and praising the schmood could develop, 
absent the typical response goodness that human beings exhibit. Perhaps this strangeness 
explains our reticence to perform the translation.  
 
Now it could be that the more sophisticated translation thought-experiments offered by 
Dreier (1990) and Horgan and Timmons (1992) and mentioned by van Roojen alleviate this 
sort of worry. I won‟t seek to press this point directly further, as there is a more damning 
way of getting at the nub of the problem for the internalist.  
 
We can see this if we remind ourselves of the internalist‟s ambitions. Recall that in the 
discussion of fetishism it was apparent that one alleged advantage of internalism was that 
we can give an explanation of the motivational push of moral judgements merely in terms 
of their contents. Because feeling appropriately motivated is a conceptual constraint on 
making a judgement with moral content we do not have to cite anything other than that 
content to explain why moral judgements have the motivational import that they do. 
However, the lesson of van Roojen‟s discussion of social externalism is that the amoralist is 
conceptually proficient. They can make a genuine judgement with moral content without 
feeling motivated to act in accord with that judgement. So there must be something extra 
that moralists have and that the amoralist lacks that explains why the former are motivated 
and the latter are not. The most obvious difference between them is that the amoralist lacks 
the right motivational state. But if this is the relevant difference between moralists and 
amoralist JUD-INT is again robbed of any substantive content – the externalist can agree 
that moral agents are motivated to act in accord with their moral judgements when they 
have, as a matter of psychological fact, the appropriate motivational element in their 
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psychology. They just don‟t think that lacking that element makes the judgement the 
amoralist makes a non-moral judgement. And van Roojen agrees with this claim.  
 
van Roojen could object that this misses the point – although any individual can proficiently 
apply moral concepts and make a genuine moral judgement without feeling a corresponding 
motivation there is a conceptual link between moral judgement and motivation at a societal 
level that underwrites the amoralist‟s deviant moral judgements. But again the objection 
rears its head – there must be some difference between the amoralist and the moralist that 
explains this difference in motivation. If the difference is that amoralists simply lack the 
appropriate motivation then JUD-INT is not a substantive thesis – it‟s something the 
externalist can endorse. What the internalist needs to do is argue that there is something 
different which is wrong with the amoralist. Perhaps the internalist can claim that what is 
wrong with the amoralist is that they exhibit some sort of weakness of will. This runs into 
two problems: first, the amoralist case was supposed to be a distinct kind of rational 
amoralism, not attributable to weakness of will – a contention that van Roojen accepts and 
his picture is supposed to account for. Going this route collapses amoralist rational 
amoralism into another type of rational amoralism. Second, this kind of response relies 
upon being able to show that there is a principled difference between lacking the right 
motivational response due to weakness of will, and lacking it for some other reason.  
 
The upshot of all this is that van Roojen‟s picture does not move the debate between 
internalism and externalism along very far. The internalist‟s case still turns on explaining 
rational amoralism via weakness of will, rather than a mere lack of the right motivational 
state on the part of the amoralist. Internalism also offered us the hope that we could explain 
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the rational authority of morality, but the materials that van Roojen offers us actually shows 
that this claim is shaky, and again depends on the viability of explaining the amoralist‟s 
situation using weakness of will. We seemed to have started from a standoff between 
internalism and externalism: the internalist insists that the amoralist either makes no 
genuine moral judgement or betrays some sort of practical irrationality, whereas the 
externalist insists that the amoralist makes a genuine moral judgement and their lack of 
motivation doesn‟t betray any practical irrationality. What van Roojen seems to offer us is 
in fact an elimination of one of the explanations of what the amoralist is doing available to 
the internalist – he agrees with the externalist that the amoralist is making a genuine moral 
judgement. If I am right then what we are left with is a disagreement over whether the 
amoralist betrays any practical irrationality. We have certainly been offered nothing like the 
compelling reasons available to someone like Williamson to support the claim that a 
character like Peter is making a mistake in taking the universal quantifier to be existentially 
committing.  
 
What I hope to have shown here is that we have little pressing reason to endorse a form of 
judgement internalism of the type likely to cause problems for a moral realist. Thus if we 
embrace externalist moral realism then we will have a view that avoids Korsgaard‟s 
criticism if we interpret her as being concerned with the inadequacy of realism in explaining 
the motivational import of moral judgements. However, this is not yet to demonstrate there 
is a viable position available in this area. In the second half of chapter three I will look at 
two views that attempt to occupy this terrain and evaluate whether they are independently 
plausible. Before we reach that point, I wish to suggest there is another way of reading 
Korsgaard‟s complaint against realism. If there is another way of taking her argument, then 
it should be useful to have an account of that other reading before we evaluate how moral 
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realism does against her complaints. It is to that alternative way of reconstructing 
Korsgaard‟s argument that I now turn.  
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CHAPTER THREE: THE GENERALISED ANTI-VOLUNTARISM 
ARGUMENT AND MORAL REALISMS 
 
 
At this point it might be worth summing up what I have been trying to argue thus far. 
Korsgaard argued that the normative question (why should I be moral?) demands an 
answer. Moral realism, she claims, cannot provide an adequate answer. Therefore we 
should reject moral realism. She also claims that it is the force of the normative question 
that explains the force of Moore‟s open question argument, and Mackie‟s argument from 
queerness.  
 
However, it‟s not particularly easy to get a grip on what Korsgaard‟s problem with realism 
is, precisely. I argued that if we interpret the normative question as a question about 
motivation then we can get an interpretation of Korsgaard‟s argument against realism which 
meets a number of aims. First, it is clearer what the problem is supposed to be; second the 
problem is located in the right kind of area; and we have an explanation of the link between 
the normative question and the open-question argument and the argument from queerness 
that Korsgaard posits. 
 
 On this interpretation, a normative sceptic (someone who doubts the normative force of 
morality) who asks the normative question is asking what is it about the fact that something 
is right that should move them to action. Korsgaard continually complains that the moral 
realist‟s answer to the normative question is inadequate because they advert to “just another 
fact” to explain why people are bound by morality. But if someone is unmoved by their 
duty to φ, then telling them that it really is a fact that they have a duty to φ will not help. 
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And, on the motivational reading of Korsgaard‟s complaint, this is still the problem. If the 
normative sceptic is not motivated by their duty, then telling them that it is a fact that that is 
their duty is hardly likely to motivate them. This is because merely believing that a fact 
obtains will not, if we assume a Humean account of moral psychology, move someone to 
action. So, on this reading of Korsgaard‟s rejection of realism, realism goes wrong in the 
place Korsgaard says it does – they try to use a moral fact at a point in the argument with a 
normative sceptic where the appeal to just another fact is of no use.  
 
We also saw that we can give plausible interpretations of both the argument from queerness 
and the open-question argument where the arguments include judgement internalism as a 
premise. These interpretations are not only independently plausible, they also match 
Korsgaard‟s ambitions in terms of scope. The original open question argument, remember, 
was designed to only militate against naturalist forms of moral realism. But Korsgaard 
wants her normative question (which she claims lies behind the open question argument) to 
have force against naturalist and non-naturalist moral realism. We would then have a 
problem explaining how the normative question explains the force of the open question 
argument – the two would differ in purported scope, and we would have to finesse the 
connection between them. Fortunately, with the revised open-question argument that 
incorporates judgement internalism as a premise, no such finessing is required. The revised 
open-question argument turns out to have force against both naturalist and non-naturalist 
moral realism, so it‟s range matches Korsgaard‟s ambitions.  
 
So, if we interpret Korsgaard‟s rejection of realism in terms of motivation we get to be able 
to explain a number of features of her views. This is still an advantage even if Korsgaard 
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herself would explicitly reject this characterisation of her argument against moral realism. 
This is because we would have an argument that could be endorsed by those who feel that 
there is something to Korsgaard‟s attack on realism, and it deserves proper scrutiny, but 
who are worried  first about where it leads, and that there is still something slippery going 
on within the argument. This slipperiness comes from the fact that for Korsgaard‟s 
argument to work (under this interpretation) it would need to be true that moral realism is 
committed to judgement internalism. If it were not, then the realist could respond to 
Korsgaard simply by pointing out that there is a breed of externalist moral realism available.  
 
This is why we have been looking at whether there is any compelling reason to think that 
moral realism has to be committed to judgement internalism. We saw that Smith‟s argument 
from fetishism, and van Roojen‟s treatment of rational amoralism don‟t provide us with an 
overwhelming case for internalism. However, it‟s one thing to say that there is no 
compelling reason why the realist has to endorse internalism, quite another to say that there 
is a viable version of externalist moral realism on the table. In section 3.3 I will look at two 
versions this type of moral realism, and see if they are at least plausible (plausible enough 
that if we are faced with abandoning realism altogether or picking one of them, it makes 
sense to pick one of them). In the course of that treatment I will cover another type of 
consideration thought to commit realists (and metaethicists more generally) to internalism – 
so called „twin-earth‟ thought experiments involving moral terms.  
 
However, there is a problem for taking this way of interpreting Korsgaard – it involves an 
argumentative strategy she disavows. In her discussion of Mill (an externalist moral realist) 
she claims that the normative question is not asking us why we should be motivated by our 
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moral judgements. Instead, it is asking us why we should endorse those judgements as 
genuinely normative (1996 §2.4). We can see that these questions can come apart, she says, 
when we consider a case where we find ourselves overwhelmed by our moral judgements – 
we can‟t help but be moved by them. Even in this case, she claims, we can still ask whether 
we should endorse those judgements. And this is what the normative question is aiming to 
get at. So, the line I am taking, although it has certain advantages, is not a line Korsgaard 
would endorse. As I have already pointed out, this is not necessarily fatal. The interpretation 
of Korsgaard‟s argument against realism I‟ve offered could be accepted by those who think 
that Korsgaard is on to something, but need to see more details. However, what it means is 
that the argument identified in this interpretation is not Korsgaard’s argument as she 
intends it. Is there, then, another way of reconstructing Korsgaard‟s argument so that we get 
something close to the spirit of Korsgaard‟s remarks about externalist moral realism, has 
some force against realism, and accords with the other ambitions Korsgaard has for her 
normative question? And what follows if we do find such an interpretation?  
 
In the proceeding material I have made much of Korsgaard‟s claim that the normative 
question (and the argument built off the back of it) explains the force of the open question 
argument and the argument from queerness. Perhaps a better understanding of Korsgaard‟s 
argument against realism can be had by looking at the other affinity Korsgaard claims for 
the normative question – between it and an argument against voluntarism. 
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3.1 Voluntarism  
 
A voluntarist, remember, claims that obligations derive from the commands (or will, or 
decisions) of a legislator. The most popular variant is theological voluntarism, where the 
relevant commands are God‟s. The voluntarist endorses something like the following claim:  
VOL:  If agent x is obligated to perform action a then this is because the legislator 
commands, or in some other way wills, a.44 
So when you are obligated it is because a legislator (typically God) has commanded that 
you act in a particular way.  
 
But the voluntarist runs into a problem very quickly. We can ask of the voluntarist „why am 
I obligated to obey the commands of that legislator?‟ According to the theory, all 
obligations come from the commands of the legislator, so it must be because she commands 
my obedience. But this cannot be right: the legislator cannot make it the case that I should 
obey their commands just by commanding that I do so – unless I‟m already obligated to 
obey their commands then such a command will make no difference. The question becomes 
„why am I obligated to obey the command that I am obligated to obey the commands of the 
legislator?‟. The voluntarist could reply that you are so obligated because the legislator 
commands that you are. But this seems to add nothing – we can ask the same question about 
that command. And now the voluntarist has stepped on the path to an infinite regress. 
 
                                                             
44
 Adapted from Schroeder’s (2005) 
120 
 
Instead they could claim that you are obligated to obey God‟s commands for some other 
reason. Pufendorf, for example, claims that we have an obligation to obey the legislator 
when they have legitimate authority over us. But if we follow this path, we have in effect 
given up on our voluntarism. Our obligations are now explained by something else – the 
legitimacy of the legislator. 
 
Thus the voluntarist faces a dilemma – either they try to explain our obligation to obey the 
legislator‟s commands using another of those commands (which is of no help, and leads to 
an infinite regress of commands, each one of which is never properly explained); or they try 
to explain that obligation using something else (in which case they are no longer a 
voluntarist). We can call this problem the „Cudworth problem‟ after the 17th century 
Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth who originated it. 
 
The other interpretation of Korsgaard available is to focus on her claim of affinity between 
the argument against realism built on the normative question, and the Cudworth problem for 
voluntarism. 
 
Realists, she claims, attempt to end the regress threatened by voluntarism by fiat - by 
positing intrinsically normative entities that are supposed to stop a repetition of the 
normative question. For Korsgaard, this is a way of avoiding answering the question at all. 
Instead of telling us why some actions are obligatory, the realist posits intrinsically 
normative entities or relations found in the world – some actions are simply right, and this is 
because these actions are intrinsically obligatory. These normative entities are supposed to 
forbid further questioning – once we have discovered that certain actions are intrinsically 
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obligatory, that will be the end of the matter. Korsgaard contends that this kind of response 
to the Cudworth problem for voluntarism (and hence the normative question) does not 
really engage with the problem at all. What we were trying to get an account of was why 
some actions are obligatory. To be simply told that some actions are intrinsically normative 
is not an explanation of the normative force of the obligation to perform that action – 
instead it is merely a statement of the realist‟s confidence in the existence of moral facts.  
 
If we emphasise this line of Korsgaard‟s thought, then what is wrong with realism is that it 
attempts to deal with the Cudworth problem voluntarism faced by stamping it‟s foot. We 
ask a voluntarist why we are obligated to do what God commands, and they have no good 
answer. We ask a realist why we should do what is right, and they simply insist that it‟s a 
fact that a certain action is obligatory. Neither response is adequate.  
 
 
3.2 Voluntarism Reconsidered 
 
We have seen that voluntarism faces a problem answering the normative question – we can 
ask why we should obey the commands of a legislator, to which the voluntarist seemingly 
had no good reply. But what is it precisely about the voluntarist‟s theory that is causing the 
problem? Remember, we had the voluntarist offering the following thesis (for simplicity I 
will discuss the problem in terms of theological voluntarism, where the relevant legislator is 
God). 
122 
 
VOL:  If agent x is obligated to perform action a then this is because God 
commands, or in some other way wills, x to perform a. 45 
The problem arises when we ask where the authority of God‟s commands come from. One 
way to make this clear is to follow Mark Schroeder (2005) by asking what is it that makes 
God‟s commands (that the voluntarist says I should obey) different from, say, Jimmy 
Savile‟s commands (which, presumably, I should ignore). If God‟s commands aren‟t special 
in some way, then it is hard to see how the theory could even hope to be true. But what does 
this difference consist in? The voluntarist seems to be committed to saying that you ought to 
do what God commands you to do, whereas Jimmy Savile‟s commands generate no such 
obligations. So the voluntarist claims that: 
AUTHORITY VOLGod: For every x (x ought to do what God commands) 
Is necessarily true, whereas: 
AUTHORITY VOLJS: For every x (x ought to do what Jimmy Savile commands) 
Is not necessarily true46. 
 
But, if the voluntarist is committed to AUTHORITY VOLGod  then the argument 
Korsgaard provides starts to bite. That is because we can ask for an explanation of the 
obligation contained in AUTHORITY VOLGod – why ought I do what God commands? 
Well, according to VOL above, for every obligation, you should fulfil that obligation 
                                                             
45 This way of laying out the problem is given by Schroeder (2005) 2-4 
46 AUTHORITY VOLJS does not have to be false – as a contingent matter of fact Jimmy Savile could have 
commanded all and only those actions God does. But Jimmy Savile’s commands in this case don’t create 
my obligations, they merely track the truth about which obligations I have. God’s commands create my 
obligations, so my obligations are linked to them in every possible world.  
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because God commands you to. So why should I do what God commands? Because God 
commands it. But this is not an adequate answer – if I have no reason to obey God‟s 
commands anyway, why would God commanding me to make any difference what so ever? 
So, the argument emerges out of the voluntarist‟s attempt to explain the authority of God‟s 
commands. It seems as if such an explanation, which goes via something like 
AUTHORITY VOLGod, which, together with VOL, leads to some sort of incoherence.  
 
However, at this point we should start to be suspicious. It seems as if the argument 
generalises to any general explanatory moral theory. As Schroeder puts it, any such theory 
(which aims to give a unified answer to the question „why ought I to do a?‟) will endorse: 
THEORY: For all agents x and action-types a, whenever x ought to do a, that is 
because x stands in relation R to a. 
What relation R is will depend upon the particular normative theory that you endorse. But, 
whatever relation R is for a particular theory, that theorist will argue that relation R is 
special in some way. There are a number of ways in which you could be related to an 
action, most of which generate no obligations at all. Relation R on the other hand, must 
command some kind of authority: “but what does this authority consist in, to explain why 
being related by R to an action can obligate you to do it? It must be this: that you ought to 
do whatever action you are related to by R.” (Schroeder, 2005, 4). But now we face the 
same problem as the voluntarist: 
 Now that [the obligation to do what you are related to by R]... is exactly the sort of 
thing that THEORY is supposed to explain – why you ought to do something. But 
if we need this, in order for the explanations offered by THEORY to work, then it 
is hardly the sort of thing that THEORY could explain. Imagine: if it were not 
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already the case that being related by R to an action obligated you to do it, then 
being related by R to  the action, doing-whatever-you-are-related-to-by-R, would 
not make a difference. And if it were already the case, then it would not matter 
whether you were related by R to it or not. (4) 
So it turns out that any general explanatory moral theory falls prey to this style of argument. 
For our purposes, this might seem a positive result – after all, Korsgaard not only wants to 
rule out voluntarism as a viable position, but any form of substantive realism. In fact, recall 
that the problem faced by the substantive realist was that they simply refused to offer an 
explanation of the source of obligation. The above argument seems to demonstrate that if 
the moral realist were to try to offer such an explanation it would fail for the same reasons 
as the voluntarist. So we might think that this generalised anti-voluntarist argument, 
combined with Korsgaard‟s normative question form quite a nice dilemma. Either the realist 
refuses to explain the authority of the obligations they insist are real – in which case they 
are failing to engage with the normative question at all; or, they offer an explanation, which 
falls down as a result of the generalised anti-voluntarist argument above.  
 
However, there are two points to be made here. Korsgaard shares explanatory ambitions 
herself – she believes that her own neo-Kantian constructivist position can successfully 
answer the normative question without falling into the kind of normative regress which 
dogs the moral realist. The account she offers however seems to have the form of 
THEORY. We will see (in chapter 5) how she argues that you are obligated to act on that 
maxim which you can at the same time will to be a universal law, as an equal legislator in a 
kingdom of ends. This seems to fit well with THEORY (with „act only on that maxim...‟ 
describing the relevant relation). Nevertheless, Korsgaard argues that the specific form of 
her theory avoids the problems faced by the moral realist. If so then we would have an 
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instance of a general explanatory theory that endorses THEORY, so it would seem that (if 
Korsgaard is right) there is at least one way of avoiding the generalised anti-voluntarist 
argument. 
 
Second, what the generalist anti-voluntarist argument attempts to show is extremely strong 
– any general explanatory moral theory is incoherent. We may feel inclined to accept such a 
theory for other, seemingly persuasive reasons. So is there any way that the anti-voluntarist 
argument (and hence the generalised anti-voluntarist argument) can be resisted? 
 
Remember, we originally started by asking what the authority of God‟s commands consist 
in. One way of glossing this was to ask how God‟s commands are different to Jimmy 
Savile‟s. The voluntarist runs into trouble when they appeal to AUTHORITY VOLGod as 
an explanation – put simply, it contains an ought which is covered by VOL, and this leads 
to the incoherence we saw above. However, Schroeder points out that AUTHORITY 
VOLGod  is ambiguous between two possible readings: 
CONDITIONAL VOL: Necessarily, for every x and every a (God has commanded 
x to do a → x ought to do a) 
Or: 
CATEGORICAL VOL: Necessarily, for every x (x stands in the ought to relation 
to the action-type: doing whatever God commands) 
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It seems that holding CONDITIONAL VOL for God‟s commands and rejecting it for 
Jimmy Savile‟s commands is adequate to describe the difference between God‟s commands 
(which lead to obligations) and Jimmy Savile‟s (which do not). However, CONDITIONAL 
VOL on its own does not fall prey to the anti-voluntarist argument. That is because is not 
committed to there actually being any obligations – it could be the case that there is nothing 
God has commanded you to do. We ran into trouble with AUTHORITY VOLGod because 
it contained an obligation that our voluntarist theory had to explain. So on this reading, we 
can avoid the anti-voluntarist argument.  
 
Schroeder asks us to compare this with CATEGORICAL VOL – this states that there is an 
obligation that everyone has – doing whatever God commands. This reading would allow 
the anti-voluntarist space to make their point – how do we explain that obligation?  
 
But if CONDITIONAL VOL is enough to explain the difference between God‟s 
commands and Jimmy Savile‟s, why should we also accept CATEGORICAL VOL, and 
leave ourselves open to the anti-voluntarist argument? One reason might be that we think 
that we need CATEGORICAL VOL to complete our explanation of the authority of God‟s 
commands. Schroeder offers us an intuitively plausible model of moral explanations under 
which something like CATEGORICAL VOL would be needed to complete the 
explanation of God‟s authority, which Schroeder calls the standard model (SM): 
SM: The explanation that X ought to do A because P follows the Standard Model 
just in case it works because there is (1) some further action B such that X ought to 
do B and (2) not just because P and (3) P explains why doing A is a way for X to do 
B.  
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And this gets us to the anti-voluntarist argument: 
The voluntarist believes that whenever you ought to do something, that is because 
God has commanded it. For this explanation to follow the Standard Model, it must 
appeal to some further thing that you ought to do, and not just because God has 
commanded this thing. And since that further thing that you ought to do falls under 
the scope of the theory, the explanation of why you ought to do it must appeal to the 
same thing – namely, itself. But that makes the explanation circular (10).47 
And this generates the anti-voluntarist conclusion. So if all normative explanations follow 
the SM then we need CATEGORICAL VOL as well as CONDITIONAL VOL to 
complete our explanation of God‟s authority, and thus we are open to the anti-voluntarist 
argument. But do all normative explanations work this way? In other words, should we 
accept the Standard Model Theory (SMT) 
SMT: For all x, a and p, if x ought to do a because p, that explanation must follow 
the Standard Model 
 
It seems as if we do have an alternative type of normative explanation, one offered by a 
reductive or constitutive explanation. For example, the voluntarist could offer the following: 
CONSTITUTIVE VOL: For God to have commanded X  to do A is just what it is 
for it to be the case that X ought to do A.  
This is a reductive thesis about oughts because it analyses oughts in terms of something else 
– God‟s commands. If this type of reductive explanation is viable, then it gives us a way 
                                                             
47
 In support of this diagnosis, Schroeder points out that the original purveyors of the anti-voluntarist 
argument were also the first proponents of the standard model of normative explanations. See Price 
(1948, 52-53), Cudworth (1996, 20). 
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around the anti-voluntarist argument. We agree with them that some normative explanations 
follow the STANDARD MODEL, but at some point these will be grounded in the type of 
constitutive explanation given above. Recall that the generalised anti-voluntarist argument 
aimed to show the inadequacy of a general explanatory moral theory. Can those other 
theories use this same strategy? It seems clear that they can. For example, a consequentialist 
might want to endorse something like: 
CONSTITUTIVE CON: For it to be the case that X ought to do A is just for it to 
be the case that doing A will bring about the most good.  
If this type of explanation is legitimate then, we have a way in which both the voluntarist or 
any general explanatory moral theory can avoid the generalised anti-voluntarist argument. 
For the purposes of this thesis, it would mean that Korsgaard puts the anti-voluntarist 
argument to ill use. She means to use it as part of a strategy to dismiss all types of 
substantive moral realism. As we‟ve seen so far though, it appears as if using the above type 
of explanation provides space for all reductive theories to avoid the anti-voluntarist 
argument. 
 
Are there any reasons why we shouldn‟t expect explanations of this kind to be legitimate? 
Well, Schroeder argues that the original proponents of the anti-voluntaristic argument 
offered it as one half of a dilemma for the voluntarist – either they fall prey to the argument 
or they have to give an explanation like the ones given above. However, if they do that, then 
they fall prey to pre-cursor of the open question argument. For example, Price says: 
Right and wrong when applied to actions which are commanded or forbidden by the 
will of God, or that produce good or harm, do not signify merely, that such actions 
are commanded or forbidden, or that they are useful or hurtful [...] Were not this 
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true, it would be palpably absurd in any case to ask, whether it is right to obey a 
command, or wrong to disobey it; and the propositions, obeying a command is right, 
or producing happiness is right, would be most trifling, as expressing no more than 
that obeying a command, is obeying a command, or producing happiness, is 
producing happiness. (Price 1948, 16-17, from Schroeder‟s 2005) 
So if it being the case that you ought to do φ just was for φ-ing to be commanded by God, 
then it would betray some kind of conceptual confusion to ask „should I do what is 
commanded by God?‟. It seems clear that Price thinks that this will always be an open 
question, so being obligated to do φ can‟t just be φ-ing‟s being commanded by God.  
 
So what does all this mean? Well, we have seen that there are two possible interpretations 
of what is going on in Korsgaard‟s rejection of moral realism. First, she could be getting at 
an issue to do with moral motivation. Second, she could be using the normative question to 
generalise the Cudworth problem faced by voluntarism to moral realism. We have also seen 
that there are strategies to escape these problems. To escape the first problem, we need to 
abandon internalism and give an account of a plausible form of externalist moral realism. 
To escape the second, we can first note that generalising the Cudworth problem is a bad 
manoeuvre for Korsgaard – it would threaten the kind of theory of moral obligation she is 
eventually hoping to offer. We have also seen that there is an alternative conception of 
explanation that allows reductivist moral realism to escape the Cudworth problem. 
However, this kind of moral realism becomes vulnerable to an open question argument style 
objection.  
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To fully complete a defence of moral realism against Korsgaard‟s attack we need two 
things. To deal with the first problem we need a sketch of a viable form of externalist moral 
realism. To avoid the second we need a sketch of a viable form of reductivist moral realism 
that can avoid the open question argument. It‟s to these aims which we now turn. 
 
3.3 Externalist Moral Realism  
 
There are, of course, a number of moral realisms available. What we are looking for in 
response to Korsgaard is a form of moral realism that at the very least embraces externalism 
about moral motivation (in order to circumvent my revisionary reading of the normative 
question) and, if possible, explores a reductionist strategy which we can exploit to escape 
the generalised anti-voluntarist argument above.48 We can distinguish between analytic and 
synthetic versions of externalist realism. I will briefly consider a version of the former, 
before looking at one version of the latter in more depth – the so-called „Cornell realism‟ of 
Brink, Boyd and Sturgeon. I will not be able here to examine each in much detail, but I 
hope to show that both Cornell realism and Finlay‟s analytic reductivism can at least resist 
the main arguments directed against them, leaving them viable alternatives to Korsgaard‟s 
neo-Kantian constructivism. 
                                                             
48 As most forms of realist non-naturalism (e.g. Moore 1903, McDowell 1998, Wedgwood 2007) are 
advocated, in part, on the grounds that they can sustain a commitment to internalism these views will 
not be relevant for our purposes. This is fortunate as the metaphysical and epistemological 
commitments of non-naturalism are troubling. According to Stephen Finlay (forthcoming) it is even 
typical for non-naturalists to acknowledge this discomfort but to provide transcendental arguments to 
the conclusion that we must embrace non-naturalist moral properties. The idea being that our moral 
practices demand such properties so we must accept their existence despite the unwelcome 
consequences of adding them to our ontology. In investigating naturalist and externalist moral realism 
we will be indirectly testing this claim – if a naturalistic realism is plausible, then we don’t need to take 
up non-naturalism.  
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3.31 Analytic Naturalism 
 
Analytic naturalisms attempt to find analytic connections between moral and naturalistic 
predicates, thereby reducing moral facts to natural facts. One version of this view is the 
analytic functionalism associated with Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit.49 A more recent, 
externalist, version of this type of view is Stephen Finlay‟s analytic reductivism. Here I will 
briefly outline Finlay‟s end-relational theory of moral semantics and then examine how well 
it does. I will argue that although Finlay‟s account has  major benefits it also faces a 
methodological worry and may be vulnerable to a modified open question argument.  
 
So, what does the account look like? Finlay‟s overarching concern is to offer a semantics 
for all normative terms as they are used in nearly all contexts rather than offering an 
account limited to just the moral uses of those terms. He points out that we use a word like 
„good‟ in both moral contexts – „Jane is a good woman‟ – and non-moral contexts – „This is 
a good knife.‟ The same goes for terms like „ought‟, „should‟, „must‟ and „may‟: we say 
both things like  „Governments should not torture people‟  and „You should run for the bus.‟ 
Finlay argues that we should prefer an account of these normative terms that is unified in 
the sense of offering the same general analysis of moral and non-moral uses. This is 
preferable on at least two grounds: 1. Without a unified account we would be forced to 
claim that „good‟ (for example) in moral contexts possessed a different sense from „good‟ in 
non-moral contexts. We would then need an explanation of how or why these two distinct 
meanings came to be associated with the same words. This concern is made particularly 
                                                             
49
 See Jackson 1992, Jackson and Pettit 1998 and Jackson 1998. For problems with this ‘network 
analysis’ of moral predicates see Smith 1994 and 1998 and McFarland and Miller 1998. This sort of view 
is also internalist, so not suitable for my purposes.  
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pressing by the fact that this feature of normative vocabulary (that it can be used in moral 
and non-moral utterances) is widely cross-linguistic – we could just about accept that this 
feature of English is pure coincidence, but this would not be anywhere near satisfying for 
accounting for a feature found in a large number of languages. 2. We hope that our account 
of moral language will be conducive to an explanation of how language users so easily 
make use of normative terms. If the semantics we offer for normative terms is unified and 
thus simpler the task of explaining how language users manage to learn and use these terms 
competently becomes easier.50 
 
Finlay‟s method is to seek semantic analyses of normative terms based on linguistic data. 
The analytic reductivist hopes to show that normative concepts are composed out of 
simpler, non-normative concepts. To offer a semantic analysis of a complex concept is to 
explain which simpler concepts it is composed of – e.g. we might analyse the concept 
BACHELOR as being composed out of the simpler concepts of UNMARRIED, MALE, 
ADULT. These analyses are supposed to be connected to meaning in some way, so that the 
truths they express will be analytic - true in virtue of meaning. Finlay holds that as concepts 
are mental entities the study of their structure is an a priori, armchair pursuit; the main data 
relevant being our linguistic intuitions about the appropriateness/grammaticality of various 
constructions involving the suggested analysis.  
 
                                                             
50 Finlay offers an interesting reason for preferring simpler to more complicated accounts of moral 
semantics in general. It might be quite easy to mould a complex theory to the linguistic data; however, it 
is unlikely that a simple theory that predicts all the relevant data is correct by accident. Therefore a 
simple theory that explains all the available data is more likely to be correct. See his (forthcoming) Ch. 1.  
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Finlay‟s suggested analysis holds that normative utterances are end-relational. The basic 
idea is that to say that something is good (for example) is to say that it raises the probability 
of  some end obtaining. The idea is easiest to see in a non-moral case. Suppose I tell you 
whilst you are chopping bread that: „This is a good knife.‟ The semantic content of that 
utterance is (very roughly) „Using this knife raises the probability of the bread being cut.‟ 
That is, I am telling you that using the knife raises the probability of obtaining some end51. 
Although the relevant end is not always explicitly mentioned it is supplied by the context of 
the utterance – if I say a knife is good whilst we are making sandwiches I say that it is good 
for (raises the probability of us succeeding in) sandwich making. If you and I are violent 
thugs I might use the same sentence to say that the knife is good for stabbing people. 
Similar considerations hold for other normative terms like „should‟: we can explicate the 
content of my utterance of „You should run for the bus‟ as „Running for the bus raises the 
probability of you catching it.‟ Finlay repeats this same sort of analysis for the most 
important normative terms („must‟, „may‟, „should‟, „ought‟, „good‟, „reason‟, and others) 
using a variety of linguistic data to explain the relationship between the target everyday 
normative utterances and the reductive analyses of their semantic content and how and why 
the everyday utterances can plausibly be accounted for as elliptical for the more obviously 
end-relational analyses. 
 
The first thing to note about this theory is that it is reductionist. We explain normative 
notions in terms of something non-normative – the concept of raising the probability of an 
end obtaining.52 This means that the analytic reductivist can easily adopt the type of 
                                                             
51 Things are slightly complicated by normative utterances sometimes being relativised to multiple ends, 
but these details won’t be important here 
52
 One historical irony is that (at least) Blackburn’s expressivist semantic programme is inspired by proto-
expressivist approaches to probability. Like moral judgements, probability judgements also have some 
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constitutive explanations that avoid the generalised anti-voluntarist argument – Finlay tells 
us that the semantic analyses he offers tell us about the essences of normative properties: in 
other words, what kind of things that they are. It will then be legitimate for the analytic 
reductivist to say that goodness, say, just is the property of raising the probability of some 
end obtaining. 
 
Finlay also gives us an account of how his end-relational theory allows us to actually 
simplify the standard possible world semantics for modal auxiliary verbs like „must‟ and 
„may‟ (see his Ch. 4).  
 
Another advantage of the analytic reductivist account is that it offers an explanation of the 
appeal of judgement internalism without committing to an implausibly strong form of 
internalism. The reductivist aims to account for the practicality of moral judgements by 
attending closely to their pragmatic content. Finlay distinguishes between semantic content 
(the proposition/s conventionally expressed by a particular combination of symbols) and 
pragmatic content (propositions that are communicated [intentionally or non-intentionally] 
by the utterance of a sentence in a particular context)53. One feature of normative 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
puzzling features, leading some to try to account for them as being expressions of our confidence in 
some particular event happening (see Blackburn, unpublished). Finlay, on the other hand, wishes to 
reduce normative judgements to a class of probability judgements in the service of a cognitivist 
semantics. The expressivist proposal about probability judgements, however, is not uncontested (and 
the metaphysical and epistemological issues might be very different in the two domains), so Finlay’s 
account may well be perfectly reasonable. It is just interesting that the same type of judgement can 
both inspire expressivist accounts of morality, and also be seen as a suitable reduction base for a realist 
cognitivism.  
53
 It is far beyond the scope of this thesis to reach a judgement about whether this way of carving the 
semantics/pragmatics distinction is correct, or even whether such a distinction is philosophically fruitful. 
For my purposes I will just take on board Finlay’s taxonomy to see whether his explanation of the 
practicality of moral judgements is plausible on its own terms.  
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judgements is that the end that they are relative to is sometimes suppressed – I can say that 
something is a good knife without adding what it is good for, or that an action is obligatory 
without explicitly saying what end it is necessary for. This is one of the reasons we have to 
do some semantic analysis to reach the end-relational theory – if the end was always 
mentioned, the semantics Finlay offers would just be obvious. It is these two factors (that 
moral utterances, like others, can communicate pragmatic content within contexts; and that 
ends are sometimes suppressed) that yields an explanation of the practicality of moral 
judgements. The situations within which it is appropriate to suppress an end when offering a 
moral judgement are those when the end the judgement is relativised to is salient for the 
speaker and their audience. So, say I am speaking at my local conservative association and 
say „George Osborne‟s economic policies are good.‟ This can be perfectly appropriate 
because the end that George Osborne‟s policies raise the probability of (redistributing 
wealth away from the poor to the rich and providing cover for a scaling back of the welfare 
state, say) is one which is sufficiently salient for us in that we all share it and know that it is 
a concern we are in the business of promoting. Thus, it should not be surprising that these 
judgements (where the relevant end is suppressed) are tightly connected to motivation to act 
– it is appropriate to utter them in this form only when the end they are relativised for is one 
that the speaker and the audience are committed to. So, by missing out a semantic 
component of the moral proposition I am expressing with my utterance (the end it is 
relativised to) I pragmatically implicate that it involves an end that I or we have (Finlay, 
forthcoming, Ch. 6).54 
 
                                                             
54 One might be worried that people have ends when the desire that some state of affairs obtains. Then 
Finlay’s view will have trouble explaining the seeming categoricity of moral requirements – that they 
apply to us regardless of our desires. Finlay makes two moves to deflate this worry: first, he argues that 
something being an end does not require a desire or even a desirer. Second, he tries to generate an 
explanation of the seeming categoricity of moral judgements in terms of pragmatic factors. 
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This explanation of the practicality in terms of pragmatics rather than semantics relieves 
internalism of some of its troubling properties. The problem with strong forms of 
internalism is that they say that being appropriately motivated is a constraint on making a 
judgement with a particular semantic content. This then forces us to either build a desire-
like motivational element into the semantic content (I will examine these sorts of accounts 
in ch. 4) or revise our theory of moral psychology in a non-Humean direction. The analytic 
reductivist isn‟t forced to do this – instead they simply hold that speakers can pragmatically 
imply that they are motivated in the direction of some moral judgement by choosing to utter 
it in a particular way (suppressing the relevant end). True, this sort of account does not 
accommodate a strong form of internalism – it‟s not conceptually impossible for there to be 
an amoralist. But we saw above that such forms of internalism are poorly motivated. What 
the analytic reductivist offers us, then, could be all the internalism we need.5556 
 
However, it‟s possible that Finlay secures this sop to the internalist at the cost of not taking 
the possibility of an amoralist seriously enough. Consider what, on the analytic reductivist 
account, it is that an amoralist is doing. Say they utter „Meat-eating is wrong‟ whilst lacking 
any motivation to refrain from eating meat. By suppressing the end that refraining from 
eating meat secures (preventing animal suffering, perhaps) the amoralist pragmatically 
implicates that they have that end. Now, an amoralist is not supposed to be stupid – they 
                                                             
55 What’s important to note here is that this appeal to pragmatic content avoids the worry that 
sometimes philosophical appeals to the semantics/pragmatics distinction are ad hoc. This application of 
the distinction only yields a plausible story because of the details of the end-relational theory that it is 
combined with – it is the fact that we can miss out ends when they are shared with our audience which 
explains the practicality of moral judgements, and we would expect to find this form of ellipsis based on 
considerations about how pragmatic content works in general: we don’t need to tailor our account of 
pragmatics specifically to this case.  
56
 Finlay remains an externalist though, for he agrees that it is possible for a semantically competent 
agent to make a moral judgement without feeling appropriately motivated. To express that judgement 
would be pragmatically improper (in lots of contexts) unless the relevant implicatures were cancelled.  
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should be just as good at working out the pragmatic content implied by their remarks within 
particular contexts, and they also know that their utterance is semantically completed by the 
particular end that they are implying they have. So, if Finlay is right, then the amoralist is 
doing something that they know is at least conversationally improper. In fact, what they 
seem to be doing is a variation of what the inverted commas theorist has them doing. 
Remember, for the inverted commas theorist when an amoralist says that something is 
good, they are only using „good‟ in inverted commas – they really mean that the thing is 
judged to be good by others, for example. Now, on Finlay‟s account what the amoralist 
does is similar – by suppressing the end their normative utterance is relativised to they are 
acknowledging that that end is one that is sufficiently salient for their audience – that a 
large proportion of the audience have that end and will be moved by it. So, although they 
are not using the symbol “good” semantically improperly (as the inverted commas theorist 
has it) they are using it improperly at the level of pragmatics by implying that they have an 
end that they don‟t. But, suppressing the end shows that they DO know that the end is 
shared by their audience; so, in effect, they are performing a speech act that amounts to 
them acknowledging that most other people would have the relevant end. At this point, the 
friend of the amoralist could argue that this strategy is sufficiently similar to the original 
inverted-commas strategy for us to reject it as a characterisation of what the amoralist is 
doing.  
 
The analytic reductivist could explore two avenues of response at this point. First, they 
could point out that speakers can implicate information that they don‟t intend to 
communicate (at least on Finlay‟s way of drawing the semantics/pragmatics distinction. See 
his Ch. 6). Therefore, we could just claim that the amoralist, although semantically 
competent, just isn‟t very good at working out the pragmatic content of their utterances. The 
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analytic reductivist could then point out that the considerations I brought out against the 
earlier treatments of the amoralist simply don‟t apply in this case – I argued that reliable 
application of a term like „good‟ to the right extension of objects is prima facie evidence of 
semantic competence. The analytic reductivist agrees that the amoralist is semantically 
competent – they just say that they are a bit slipshod when it comes to pragmatic content.  
 
However, this sort of response may not go far enough – in order to understand that they can 
miss out the end their normative judgement is relativised to the amoralist has to understand 
that it is an end that their audience shares, even if they do not have it themselves. If they did 
not know this, then their utterance would be semantically incomplete – it would fail to 
communicate any determinate proposition.57 So, it looks like the amoralist knows enough 
about how normative terms work to know that you can suppress an end when your audience 
has that end, but they seem to have a very particular blind spot when it comes to the 
relationship between those terms and their own ends. We might worry then that Finlay‟s 
treatment  of the amoralist is not as principled as he would like it to be.  
 
The second avenue the analytic reductivist could explore is a particular feature of pragmatic 
content – its cancellability. Because pragmatic content is only conversationally rather than 
conventionally implicated by a certain collection of linguistic tokens, it‟s possible to cancel 
the pragmatic content implied by the use of an utterance within a context – to indicate that 
you don‟t wish to communicate that content. For example, suppose we were in a restaurant 
together and I asked you what you thought of it. If you said „Well, the waiters are polite‟ 
                                                             
57Or, more accurately, if they did not know this information it would be something of a mystery how 
they manage to know when to suppress the relevant end.  
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and left it at that, you literally say that the waiters are polite; but you might also 
conversationally implicate the proposition that the food isn‟t up to much. However, you can 
supplement your utterance in order to cancel that particular implication – you might say 
„Well, the waiters are polite. But the food isn‟t bad either.‟ Now, the analytic reductivist 
could claim that it is always appropriate for amoralists to cancel the problematic pragmatic 
content of their utterances. That it is appropriate for them to say things like „Meat-eating is 
wrong. But I don‟t mean to suggest by that that I intend at all to stop eating meat.‟ 
However, the amoralist might reject this as a characterisation of their practice – they might 
claim that that is not what they are thinking when they think about meat-eating – they think 
just that meat-eating is wrong. This would be problematic as it‟s typically thought that 
conversational implication of pragmatic content is something that happens at the level of 
public conversation – to put it very simply, that the laws of pragmatics do not apply at the 
level of thought. If, then, the amoralist rejects this characterisation of what they are trying to 
communicate, then this would be some evidence against the reductivist proposal. Finlay 
himself believes that pragmatic considerations apply even at the level of thought, so he is 
unlikely to be moved by this worry. Whether this sort of view (that pragmatic 
considerations apply at the level of thought as well as conversation) is plausible will 
depend, in turn, on what we think of thought. If we think of thought as something like the 
internal monologue that we hear in our heads, then the Finlay type of view might seem 
plausible – when talking to ourselves we might employ things like ellipsis to save ourselves 
time, etc. However, if one thinks of thought in a more Fregean and determinate way – as 
that for which truth or falsity is an issue – then the idea of pragmatic considerations 
applying to thought might look incredibly strange. It‟s beyond the scope of what I am trying 
to do here to investigate this particular issue beyond this extremely rough sketch. All I want 
to conclude from this is that Finlay‟s pragmatic treatment of practicality is not entirely 
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unquestionable, but could be made to work depending upon our ancillary assumptions about 
the general nature of thought and language. 
 
We might be concerned about the analytic reductivist‟s general framework – particularly 
their search for analytic connections between complex normative concepts and simpler non-
normative concepts. Forty years ago this concern would be easy to express – you could just 
mutter something about Two Dogmas of Empiricism or Truth by Convention (Quine, 1951; 
1935) and hope your audience shared your distrust of the idea of analyticity. Nowadays, 
following the work of people like Paul Boghossian and particularly Gillian Russell 
(Boghossian 1996, 1997, Russell 2008) to rehabilitate analyticity such a mere expression of 
ethos is not enough to satisfy anyone. However, there is still a worry here for Finlay about 
whether the defence of analyticity he relies upon fits with his methodological programme. 
He cites Gillian Russell‟s recent work (2008) as a defence of the notion of analyticity he 
wants to make use of, so it should be fruitful to very briefly consider how Russell‟s account 
works. 
 
Russell‟s insight is to point out that traditional characterisations of analyticity as truth in 
virtue of meaning are particularly murky. This is because we can distinguish between four 
elements of language that we could call „meaning‟: 
Character: the thing speakers must know to count as understanding an expression 
Content: what a word contributes  to what a sentence containing it says 
Reference Determiner: a condition which an object must meet in order to be the 
referent of, or fall in the extension of, an expression. 
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Referent/Extension: the (set of) object(s) to which the term applies. 
(Russell, 2008, 45-46) 
Russell argues that the lesson we should take from 20th century philosophy of language is 
that these different notions can come apart in various ways. For example, the work of 
externalists like Burge (1979) and Putnam (1975) shows that we can count as understanding 
an expression with a merely deferential grasp of that expression – we might count as 
understanding the meaning of „beech‟, say, without knowing its reference determiner and 
thus being unable to distinguish beeches from elms. Similar lessons can be drawn from Saul 
Kripke‟s work on natural kind terms and proper names (1980) and David Kaplan‟s on 
indexicals (1989).  
 
The account of analyticity that Russell defends revolves around reference determiners. 
Sentences turn out to be analytically true when the right sort of relations of containment and 
exclusion hold between the reference determiners of the (logical) subject and (logical) 
predicate of that sentence.58 To flesh this out a little – the condition that an object has to 
meet for being a bachelor contains the condition of being a male, for example, so the 
sentence „All bachelors are male‟ comes out as analytic. In contrast, the condition for being 
a renate (having kidneys) does not sustain the right connections to the condition for being a 
cordate (having a heart) so „All renates are cordates‟ would not be analytic, even if the 
extensions of „renates‟ and „cordates‟ overlapped. What drove a lot of the Quinean concerns 
about analyticity, Russell contends, was a failure to recognise that reference determiners 
were the best source of an account of analyticity. Suppose you ran all of the elements of 
                                                             
58
 This characterisation leaves out a lot of detail, including what Russell means by the metaphorical 
sounding ‘containment’ and ‘exclusion’ and what it is to be the ‘logical’ subject or predicate in a 
sentence. The full details are in her Ch. 3, but they should not be needed here.  
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language that Russell teases apart together. Then the notion of analyticity that was revealed 
could look quite puzzling – to count as competent with an expression you‟d have to know 
how its reference is determined, which things it applied to, etc. Then you could, merely in 
virtue of being competent with a concept know various truths about it – e.g. that a fortnight 
is a length of time that lasts 14 days. However, it shouldn‟t be surprising that analyticity 
within this framework looks shaky – we have learned that, for example, merely being 
partially competent with the concept FORTNIGHT does not suffice for knowing that a 
fortnight is 14 days. But, this does not mean that the notion of analyticity in general is 
suspect. Instead, we merely need to amend our conception of analyticity to respect the 
lessons that philosophy of language has taught us. Mere conceptual competence does not 
mean you will be able to recognise the analytic truths that involve that concept, when they 
are presented to you, but that‟s just because mere conceptual competence does not 
guarantee that you know the reference determiner of that concept which is what accounts 
for the analytic truths involving that concept.59 
 
Of course, there is room to still be sceptical about this version of analyticity (see for 
example Boghossian‟s review of Russell (2010) or Williamson‟s (2007) where he makes 
cases against the metaphysical account of analyticity Russell defends AND the 
epistemological conception Boghossian prefers), but we can circumvent a lot of this debate 
if we instead consider whether the account Russell offers supports the use Finlay wishes to 
make of it. 
                                                             
59
 You might worry that on a Fregean picture sense (like a reference-determiner) determines reference, 
so that grasp of sense does imply grasp of reference-determiner, so in virtue of grasping the sense of an 
expression you should be able to work out the analytic connections that it sustains. At this point Russell 
would simply deny the traditional Fregean picture – if sense is what determines reference, then it is not 
something that is always grasped by a speaker, in that being able to use a term is compatible with not 
knowing its sense, in this sense. 
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One possible source of tension is that Finlay conceives of semantic analysis as basically an 
a priori armchair pursuit (Finlay, forthcoming, Ch. 1). This is what allows him to derive 
semantic analyses of normative concepts from the data he has available to him (our 
linguistic intuitions). This, however, is problematic given the distinctions Russell makes 
between different elements of language. Analytic truths are those, remember, that are true in 
virtue of reference determiners. And, the lesson of recent philosophy of language is that 
mere competence with a concept (grasp of its character) sometimes does not suffice for 
grasp of that concept‟s reference determiner. Thus, there is space for a view that says, 
roughly, that we can grasp the character of moral terms without knowing very much at all 
about their reference determiners. If this is the case, then working out any analytic truths to 
do with those concepts will require more than a priori reflection – Russell‟s view is 
explicitly committed to the possibility of both contingent analytic truths (like „I am here 
now‟) and a posteriori ones. We shall look at a view of moral terms which does allow grasp 
of moral concepts to be insufficient for knowledge of reference determiners (and thus 
knowledge of any nearby analytic truths, if there are any) in the next section, and Finlay‟s 
response to that sort of view. Whether the analytic reductivist‟s methodology is appropriate 
depends upon whether Finlay can rule out this sort of view; this is problematic because it‟s 
the sort of view that Russell herself uses (in part) to construct her account of analyticity – 
the one Finlay adverts to.  
 
A more particular concern with the „analytic‟ in „analytic reductivism‟ is not to do with 
analyticity in general, but with its application to the metaethical case. It‟s been thought that 
Moore‟s open question argument militates against metaethical analyses in particular. The 
open question argument, basically, claims that for any suggested naturalistic (or 
metaphysical) analysis N of a moral term D the question „I see that x is N, but is it D?‟ is 
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always open (in the sense that sincerely asking it does not betray any conceptual or 
semantic incompetence). If the analysis were correct this question would not be open, so the 
naturalistic analysis is not correct. Now, Moore then goes on to push this argument further 
than it will go – he moves from there being no correct naturalistic analysis of moral terms to 
the impossibility of a naturalistic reduction of moral terms. However, many have accepted 
the first step – that the open question argument shows that we cannot have analyses of 
moral terms in non-normative vocabulary. How does Finlay deal with this?  
 
Finlay makes three points. First, as the open question argument is usually presented, it is far 
too quick. We are usually given one or two putative analyses of normative terms into non-
normative vocabulary, presented with the claim that these leave the question open, then we 
are expected to accept that this shows that ALL suggested analyses must be false, even in 
advance of hearing them. This seems like a rash overgeneralisation.60 The anti-analyticist 
could bolster their case by appealing to their intuitions about all possible analyses as when 
Wittgenstein says: “I at once see clearly, as it were in a flash of light, not only that no 
description that I can think of would do to describe what I mean... but that I would reject 
every significant description that anybody could possibly suggest, ab initio” (1930, as found 
in Finlay, forthcoming Ch.2). Against this Finlay simply points out that true analyses can 
sometimes be surprising and informative – it seems hopelessly overconfident to suggest that 
no analysis of moral terms could work just because you would be surprised if it did: far 
better to actually look at the suggested analyses and see what we think then. Third, and 
most importantly, Finlay suggests we can deal with the seeming openness of the open 
question argument by again attending to the distinction between pragmatics and semantics. 
How does this work? 
                                                             
60
 This is one criticism that could be extracted from William Frankenna’s (1939). 
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Well, on Finlay‟s account a word like „good‟ expresses an incomplete predicate which 
requires relativisation to an end before sentences containing it express propositions. What 
this means is that „good‟ can be used to predicate any number of different properties of an 
object (having the property of raising the probability of the bread being cut, or of animals‟ 
rights being respected, or of catching the bus, etc) depending on the context involved. This 
is supposed to explain how someone can always ask „I grant that x is N, but is x good?‟, as 
there are a number of different properties N can refer to; suppose that the analysis N1 
correctly defines one property we can refer to with „good‟, there will still be other 
properties that we can use „good‟ to refer to. So, if someone says to us „I see that x is N1, 
but is it good?‟ we have to understand them as acknowledging that that x falls under the 
predicate N1, but asking whether x falls under some other predicate we can express with the 
term „good‟. This is given a pragmatic explanation – we very rarely waste people‟s time 
with questions if we can avoid it, so if someone asks the open question they must be using a 
different completion of „good‟ in that question. We can draw a useful comparison with 
other incomplete predicates. It‟s sometimes held that expressions like „tall‟ need to be 
relativised to comparison classes – what is tall for an ordinary adult male is not what is tall 
for basketball players. So, supposed you analysed „tall‟ for ordinary adult males as „over 
6ft4‟. Now, if someone asked „I see that Jimmy is over 6ft4, but is he tall?‟ you don‟t have 
to take the openness of the question as a refutation of you proposed analysis. Instead you 
can adopt the pragmatic explanation Finlay advances and conclude that the questioner is 
asking whether Jimmy is tall in some other sense. Thus, the supposed openness of the open 
question is a consequence of the fact that we can relativise „good‟ to a wide variety of ends 
depending on context, together with the pragmatics of asking questions involving 
incomplete predicates. In effect, what Finlay is doing is explaining away our intuition that 
the relevant question is open by giving a debunking analysis of what the question is really 
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asking for. Thus, if Finlay‟s response is adequate it has force against updated versions of the 
open question argument, like the one explored in §2.14. 
 
At this point the anti-reductivist could put their worry a different way. Although there are 
many ways of completing the predicate „good‟ and thus expressing many different 
propositions using sentences containing that predicate, it should be possible, in principle at 
least, to specify all the permissible completions and thus the propositions that can be 
expressed using „good‟. The anti-reductivist can then claim that they can ask the open 
question argument of that complicated mass of predicates and propositions. The trouble 
with this strategy is that although the anti-reductivist may claim that they would be able to 
ask the open question of that complicated analysis, they have very little evidence that they 
would – they are back to relying upon the Wittgensteinian intuition mentioned above: that 
they would reject ANY analysis of normative terms out of hand. And Finlay already has an 
answer to that sort of objection – it‟s just far too quick.  
 
So, we have seen that analytic reductivism offers a number of benefits – it gives us a unified 
semantic picture of normative terms, it avoids commitment to non-natural properties, it can 
go some way to explaining the appearance of practicality connected to moral judgements 
and as it is reductivist it avoids the generalised anti-voluntarist argument we drew out of 
Korsgaard. However, its explanation of the practicality of moral judgements is not entirely 
problem-free, and we might still be sceptical of the appeal to analytic connections between 
normative and non-normative predicates (although perhaps not because of any worry about 
moral terms in particular, but just because the account of analyticity that Finlay relies upon 
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may not support the analytic reductivist‟s methodology, a question we will be indirectly 
tackling in §3.32-5).  
 
3.32 Cornell Realism  
 
Cornell realists (e.g. Sturgeon 1985; 1986; 1988; 1992) offer us a non-reductionist 
externalist moral realism. They combine two main claims: 1. we can model the semantics of 
moral terms on the framework for natural kind terms given by Saul Kripke and Hilary 
Putnam; and 2. that moral properties do not have to be reduced to natural properties as they 
earn their ontological keep by featuring in our best explanations of natural phenomena. 
Both of these claims have been challenged and I will attempt to elucidate the Cornell realist 
view by  looking at each of them. Turning to the second claim first. 
 
3.33 Moral Properties and Ontological Commitment 
 
Cornell realism claims that we cannot analyse moral vocabulary in terms of non-moral 
vocabulary (like Finlay‟s analytic reductivism above); neither can we reduce moral 
properties to non-moral properties as a matter of synthetic fact. However, moral properties 
are still perfectly naturalistically respectable according to the Cornell realist. This is because 
there is a useful analogy to be had between moral terms and the „natural kind‟ terms found 
in biology, chemistry and the social sciences.  
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The basic idea is this: there may not be any reductive analysis of terms like „gene‟, 
„species‟, „acid‟, „culture‟ or „catalyst‟ available to the biologist, sociologist or chemist in 
physical terms61. There may be many ways to realise the type of acid, say. Nevertheless, 
these are theoretical terms in good standing which refer to properties which deserve to be 
included within our ontology because these properties earn their ontological keep by being 
explanatorily relevant. There are biological explanations of naturalistic phenomena, like the 
distribution of certain morphological features amongst a population of animals within a 
certain area, that would be lost if we omitted the concepts of GENE or SPECIES from our 
best scientific theories. And this is true even though gene-hood and species-hood resist 
reduction to the terms of physics. So, because these biological, sociological or chemical 
kinds feature in our best explanations of natural phenomena we should accept them into our 
ontology despite their resistance to reduction. 
 
This way of looking at things reflects a broadly Quinean conception of ontological 
commitment. Quine argued (1948) that we should base our ontological commitments on 
which entities are ranged over in the statements of our best scientific theories in some 
canonical notation (typically first-order logic with identity). To be, then (in the famous 
phrase), is to be the value of a bound variable. One area where this has played out is with 
regards to the existence of numbers and other mathematical objects. Indispensability 
arguments for the existence of mathematical objects start by claiming that there are some 
scientific facts that resist being captured without quantifying over numbers or other 
                                                             
61 In fact, the relevant reduction bases here would be different for each case – the reductionist chemist 
would aspire to reduce chemistry to physics, the reductionist biologist biology to chemistry, the 
reductionist sociologist to some combination of economics and psychology (which in turn would be 
reduced to other bases).  
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mathematical objects in our statement of them.62 Combined with a Quinean account of 
ontological commitment this yields the result that we should believe in the existence of 
numbers, or sets, or whatever mathematical object can play the relevant role. Opponents of 
these arguments attempt to show how you can embrace the Quinean claim about ontological 
commitment but avoid commitment to numbers by showing how to nominalise away 
references to mathematical objects in our statement of our best scientific theories.63  
 
The fan of biological, chemical or sociological kinds makes a similar move to the proponent 
of the indispensability argument in the philosophy of mathematics. They will claim that 
there is some perfectly natural phenomenon that we cannot explain without invoking the 
biological/natural/sociological kind.64If that claim is combined with the Quinean thesis of 
ontological commitment then we will have reason to accept the existence of the relevant 
biological/chemical/sociological properties.  
 
The Cornell realist exploits a similar move when it comes to moral properties. They argue 
that there are some naturalistic phenomena that we would not be able to fully explain 
                                                             
62 There has been a debate about the need for the concept of an ‘average number’ for the statement of 
some facts for example – see Melia (1995) 
63
 For an attempt to show how science could be given a nominalistic basis see Field (1980). See also 
Colyvan (2011) for a good summary of these debates and how they have developed. 
64 For an example of an application of this sort of manoeuvre see Beebee and Sabbarton-Leary’s (2010) 
application of Boyd’s permissive conception of a natural kind (2010) to psychiatric kinds.  
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without positing moral properties65. For example, the Cornell realist could claim that we 
need to posit moral properties to explain why people have the moral beliefs that they do.66 
 
However, this sort of strategy faces a challenge from Gilbert Harman67. Harman (1977) 
accepts that properties earn their ontological keep by featuring ineliminably in our best 
explanations of experience. However, he thinks there is a crucial disanalogy between the 
properties posited by, for example, our best physics, and the moral properties of interest to 
the Cornell realist. He asks us to compare two cases – a physicist who believes (on the basis 
of some visual disturbance) that there is a proton in a cloud chamber; and an onlooker 
watching a gang setting fire to a cat who forms the belief that what the gang is doing is 
morally wrong. Whilst the best explanation of the physicist‟s belief that there is a proton in 
the cloud chamber is that there is a proton in the cloud chamber, when it comes to the 
onlooker‟s belief that burning the cat is wrong:  
                                                             
65 For Quine himself, who takes the right canonical notation to be first-order logic, this would be 
anathema. We would, if taking this Cornell realist line, have to embrace a second-order logic where we 
quantify over properties. 
66 Given that their strategy relies implicitly on a roughly Quinean view of ontological commitment it 
could be challenged by someone who believes another account of ontological commitment gives us a 
more perspicuous treatment of the nature of the world. Thomas Scanlon’s (2009) Locke lectures can be 
considered as an attempt to develop a moral realism within a neo-Carnapian rather than Quinean 
framework. All parties to the debate I survey accept something like the Quinean framework (at least for 
the sake of argument) however. In addition, I suspect that Scanlon’s account makes moral properties 
causally inefficacious, which might raise suspicions about how it can avoid the unwelcome 
consequences of non-naturalism whilst retaining the right to be called a form of moral realism. How 
would things look using a truth-making account of ontological commitment (of the type suggested by 
Armstrong 2004)? On that account we should believe in only the entities required to make true the 
truths we accept. I suspect that because the Cornell realist rejects analytic connections between moral 
predicates and naturalistic predicates (which may have given them truthmakers for moral truths as an 
‘ontological free-lunch’) the terms of the debate will remain substantially the same.  
67
 The outline of this discussion depends heavily on Miller (2003) 
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[Y]ou do not seem to need to make assumptions about any moral facts to explain 
the occurrence of the so-called moral observations I have been talking about. In the 
moral case, it would seem that you need only make assumptions about the 
psychology or moral sensibility of the person making the moral observation. (6). 
This disanalogy means that although we have reason to commit ourselves to the presence of 
a proton in the cloud chamber we don‟t have to believe in the existence of distinctly moral 
properties.  
 
Sturgeon (1985) argues that there are some phenomena which resist the debunking 
explanations offered by someone like Harman. For example, he claims that we can explain 
why Hitler did the things he did by using the fact that he was a morally depraved person; or 
the increase in opposition to slavery in 19th century America by the fact the slavery at that 
time was a particularly oppressive institution. In addition, he claims to identify a misstep in 
Harman‟s challenge to the moral realist. Harman claims that in the cat example the 
wrongness of setting fire to a live cat plays no explanatory role in accounting for your belief 
that it is wrong. One way of testing explanatory relevance is to look at relations of 
counterfactual dependence. If a factor is explanatorily relevant to some outcome that means, 
roughly, that in a world where that factor was absent the outcome would not have come 
about. This is what licenses Harman‟s claim that the presence of a proton in the cloud 
chamber is relevant to the physicists belief that there is such a proton – if the proton had not 
been present then the disturbance in the cloud chamber would not have occurred, meaning 
that the physicist would not have formed the belief that there is a proton in the cloud 
chamber. However, Harman can be read as claiming, that this relationship of counterfactual 
dependence does not hold in the moral case – in a world without moral wrongness, the 
onlooker would still have judged that burning the cat was wrong. This, though, 
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misunderstands the Cornell realist‟s position. They accept that the distribution of moral 
properties supervenes upon (or is constituted by/multiply realised by) the distribution of 
non-moral properties. Thus, it is because burning a cat is an act of inflicting unnecessary 
suffering (a characterisation we could give of the act using non-moral vocabulary) that it is 
a wrong act. In order for the act of burning a cat to lack the property of wrongness it would 
also have to lack the non-moral property of being an act of causing unnecessary suffering 
(and the other properties in the supervenience base of „being wrong‟) upon which the moral 
property supervenes. But, if it did lack that property then it‟s implausible to think that we 
would judge the act to be morally wrong. So, there is a relationship of counterfactual 
dependence between the moral belief and the relevant moral property, which means that 
Harman cannot get his disanalogy.  
 
Harman (1986) responds to this reply by arguing that mere counterfactual dependence is not 
enough to yield explanatory relevance (and hence ontological rights). This is because a 
view which claimed that moral properties were counterfactually dependent on non-moral 
properties, and also claimed that moral properties were causally inert (moral 
epiphenomenalism) underwrites the counterfactual dependency of moral judgements on 
moral properties but does not make moral properties explanatorily relevant. Sturgeon 
(1986) replies by arguing that this is only a problem if moral epiphenomenalism were an 
independently plausible view, which it is not. He seems to claim that the best way to sustain 
it would be to argue that higher-order properties in general are explanatorily irrelevant, 
which would have the implausible consequence that all biological, chemical and 
sociological properties are explanatorily irrelevant. 
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However Alex Miller (2003) effectively undermines this response to Harman. He points out 
that Sturgeon began by making the claim that counterfactual dependence of certain 
phenomena (like moral beliefs or Hitler‟s actions) on putative moral properties is sufficient 
for the assigning explanatory relevance to those properties. Harman‟s objection undermines 
this sufficiency claim because if moral epiphenomenalism is not incoherent then there is a 
way to get counterfactual dependence without explanatory relevance. Such a view does not 
appear obviously incoherent – if we compare it to a similar view in the philosophy of mind 
where mental properties are causally linked to physical properties in one direction only68 we 
can see this. This view does not get attacked for being incoherent – instead, the main 
objection to it is that it makes our beliefs and desires causally irrelevant to our actions, 
which seems strongly counterintuitive, but not incoherent. So: 
It follows that Sturgeon‟s reply to Harman is implausible as it stands: Sturgeon 
needs to add something to mere counterfactual dependence to get the conclusion 
that moral properties are genuinely explanatorily relevant.                           (Miller, 
2003, 149) 
 
 
3.34 Program Explanation  
 
What could Sturgeon add to mere counterfactual dependency to bolster the Cornell realist‟s 
ontological claims? Miller considers whether the notion of program explanation could help. 
Jackson and Pettit (1990) have argued that if we think that the only way for a factor to be 
                                                             
68
 See type-E dualism in David Chalmers’s 2002 
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causally relevant to a phenomenon is for it to be causally efficacious with regards to that 
phenomenon (where causally efficacious properties are those “in virtue of whose 
instantiation the phenomenon occurs” 108) then it will turn out that many properties that we 
think are causally relevant are not. Consider the example of a glass vessel cracking when 
we boil water in it: 
Why did it cack? First answer: because of the temperature of the water. Second 
answer, in simplified form: because of the momentum of such and such a molecule 
(group of molecules) in striking such and such a molecular bond in the container 
surface. The temperature property was efficacious only if the momentum property 
was efficacious... But the temperature of the water – an aggregate statistic – did not 
help to produce the momentum of the molecule in the way in which it, if 
efficacious, helped to produce the cracking... And neither did the temperature 
combine with the momentum to help in the same sense to produce the cracking: one 
could have predicted the cracking just from full information about the molecule and 
the relevant laws.                                                                                 (110) 
So, if the only way for a property to be causally relevant was for it to be causally 
efficacious, then the temperature of the water is causally irrelevant to the breaking of the 
glass vessel. But surely something has gone wrong here – we want to say that the water‟s 
boiling was causally relevant when it comes to the container‟s breaking. This suggests to 
Jackson and Pettit that there must be another way for a property to be causally relevant for a 
phenomenon. How does this work? 
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The basic idea is that a higher-level property (like the water‟s temperature) can program for 
the existence of a lower-level property that is causally efficacious (like the momentum of 
the relevant molecule) in such a way that the higher-level property is still causally relevant: 
Although not efficacious itself, the temperature property was such that its 
realization ensured that there was an efficacious property in the offing: the property 
we may presume, involving such and such molecules. The realization of the higher 
order property did not produce the cracking in the manner of the lower order. But it 
meant that there would be a suitably efficacious property available, perhaps that 
involving such and such particular molecules, perhaps one involving others. And so 
the temperature was causally relevant to the cracking of the glass, under a perfectly 
relevant sense of relevance, though it was not efficacious. It did not do any work in 
producing the cracking of the glass – it was perfectly inert – but it had the relevance 
of ensuring that there would be some property there to exercise the efficacy 
required... A useful metaphor for describing the role of the property is to say that its 
realization programs for the appearance of the productive property and, under a 
certain description, for the event produced. The analogy is with a computer 
program, which ensures that certain things happen – things satisfying certain 
descriptions – though all the work of producing those things goes on at a lower, 
mechanical level.                 (this is a composition of Jackson and Pettit‟s (1990, 
114) taken from Miller‟s (2003, 151-2)).  
 
Thus certain higher-properties can be causally relevant69 because although they themselves 
are not causally efficacious, they program for the instantiation of lower-level properties 
                                                             
69
 The claim which the Cornell realist then uses to earn ontological rights for moral properties.  
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which are causally efficacious. What the program explanation does is offer us information 
that mere process explanation (explanation in terms of the causally efficacious properties) 
does not – in this case that the water is at boiling temperature, and that at relevantly similar 
possible worlds (ones where the glass is broken by a different molecule to the one 
mentioned in the process explanation) the glass still breaks. Is there anything stopping the 
Cornell realist from exploiting this sort of program explanation to earn ontological rights 
for higher-level moral properties which program for lower-level causally efficacious non-
moral properties? 
 
Brian Leiter (2001) argues that the type of examples offered by the Cornell realists are 
either shallow (in relation to the example that cites Hitler‟s moral depravity to explain his 
behaviour: “I would take such an answer to be a bit of a joke: a repetition of the datum 
rather than an explanation.” (94)) or are not plausibly our best explanations of the 
phenomenon in question – in relation to opposition to apartheid in South Africa “we have to 
turn precisely to the particular lower-order social, economic, and political facts to really 
explain why social protest arose against racial oppression at the time it actually did.” (97).  
 
An interesting point to consider in relation to this is whether commitment to something like 
Karl Marx‟s theory of history creates problems for the Cornell realist on this score. 
According to this theory (at least on Jerry Cohen‟s (1978) influential reading) cultural 
institutions arise and succeed when they do because they bring about the development of 
the productive forces. On this account a cultural, legal „superstructure‟ is determined by the 
functional role it can play in developing the productive forces. This might look like the 
strongest type of claim that would endanger the Cornell realist‟s ambitions – we could 
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explain all (or at least most) social phenomena by adverting to an economic rather than 
moral explanation. Thus, to return to the example of opposition to slavery, we would 
explain the abandonment of traditional forms of slavery by explaining how slavery no 
longer served the expansion of the productive forces and instead in some way „fettered‟ 
them. This sort of framework could be what Leiter has in mind when he claims that we can 
explain opposition to apartheid in social, economic and political terms. In any event, it 
looks like the sort of theory in which distinctly moral factors turn out to be causally 
irrelevant. However, Cohen argues that this sort of deterministic reading of Marx ignores 
the relationship between Marx‟s theory of history and his philosophical anthropology. We 
can ask „why do the productive forces drive human development (including the 
development of political, legal institutions, etc)?‟. Cohen‟s answer is that it is part of 
Marx‟s anthropology that human beings are, by and large, at least somewhat rational. This 
is one of the reasons why we develop institutions that serve the expansion of the productive 
forces – we see that expanding those forces satiates human needs, or even if we do not 
consciously see that this is the case, we rationally respond to this kind of consideration. This 
interpretation of Marx is certainly contested, but it does look prima facie plausible. Without 
something like the anthropological claim it might look mysterious as to why the cultural 
superstructure is determined by the economic facts unless we make out Marx to be 
massively deterministic. If, then, the cultural superstructure emerges when it does and takes 
its particular form because that form serves expansion of the productive forces and we care 
about expanding the productive forces because they serve to meet human needs then there is 
space for an advocate of a Marxist theory of history to make use of explanations using 
moral properties. Thus, the tension between Cornell realism and a Marxist theory of history 
may be only prima facie. In effect, the Marxist can agree with Miller‟s contention that by 
pointing towards legal, economic and political factors as the best explanation of a particular 
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phenomenon Leiter is, in effect, letting program explanation in through the back door (see 
Miller, 2003 172-3).70  
 
A more pressing worry is offered by Miller. That is that program explanations (at least in 
these contexts) are only the best explanations on offer because of our parochial epistemic 
limitations. What program explanation secures us is information about how things go in 
relevantly similar possible worlds – we think the boiling (a higher-level property) caused 
the cracking of the class because in close by possible worlds where the particular molecule 
which is causally efficacious in breaking the glass is missing, the glass still breaks (some 
other molecule would hit some other molecular bond in the side of the container). Miller‟s 
suggests that this modal information (about how things go in similar possible worlds) is 
only a theoretical boon to creatures who share our epistemic limits. If we imagine a creature 
without these limits – an omniscient God – we see that such a creature would not suffer 
explanatory impoverishment if they lacked program explanations71. God would have as rich 
an explanatory theory as us if She just relied on process explanations involving causally 
efficacious properties and her knowledge of the relevant modal information that program 
information gives us.  
 
                                                             
70 For an exploration of structural explanations of this sort as applied to social theory see Jackson and 
Pettit’s (1993).  
71 Here, this ‘God’ is being used as merely a heuristic device to militate against using program 
explanation to earn ontological rights for moral properties. The device is supposed to demonstrate the 
strangeness of using program explanation to earn ontological rights when the utility of program 
explanation is based merely on our limited knowledge (of lower-level facts/properties and process 
explanations).  
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You might argue that making such a move (stripping properties of their ontological rights 
because they only feature in our parochial best explanations of phenomena) is unwarranted 
– isn‟t the point of the Quinean account of ontological commitment to link ontological 
commitment to precisely our best theories? However such an argument would be off-beam. 
As Miller puts it: “when we are in the business of asking about what properties earn their 
ontological rights, we should be concerned with what properties would figure in the world 
as seen from the viewpoint in which all such epistemic limitations [ones due to our 
particular position] were transcended.” (2003, 173). Why? Well, one reason is given by Joe 
Melia (1995) with reference to indispensability arguments for mathematical objects. A 
proponent of these arguments could argue from the fact that we need average numbers to 
represent certain empirical discoveries that we need to admit numbers to our ontology. 
However, Melia argues that, at least in some of these cases, although our best theories 
ineliminably refer to average numbers, we can imagine a better theory that eliminates them 
in favour of lists of objects which encode that information. These lists might be too long for 
us to grasp. Nevertheless, this averageless theory would be better (more parsimonious) than 
our best theory, so we ought to be able to avoid commitment to average numbers. If this is 
true, then Miller‟s point stands as well motivated – a creature not limited by our epistemic 
position would not need program explanation, so we cannot use it to earn ontological rights 
for moral properties.  
 
Mark Nelson (2006) accepts Miller‟s amendment to the realist‟s task (showing that a 
creature without our epistemic limits would need to make use of program explanations to 
explain certain phenomena in order to earn moral properties their ontological rights through 
this strategy) but reckons it is still one that can be met. Remember, the key point from 
Miller was that God knows all the modal information (the relevant true counterfactuals) that 
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program encodes for us. Nelson concedes this point, but argues that even in this position 
there is something that God lacks: She may know that the relevant counterfactuals are true, 
but She will not know why they are true. To return to the breaking glass example, God may 
know that if a particular molecule (the one that actually did break the glass) did not hit the 
particular bond at the particular time that it did, the glass would have still broken (another 
molecule would have hit another bond at a slightly different time); but She does not know 
why this particular counterfactual is true. In particular, just knowing all the microphysical 
facts up to the point of time where the glass broke will not tell you why the counterfactual is 
true, and the relevant causal laws cannot explain it either.  
 
Miller responds (2009) by arguing that higher-level properties will not feature in an account 
of God‟s explanation of the truth of the relevant counterfactuals. He does this by first noting 
that the proposition expressed by a counterfactual sentence is context dependent – it 
depends both on context of utterance and the speaker‟s intentions. He borrows the following 
example from Jonathan Lowe: 
Suppose we are together in a room which we both know to contain a considerable 
amount of highly inflammable gas owing to a gas leak, and we both observe the 
presence there of a third person, Brown, concerning whom we know the following 
facts: first, that he has in his hand a box of dry and perfectly sound matches, and 
second that he is an extremely cautious individual who is exceptionally sensitive to 
the presence of gas and strongly averse to risking its ignition by a naked flame            
(Lowe, 1995, 53) 
Now take two counterfactual sentences: 
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(I) „If Brown had struck one of those matches just now, there would have been 
and explosion‟, as uttered by A 
(II) „If Brown had struck one of those matches just now, there would not have been 
an explosion‟, as uttered by B 
 
Lowe‟s point is that as (I) and (II) express different propositions, both can be true at the 
same time. If A intends to convey something about the relationship between lit matches and 
gas explosions, or finds herself in a conversation where that relationship is salient, then 
what she says is true. If B intends to convey something about Brown‟s general dispositions 
about danger, or finds himself in a conversation where that topic is salient, then his 
utterance is true. This is because of a fact about the evaluation of counterfactuals that Miller 
draws to our attention – on the Lewis-Stalnaker account of counterfactual  conditionals a 
counterfactual conditional is true if in the closest possible world (or worlds) to this world in 
which the antecedent is true the consequent is also true. And, which worlds are closest 
displays a measure of context sensitivity. To evaluate A‟s utterance we hold the facts about 
distribution of gas molecules in the room fixed and vary the facts about Brown‟s 
psychology – we consider worlds where Brown‟s psychology is different but the room is 
still full of gas to be closest. To evaluate B‟s utterance we do things the other way round – 
hold the facts about Brown‟s psychology fixed, but suppose that he would not strike the 
match unless he‟d done something to prevent the gas explosion occurring – opening all the 
windows perhaps. What this means is that which proposition a particular utterance of a 
counterfactual expresses depends in part upon contextual factors like a speaker‟s intentions 
or conversational salience. (Miller, 2009, 339) 
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Miller then examines Nelson‟s argument in light of this consideration and concludes that it 
misfires. Nelson claims that without program explanations of the form „The glass cracked 
because the water was boiling‟ God will not know why counterfactuals of the form „If that 
particular molecule hadn‟t hit that particular bond at  that particular time the glass would 
have still cracked‟ are true. In order to know this God would need to know which possible 
world (or sets of equally close possible worlds) is (are) closest to the actual world. 
However, Miller contends that God does know precisely this – God knows which 
proposition any particular utterance of the relevant counterfactual expresses (She is 
omniscient, after all!). She does not need to invoke higher-level properties to do this. The 
upshot of all this is that Miller‟s original argument is left untouched by Nelson‟s reply – 
yes, God will need to know why particular counterfactuals are true, but this is something 
She can do without invoking higher-level properties. Thus Nelson‟s reply offers no succour 
to the Cornell realist who hopes to exploit program explanation.  
 
However, I suspect there may be hope for the Cornell realist yet. Miller‟s argument relies 
upon the following insight – if God knows which proposition a particular utterance of a 
counterfactual expresses then She knows why that counterfactual is true (as She knows 
which is the relevant closest world). However, we can still ask on behalf of Nelson and the 
Cornell realist – how does God know this? Presumably Miller‟s thought is that as which 
worlds are closest is a matter of a speaker‟s intentions, and God has access to those, She 
will thus know the relevant closeness ordering of possible worlds. This, though, may be a 
bit hasty. The defender of program explanation could claim that although there is a role for 
speakers‟ intentions and other contextual elements in the closeness ordering of possible 
worlds that these elements do not totally determine what the relevant similarity measure is. 
Another way to put the point is that sometimes speakers‟ intentions will not determine a 
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uniquely close possible world or set of possible worlds. In light of this, Lewis offers a 
„default‟ measure of similarity of worlds for standard contexts:  
1. It is of first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of [natural] 
law. 
2. It is of the second importance to maximize the spatio-temporal region 
throughout which perfect match of particular fact prevails. 
3. It is of the third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple violations of 
law. 
4. It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact, 
even in matters that concern us greatly. (Lewis 1979: 47–8) 
 
The glimmer of salvation for the program explanationist comes with criteria 1 and 3. If they 
can plausibly claim that speakers intentions do not fully determine which similarity measure 
is relevant and hence which proposition is expressed by a particular utterance of a 
counterfactual, and that to determine criteria 1 and 3 even God will need information about 
higher-level properties, then there is something that God cannot know without program 
explanation – which proposition is expressed by a given counterfactual utterance. This is 
because what the appropriate similarity measure will be for evaluation of that counterfactual 
depends in part (according to the program explanationist) on program explanations.  
 
If this is right, then there is hope yet for program explanation – even God needs to use it to 
access the modal information program explanation encodes for us. Therefore program 
explanations are no mere artefacts of our best theories. They may be found in the best 
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theories simpliciter, in which case Cornell realists can exploit program explanation to earn 
ontological rights for moral properties.  
 
3.35 Cornell Realism‟s Semantic Programme 
 
So we have seen that there are worries for the Cornell realist about their strategy for earning 
ontological rights for irreducible, natural, moral properties; although it‟s not obvious that 
that strategy fails. Cornell realists also advance a distinctive semantic claim – that we can 
model the semantics for moral terms on the semantics for natural kind terms originally 
advanced by Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam. Here I will examine that semantic claim. I 
will not be able to settle the question of whether the Kripke-Putnam framework is the right 
one for natural kinds, all I intend to do is examine whether the Cornell realist can make an 
analogy between natural kind terms (understood in the Kripke-Putnam manner) and moral 
terms. This will at most license a conditional claim: if the Kripke-Putnam semantics works 
for natural kind terms then the Cornell realist can model their semantics of moral terms on 
it. So, this section will examine whether there is the similarity between the two types of 
terms that the Cornell realist can exploit. First though, a (very) brief history of the 
development of the Kripke-Putnam semantics for natural kind terms. 
 
According to a Millian view of meaning the meaning of some term, like a name, just is its 
referent (or extension in the case of other types of term). So, the meaning of the name 
„Venus‟ is the actual planet Venus. Gottlob Frege opposed this view based, in part, on the 
following data: it seems like identity statements involving co-referring expressions are 
cognitively significant. For example, learning that the Morning Star is the Evening Star is a 
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genuine cognitive advance, even though both names refer to the same object (the planet 
Venus). One way to tell this is that the identity of the Morning Star with the Evening Star 
was an empirical discovery of astronomy. Mere competence with the meanings of „Morning 
Star‟ and „Evening Star‟ is not enough to know the identity. On the Millian picture this is 
deeply puzzling – the referent of „Morning Star‟ is, like the referent of „Evening Star‟, just 
the planet Venus. So, if I know the meaning of „Morning Star‟, which on the Millian picture 
is to know the referent, then I should be able to work out the identity just through reflection 
on that meaning.  
 
This observation drove Frege to distinguish between sense and reference. „Morning Star‟ 
and „Evening Star‟ may share the same referent (the planet Venus) but they have different 
senses. We then give an account of meaning which gives a central role to sense. On this sort 
of picture, then, grasp of the meaning of the term „Morning Star‟ will not be enough to 
know the truth of the identity between the Morning Star and the Evening Star, and thus we 
will have a ready explanation of the cognitive significance of „The Morning Star is identical 
to the Evening Star‟.  
 
However, what this view needs is an explication of the notion of sense. One way to do this 
is to offer a descriptivist semantics. On these views the meaning of an expression is given 
by a cluster of descriptions associated with that expression. This is easiest to see in the case 
of names. The proposal is that a name like „Aristotle‟ means something like „the pupil of 
Plato who taught Alexander the Great and  wrote the Nicomachean Ethics...‟, suitably filled 
in with the descriptions that speakers associate with the name „Aristotle‟. The meaning of 
„Morning Star‟ could be given as „the object that is visible in the morning sky at such-and-
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such a time in such-and-such a position‟ whereas the meaning of „Evening Star‟ is given as 
„the object that is visible in the evening sky at such-and-such and time in such-and-such a 
position‟. So, when you learn that the Morning Star is the Evening Star you learn that the 
object that is visible in a certain place in the sky in the morning is the very same object that 
is visible in the sky in the evening – a genuinely substantive discovery. Thus we can use 
descriptivism to give an explication of the notion of sense which leaves us with a 
explanation of the cognitive significance of identity statements involving co-referring 
expressions, seemingly a genuine advance on the Millian picture. 
 
But, the descriptivist does not have it all their own way. Saul Kripke (1980) launches a 
battery of objections against the descriptivist project, a few of which I will brief outline (my 
summary of this material will be extremely quick, as I‟m just trying to give an indication of 
what the general framework looks like before seeing how it applies to moral terms. For a 
more detailed account see Miller 2007 or Soames 2002, 2010). Kripke‟s modal objection 
first: if the meaning of „Aristotle‟ is given by the description „the pupil of Plato who taught 
Alexander the Great and  wrote the Nicomachean Ethics...‟ then „Aristotle was the pupil of 
Plato who taught Alexander the Great and  wrote the Nicomachean Ethics...‟ will turn out to 
true purely in virtue of meaning and thus necessarily true72. However, that Aristotle was 
taught by Plato and taught Alexander is surely a contingent fact – there‟s certainly nothing 
incoherent about saying that Alexander could have been taught by someone else, and that 
there are possible worlds where such a state of affairs obtains. Kripke‟s diagnosis of this is 
that proper names are rigid designators – they refer to the same object in every possible 
world in which that object exists. So, the name „Aristotle‟ still stands for Aristotle even in 
                                                             
72
 This ignores the possibility, raised earlier in discussion of Gillian Russell’s work, of contingent analytic 
truths. However, that account provides space for contingent analytic truths in very narrow 
circumstances involving thoroughly indexical terms, unlikely to be applicable here.  
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worlds where Aristotle does not do the things that we associate with him – so it‟s no 
surprise that the meaning of Aristotle is not given by a definite description. In addition, as a 
matter of empirical fact people can very well grasp the meaning of a name whilst 
associating either incomplete (descriptions that fail to uniquely pick out one object) or false 
descriptions with that name; and the descriptions each speaker associates with a name can 
vary. This causes particular problems for a Fregean descriptivist, for the Fregean would like 
to preserve the claims that sense determines reference, and that sense is also objective – 
something shared by all users of a term.  
 
However, the descriptivist could weaken their claim – instead of saying that the description 
gives the meaning of the name, they could instead claim that it merely fixes the referent of 
that name73. The idea is that although „Aristotle‟ doesn‟t mean „the pupil of Plato who 
taught Alexander the Great and  wrote the Nicomachean Ethics...‟, the reference of the 
expression „Aristotle‟ is fixed by that description. At this point Kripke presents a number of 
cases where our intuitions seem to indicate that this weaker descriptivist thesis is still false. 
Consider the name „Gödel‟. The only thing that many speakers know about Gödel (and thus 
the descriptive content that they associate with that name) is that he proved the two 
incompleteness theorems. But, Kripke asks, suppose that Gödel didn’t prove those theorems 
– instead, he stole the proofs from another mathematician, Schmidt. Now, when you use the 
name „Gödel‟, who are you referring to? Most of us74 have the intuition that we would not 
                                                             
73
 We could explicate the meaning/reference-fixing distinction modally. The descriptivist who claims the 
relevant description fixes the referent of then name will accept a clause like ‘X is the referent of Aristotle 
iff X is D’ (where D is an abbreviation of the relevant description). They just will reject appending a 
necessity operator to that claim, as then the clause would have the wrong modal profile – it would make 
it impossible for Aristotle to have failed to do the things in the description.  
74
 At least, if the experimental philosophers are to be believed, most western philosophy 
undergraduates. See Machery et al (2004) and (2009) for putative evidence that East-Asian philosophy 
undergraduates have intuitions broadly consistent with a descriptivist story about reference. However, 
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be referring to Schmidt – the one who actually proved the incompleteness theorems – but 
instead to Gödel. This shows that „the prover of the incompleteness theorems‟ does not even 
play a mere reference-fixing role for „Gödel‟.75  
 
What‟s Kripke‟s alternative picture? Instead of descriptions fixing references he thinks this 
job is done by baptisms and facts about causal chains linking our use of a word back to its 
baptism. To put it as loosely as possible, we point at some object and agree to use a certain 
term to stand for that object. Competence with that term is then gained by being a part of a 
causal-historical chain of overlapping intentions that lead back to the initial baptism. So, in 
the case of Aristotle: he was named by someone and at that time the linguistic community 
agreed to use „Aristotle‟ to stand for that person. Other speakers get to refer to Aristotle 
because they intend to use the term „Aristotle‟ to refer to whoever was the referent of the 
initial baptism of that term76: they in a way piggyback on the referential intentions of the 
person from whom they learned the term, all the way (hopefully) back to Aristotle himself.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
there has been some scepticism about this type of evidence expressed in Ichikawa et al (2011) and 
Kauppinen (2007). Even if this data is right, however, the Kripke framework might survive unscathed – 
Kripke is willing to admit that we could have spoken a descriptivist language and even within English as 
we speak it some terms may be open to a descriptivist analysis. Kripke claims he is not advancing a new 
general theory of his own; instead he is casting doubt on the descriptivist’s ambition to give a universal 
treatment of language by showing how it fails in many cases. 
75 Although see Lewis (1984) for the suggestion that all these cases show is that we need to refine the 
descriptive content we offer as a reference-fixer. However, Lewis agrees with the Kripkean claim that a 
general descriptivism is untenable, although for different reasons and his distrust of general 
descriptivism is much more limited – he still thinks it’s viable to give a descriptivist treatment of almost 
all language, a conclusion Kripke would demur from.  
76 This is an extremely simplified account, and cannot be right as it stands – it faces problems with cases 
where the referent of a term changes over time like in the case of ‘Madagascar’ (see Evans 1973) and in 
other situations. However, the fan of the Kripke-Putnam framework hopes that they will be able to 
finesse the account to deal with these putative counterexamples. In addition, some argue that if we 
adopt this Kripkean account we are forced back into offering a Millian account of meaning, one which 
still struggles with the puzzles of cognitive significance that inspired Frege, although see Salmon (1986) 
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So much for names, what about natural kind terms like „water‟, „gold‟, „tiger‟, „acid‟ and 
„catalyst‟? Well, we can adduce similar types of worries about descriptivism with these 
types of terms too. Hilary Putnam (1975) famously offers us the example of Twin-Earth. 
Twin-Earth is a distant planet, exactly like Earth except in one respect: the clear, odourless, 
potable stuff that falls from the sky and fills the lakes, taps and rivers does not have the 
chemical composition H2O, but some other chemical composition – call it XyZ. If the 
descriptions we associate with water (that it is clear, odourless, potable stuff that fills lakes, 
taps and rivers etc) gave the meaning of, or fixed the reference of our term „water‟ then our 
term „water‟ would apply to XyZ just as well as it does to H2O. However, Putnam contends 
that this is unintuitive – our term „water‟ does not refer to XyZ, just as in the Twin-
Earthers‟ mouths their term „Water‟ does not refer to H2O. This is because, like proper 
names, the reference of our word „water‟ is fixed by some initial baptism that incorporates 
an intention to refer with „water‟ to the stuff that shares an intrinsic nature with the stuff that 
is dominant causally responsible for our water perceptions – the ones that form what we can 
call water‟s „nominal essence‟ – that water is wet, potable, falls from the sky, fills lakes, etc. 
This explains why, as Kripke points out, the term „Gold‟ does not refer to fools good – 
although fool‟s gold satisfies the superficial descriptions we associate with gold (it‟s 
yellow, soft, etc) it differs in atomic chemistry from gold – it does not have atomic number 
79. When we introduced the term „gold‟ we intended to use it to refer to the stuff that shares 
an intrinsic nature with the stuff we were baptising, and so anything that lacks that intrinsic 
nature fails to count as gold. Similar examples abound – orange and black stripey cats are 
not tigers if internally they are actually robots instead of being biological organisms that 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
and Soames (2002) for attempts to deal with this worry. One move open to the Kripkean who takes up 
the Millian line is to claim that ‘Morning Star’ and ‘Evening Star’ do have the same meaning (as they 
share the same referent), but that mere competence with applying the term does not mean you grasp 
that meaning, which explains why you can falsely believe (as a matter of the meaning of the terms 
involved!) that the Morning Star is distinct from the Evening Star. This is, of course, complete anathema 
to the traditional Fregean picture where meanings are what competent speakers grasp. 
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share the morphological, physiological and genetic properties characteristic of actual tigers. 
One consequence of this view is that if a Twin-Earther chemist got into an argument with 
an Earther chemist about whether a sample of XyZ was „water‟ they would be talking at 
cross purposes – the term has a different meaning in each of their mouths (even though they 
might associate all the same descriptions with „water‟).  
 
What we are left with is a picture where for both names and natural kind terms reference is 
fixed and maintained via initial baptisms in concert with overlapping chains of referential 
intentions. What use is this to the Cornell realist? 
 
Well, Richard Boyd argues that we need to be more permissive than an orthodox Kripkean 
in our account of natural kinds77. Natural kinds are, for him, those terms which track the 
properties which inform our explanatory inferences. What does this mean? Well the idea, 
briefly, is that there are causal structures in the world which natural kind terms latch on to. 
These causal structures allow us to explain and predict various events. In some cases these 
will involve the sharing on one particular property among all samples of a given kind: as in 
Kripke‟s gold case, where all gold has the atomic number 7978, and having atomic number 
79 thus characterises gold‟s intrinsic nature and informs us about its essence. We can then 
use that essence in our scientific practices – in explanations of why gold is how it is, and 
how it interacts with other substances. However, things are not this simple for other natural 
                                                             
77 Boyd (1991, 2010); for problems with the pure Kripkean account of natural kinds see also Beebee and 
Sabbarton-Leary (2010); for an account similar to Boyd’s see Dupré (1993). 
78
 In actual fact, the case of chemical kinds is considerably more complicated than this, but let’s not get 
too worried about that – all we need for present purposes is a contrast with cases where it is even more 
complicated 
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kind terms in good standing, like biological or social kinds. For instance, there is no one 
genetic, morphological or physiological property that all tigers share in common. However 
the category „tiger‟ does underwrite our explanatory practices, and maps on to genuine 
causal structures in the world – it‟s just that these causal structures are much looser than in 
the case of chemical kinds. What we have instead are what Boyd calls „homeostatic 
property clusters‟. These are a number of properties that tend to cluster around one another 
in instances of the kind in question – so most tigers have four legs, orange stripes, certain 
portions of genetic code, etc, and this is enough to group tigers as a kind, even though there 
is no one property that all tigers share in common, nor even one single mechanism which is 
responsible for tigers sharing some of the features that are common for their type. „Tiger‟ is 
still a natural kind term because the clustering of this group of properties is enough to 
underwrite our classificatory and explanatory inferences – we can still use „tiger‟ to license 
certain (ceteris paribus) generalisations about tigers and so on. We are still broadly within 
the Kripke-Putnam framework, however, because it is these properties which are causally 
responsible for our tiger perceptions – the homeostatic property cluster basically, in a loose 
way, gives us the intrinsic nature of tigerhood that our initial baptism of „tiger‟ attempted to 
latch on to. This explains why the Cornell realist was so keen to find a role for moral terms 
in our best explanatory practices – it is featuring in those practices which give a term 
natural kind status, which allows the Cornell realist to pursue their analogy between moral 
terms and natural kind terms.  
 
The Cornell realist‟s suggestion is that moral terms are like natural kind terms in this 
permissive sense. They are, as in Boyd‟s (1991) homeostatic property clusters that 
underwrite our moral practices. So, for example, „good‟ refers to that cluster of properties 
that is dominantly causally responsible for various aspects of our moral practices – it plays a 
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central role in how we regulate our affairs, we typically respond to judgements that 
goodness is instantiated in some state of affairs by being motivated to pursue that state of 
affairs, and so on. What‟s the upshot of all this? Well, natural kind terms, on this sort of 
view, do not have to be reductively defined in terms of other vocabulary to earn their 
ontological keep. This means the Cornell realist does not fall prey to the open question 
argument – they never claim that „good‟ or „right‟ can be analytically defined in other 
terms. Nevertheless, goodness is still perfectly real, and perfectly natural. We are not forced 
down the road of offering an anti-realist or non-naturalist account of morality. The Cornell 
realist is also an externalist about moral motivation – they can quite coherently claim that 
we only typically respond to judgements about goodness by being motivated towards that 
goodness, for example. This means that if we read Korsgaard‟s attack on moral realism as 
an attack centring on the motivational effects of moral judgements, then her attack simply 
fails to get a grip on the Cornell realist, who has the added advantage of offering us a 
semantics seemingly commensurate with the discoveries of late 20th century philosophy of 
language. 
 
In addition, this semantic thesis, if tenable, has implications for Finlay‟s analytic 
reductivism. Remember, Finlay wanted to give reductive analyses of normative terms in 
non-normative vocabulary, and he supported this practice of analysis by adverting to Gillian 
Russell‟s defence of analyticity. However, on this Kripke-Putnam picture moral terms 
would either not be suitable components of the kind of analytic truths Finlay wants to 
generate, or, if they were they would not be the kind of truths that would be accessible 
through the armchair speculation Finlay takes up as his method. This is because, to put 
things in Russell‟s terminology, natural kind terms have reference-determiners that are 
sensitive to context of introduction – roughly, if we had been pointing at XyZ rather than 
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H2O when we baptised „water‟, our word „water‟ would have referred to XyZ, not H2O. 
However, the term „H2O‟ is not sensitive in the same way. This is what makes it the case 
that „Water is H2O‟ is not analytic, though necessary, because it is impossible for the right 
relations of inclusion, exclusion or identity to hold between the reference-determiners of 
„water‟ and „H2O‟ given their different sensitivity to contexts of introduction.  
 
Suppose though that we, rather implausibly in my view, dropped this aspect of Russell‟s 
view of natural kind terms and allowed that they could have reference-determiners 
insensitive to contexts of introduction (this would give bizarre results, but it would mean 
that there could be the analytic connections between normative and non-normative terms 
Finlay wants). Even then, this would not license Finlay‟s method. This is because it is part 
of the more general Kripke-Putnam framework that one can be competent with a term 
without knowing much, if anything, about its reference determiner – for hundreds of years 
we knew the meaning of „water‟ without knowing anything about its chemical composition; 
in actual fact whilst falsely believing it was a simple substance. So, regardless of the details 
of the account of analyticity that Finlay adverts to if anything like the Cornell realist‟s 
semantic thesis (that moral kind terms are analogous in their function to Kripke-Putnam 
style natural kind terms) is right then the project of analytic reductivism is sunk.  
 
So, is the Cornell realist‟s semantic claim plausible? Finlay himself makes two broad moves 
against this picture of moral language – first he challenges the general framework on a 
number of grounds; and also its application to the moral case. I will just briefly outline this 
second move before moving on to another objection that has played a significant role in 
recent literature. Finlay argues that, because we have a priori access to significant moral 
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truths, normative concepts must be „metaphysically thin‟ and therefore „transparent‟ to us. 
What he means by this is that normative properties are not concrete in the way that tigers 
and gold are. This is supported by the claim that normative properties can not only be 
predicated of concrete objects (like tools, people, actions) but also abstract things (like plans 
and ideas). So, there are two bits of evidence that moral concepts and the terms that stand 
for them are unlike natural kind terms – they can be reasonably applied to abstract objects 
and we know truths involving them a priori. The Cornell realist is unlikely to be moved by 
the second sort of consideration – they will simply deny that these putative a priori truths 
are genuinely known a priori. After all, for them, to even know whether a term like „good‟ 
refers to a property at all you need to see whether it has an ineliminable role in our best 
explanations of various phenomena - a thoroughly empirical pursuit. The other worry may 
be more troubling but again the Cornell realist has avenues to explore – they could deny 
that things like plans and ideas are abstract, instead identifying them with certain types of 
concrete objects (perhaps via identifying them with types of mental states which are 
themselves concrete objects), or they could hold that the application of moral terms to 
abstract objects is either false or merely metaphorical. 
 
A more particular argument against the Cornell realist‟s semantic programme is found in 
Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons attempt to launch a revised open question argument 
against it79. The Cornell realist eschews the analytic definitions of moral terms advanced by 
an analytic naturalist like Finlay, but they do hope to offer synthetic definitions which 
characterise the intrinsic nature (or „real essence‟) of moral properties. What might this 
property be like? In order to generate their argument against Cornell realism Horgan and 
                                                             
79 Horgan and Timmons 1991, 1992, 1996, 2000; and see 2009 for a structurally similar attack on 
analytic functionalism. 
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Timmons combine Boyd‟s claim that moral terms are, like natural kind terms, rigid-
designators that refer to natural properties with David Brink‟s view that the properties in 
question are functional properties whose intrinsic nature is revealed by our best normative 
theory. This yields a thesis they label „Causal Semantic Functionalism‟ (CSF) 
CSF: Each moral term m is causally regulated by a unique functional property, and 
rigidly designates that property.80                           (Horgan and Timmons 1996, 12) 
It‟s this claim that allows Horgan and Timmons to generate problems for the Cornell realist 
using a modified Twin-Earth scenario. 
 
Suppose, as a matter of empirical fact, that the mature normative theory that Earthers 
converge upon is consequentialist in nature, and thus (with CSF and Brink and Boyd‟s 
other semantic commitments) our word „good‟ rigidly designates this consequentialist 
property. This property is what our term „good‟ rigidly designates. Now consider Moral 
Twin-Earth. On Moral Twin-Earth the mature normative theory that Twin-Earthers 
converge on is deontological in nature – the property that their word orthographically 
similar word „good‟ rigidly designates in deontological. However, this property is 
connected up with Twin-Earthers lives in the way goodness is connected up with ours – 
Twin-Earthers are typically motivated by judgements involving goodness, judgements of 
goodness are thought to have special bearing on Twin-Earthers‟ well-being, etc. 
Importantly, the similarities between the practices connected with their use of the word 
                                                             
80 We get the causal regulation part from the fact that natural kind like terms refer to whatever is 
dominantly causally responsible for our perceptions of the superficial properties caused by the 
properties denoted by those terms. Note that this formulation talks about a unique property, whereas 
Boyd’s mature view talks of homeostatic property clusters. To explicate Horgan and Timmons’s 
argument it should be harmless to leave this complication out of the picture.  
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„good‟ and our use of our word „good‟ are strong enough that they would feel inclined to 
translate their word with our word.  
 
Now, Horgan and Timmons claim that our intuitions about Moral Twin-Earth diverge 
wildly from our intuitions about the Twin-Earth scenarios offered in favour of the Kripke-
Putnam semantic framework. Remember, in the original „water‟ case we feel as if the 
following sort of dispute involves people talking at crossed purposes: a Twin-Earth chemist 
and an Earth chemist pointing at a sample of XyZ and arguing about whether it is a sample 
of „water‟. The reason why this dispute is pointless is that the term „water‟ has a different 
reference in each of their mouths – for the Twin-Earth chemist it refers to stuff iff it is XyZ, 
but for the Earther it refers to H2O. We might even characterise their dispute as merely 
verbal – if they knew more about the semantic practices of their respective languages they 
would give up the dispute.  
 
Now imagine a parallel disagreement about a moral term like „good‟ – suppose some state 
of affairs possesses the deontological property that causally regulates a Twin-Earther‟s 
word „good‟ but fails to possess the consequentialist property that performs the same role 
for the Earther. One ostends the state of affairs and says „This is good‟ whilst the other 
denies it. Do we feel that this dispute is, again, really a waste of time? We could certainly 
offer that interpretation of what‟s going on here – that in their mouths „good‟ simply 
means/has its reference fixed by different things, so really their dispute is merely verbal. 
However, Horgan and Timmons claim that „the far more natural and plausible mode of 
description‟ of this dispute is that „moral and twin-moral terms do not differ in meaning or 
reference, and hence any apparent moral disagreements that might arise between Earthers 
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and Twin Earthers would be genuine disagreements – i.e. disagreements in moral belief and 
in normative moral theory, rather than differences in meaning‟ (2009, 8).  
 
We can explicate this another way to show up the similarities to the old open question 
argument.81 The Cornell realist accepts something like CSF for above, and so for each 
moral term they will offer a (synthetic) semantic analysis like this (for good): 
GOOD: x is good iff it instantiates the property that causally regulates our moral 
talk. 
This, according to Horgan and Timmons, tells us something about the meaning of good. 
Thus, the following question: „x instantiates the property that causally regulates our moral 
talk, but is it really good?‟ should be closed. Reflection on the Moral Twin-Earth thought 
experiment is supposed to show that it is not. This is because we can imagine ourselves in a 
genuine disagreement with the Twin-Earthers about this. 
 
As presented so far this revised open-question argument might appear to beg the question 
against the naturalist just like the old. As Miller puts it “the...argument works only if our 
conviction that the question is open is well-grounded, or, equivalently, that our intuitions 
about the moral Twin-Earth case are correct. But to make either of these assumptions is 
already to presuppose the falsity of the idea that the semantics of „good‟ is given by the 
likes of GOOD.” (2003, 167). Miller suggests that Horgan and Timmons should instead 
model their argument on the revised open question argument that we saw from Darwall, 
Gibbard and Railton (1992) in §2.14. There, we don‟t start from the datum that our intuition 
                                                             
81
 They also offer a revised argument from queerness (1992, 248).  
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is well-grounded. Instead we start from the less controversial claim that we have the 
intuition in question, then proceed to argue that the best explanation for our intuition that 
the question is open, or that our dispute with the Twin-Earther is substantive, is that the 
intuition is well-grounded. Horgan and Timmons explicitly endorse this strategy in their 
2009 (5).  
 
They also have some motivation for making the inference from „we have this intuition‟ to 
„this intuition is well-grounded‟, for two reasons – the seeming strength of the intuition, and 
the dialectical environment they offer it in. On the first, it seems like this intuition is one 
that might be strongly held. One way to flesh this out is to think how things would go if we 
leapt into our spaceship and went off to meet the Twin-Earthers. It would be of fairly large 
importance to us which definition of goodness governed those interactions, and we would 
try to argue the Twin-Earthers around to our normative theory, in contrast to the „water‟ 
case where we would take a far more relaxed attitude. On the second reason, remember that 
the Cornell realist (or anyone who models moral semantics on natural kind semantics in the 
Kripke-Putnam mould) heavily relies upon intuitions about Twin-Earth cases to motivate 
their semantic programme – it is the intuition that the dispute with the Twin-Earther about 
„water‟ is trivial that the picture of natural kind terms as rigid-designators that have their 
reference fixed by causal-historical chains back to particular type of baptisms is supposed to 
offer a non-debunking explanation of. So, if it is not only acceptable but a vital part of the 
Cornell realist‟s general semantic commitments that our intuitions about Twin-Earth cases 
deserve respect, then it seems improper for them to dismiss this intuition about Twin-Earth 
cases out of hand – there seems to be a positive presumption in favour of Horgan and 
Timmons‟s claim that the Cornell realist needs to undermine.  
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Horgan and Timmons‟s argument has come in for a large amount of criticism.82 The point I 
wish to make is that Horgan and Timmons‟s presentation of their argument is misleading, 
and that when this misleadingness is noted it loses its power. Remember that what is crucial 
for Horgan and Timmons‟s new open question argument is the difference between how we 
respond to the water Twin-Earth case and the Moral Twin-Earth case. In the case of „water‟ 
the question „This sample is made up of the stuff, H2O, that causally regulates our use of 
„water‟, but is it really water?‟ (Qwater) is closed, whereas the question „This state of 
affairs instantiates the property, the consequentialist one, that causally regulates our use of 
„good‟, but is it really good?‟ (Qgood) is open. This is supposed to show that the natural 
kind semantics offered by the Kripke-Putnam framework is adequate for water, but cannot 
account for moral terms.  
 
However, once we examine more closely the idea of a question being „closed‟ this problem 
dissolves. A question is closed when the answer is available to someone based merely on 
their competence with the meaning of the expressions involved. This is why the original 
open question argument militates against analytic naturalism – if there were analytic 
definitions of moral terms in non-normative vocabulary available these definitions would be 
true in virtue of meaning, and mere grasp of the relevant meanings would be enough to 
know they are true. Mere understanding of the meaning of the terms does not suffice to 
                                                             
82 See, for example: Gert (2006) who argues that the Horgan and Timmons’s style of argument, even if it 
has force against the synthetic definitions of ‘good’ offered by the Cornell realist, has no force against 
synthetic definitions of more basic normative notions, like harm, out of which we could construct better 
synthetic definitions of goodness; Sayre-McCord (1997), who claims that the Twin-Earther’s word ‘good’ 
will be regulated by whichever normative moral theory is correct, regardless of what property the Twin-
Earthers or best scientific theory thinks causally regulates their moral talk; van Roojen (2006) argues 
that Horgan and Timmons’s argument has some force against Boyd’s account, but this evaporates when 
we modify it slightly; Copp (2000) attempts to offer an alternative explanation of our readiness to 
translate Twin-Earthers’ ‘good’ as our ‘good’, though see Horgan and Timmons (2000) for a response.  
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know that these definitions are true however, says the Moorean, so the definitions are not 
true. The crucial point is that if this is what it means for a question to be closed neither 
Qwater or Qgood should be closed on the Kripke-Putnam framework. This is because mere 
competence with the terms involved does not suffice to know the definitions that they are 
bringing into question. Why is this? Well even if we understand all the relevant terms we 
will not know, a priori, that, for example, that the stuff that causally regulates our „water‟ 
talk is water. This is because the Kripke-Putnam framework that the Cornell realist exploits 
is supposed to be a substantive, a posteriori discovery. Mere reflection on our concept of 
„meaning‟ or „reference-fixing‟ is not enough to know its truth – instead we offer the 
framework as the best explanation of the various intuitions we have about the cases.83 This 
means that it should be perfectly possible for someone to doubt whether a sample of the 
substance that is made up of stuff that causally regulates our „water‟ talk is really water – 
because they don‟t know, merely on the basis of their semantic competence, that „water‟ 
refers to whatever causally regulates our water talk. What this means is that both Qwater 
and Qgood should be open, in the relevant sense. This means that Horgan and Timmons‟s 
claim that the semantics of moral terms cannot be given a Kripke-Putnam treatment whilst 
natural kinds can be collapses. If the disanalogy they point to between Qwater and Qgood 
does exist then their conclusion should be that „good‟ can be given the Kripke-Putnam 
treatment, but „water‟ cannot, because to give a Kripke-Putnam treatment the relevant 
question should be open, and it is only in the case of goodness. Clearly something has gone 
wrong here. 
                                                             
83 Another way to put the point is that according to Horgan and Timmons the semantic analysis Good 
above is, on the Kripke-Putnam framework, analytic, thus moving the problematic analyticity to a 
different place, and giving Horgan and Timmons space to run a revised open question argument. 
However, this misunderstands the Cornell realist’s semantic framework. Good above is not analytic. 
Instead, it is a theoretical postulate in an empirical theory of meaning. The justification for believing it is 
not that it follows from mere semantic competence with “good”, instead positing it helps in the 
construction of the best explanation for the intuitions speakers have about particular cases.  
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The mistake Horgan and Timmons make is to mischaracterise the evidence that Moral 
Twin-Earth opens up to us. Instead of characterising our response to Qwater or Qgood in 
terms of their openness (because if the Kripke-Putnam framework is right for „water‟ 
neither should be closed) we should instead talk about their obviousness84. The answer to 
Qwater does seem obvious, and this might lead us to conclude that the question is closed. 
But, it could just be obvious because of our extensive knowledge of the chemical 
composition of water – we know that it is H2O. However, in the case of goodness, what the 
right normative theory is is not at all obvious. So to be told that some state of affairs 
instantiates some consequentialist property that causally regulates our „good‟ talk does not 
make the answer to Qgood obvious – because we are not sure that the consequentialist story 
is true.85 If we are told that it is the consequentialist property that causally regulates our 
„good‟ talk, our uncertainty about that consequentialist theory will threaten our acceptance 
of a semantic theory that links the meaning or reference of „good‟ to the stuff that causally 
regulates our „good‟ talk. Thus the answer to the question will not seem obvious, but not 
because it is open (in the sense of not being decided by semantic competence) rather than 
closed. True, it is open in this sense (because the Kripke-Putnam framework is a substantial 
a posteriori  discovery) but then so is Qwater. Regardless of whether this is the correct 
explanation of our different intuitions what is clear is that Horgan and Timmons‟s position 
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 What I am in effect claiming here is that consideration of ‘openness’ when glossed in the typical way 
will have to be given a different treatment on a Kripke-Putnam framework. On that framework, precisely 
because something like Putnam’s slogan ‘meanings aint in the head’ is apposite, lots of true explications 
of meaning will not leave the relevant questions closed. Instead, what the Kripke-Putnam theorist needs 
to do is to give an alternative explanation of our intuitions that certain questions are closed and others 
open. Talking in terms of obviousness is one way of doing this.  
85
 This factor also explains why there is a difference in intuitions about when we are talking at cross-
purposes. In the water case we feel as if we are talking at cross purposes, but not in the good case as set 
up by Horgan and Timmons. This is because what the right moral theory is is still up for grabs, and we’d 
treat the twin-earthers, until the point at which we’ve exhausted all possible avenues of debate, as 
interlocutors in the discussion of which moral theory is correct, rather than assume at the outset that 
they mean something different by ‘good’.  
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is untenable. They aim to draw a contrast between the original Twin-Earth case (where the 
Kripke-Putnam framework is appropriate) and Moral Twin-Earth (where it is not) and this 
cannot be done in the way they adopt.  
 
To sum up, we began looking at Cornell realism to see whether there was a version of moral 
realism that could evade Korsgaard‟s attack on moral realism (when this is construed as 
being an issue to do with moral realism). Cornell realism can resist this attack whilst 
evading the original open-question argument and offering the possibility of a plausible 
semantics of moral terms. We have seen how the Cornell realist‟s strategy for earning moral 
properties their ontological keep is threatened by an argument due to Harman, but that there 
might be hope for this aspect of the Cornell realist if they make certain moves invoking 
program explanation. We‟ve also seen how the Cornell realist‟s semantic programme can 
resist the problems presented by Moral Twin-Earth. This means that we have a position that 
can both avoid the neo-Kantian attack on realism (read one way) and is independently 
plausible. Recall also that the fate of Finlay‟s analytic reductivist project rested, in part, on 
the demise of the attempt to model moral semantics on the Kripke-Putnam semantics for 
natural kind terms. We‟ve seen that perhaps the Cornell realist is not in as much trouble as 
is sometimes thought.  
 
However, in terms of the engagement with the neo-Kantian‟s attack on realism, this issue is 
less important. If there is some compelling reason to reject a Kripke-Putnam treatment of 
moral terms, then this means that Finlay‟s analytic reductivism becomes more motivated. If 
moral terms are given a natural kind style semantics, then the Cornell realist looks in better 
shape. But both positions avoid the neo-Kantian objection. To make the objection stick, the 
183 
 
neo-Kantian needs an argument that rules out both of these positions as untenable, which 
we have seen they are not. The neo-Kantian‟s case for a new metaethics instead rests on 
whether their own account offers some other advantages over these realist accounts, an 
investigation we will get to in chapter five. First we turn to the neo-Kantian‟s engagement 
with non-cognitivism. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE NEO-KANTIAN AND EXPRESSIVISM 
 
 
We have seen in the last chapter how Korsgaard advances an argument against moral 
realism, and how the moral realist can avoid that argument in a number of ways. The Neo-
Kantian also presents themselves as offering a distinct metaethical position from that 
offered by expressivists. In this chapter I will first briefly outline expressivism (§4.1); then 
present Korsgaard‟s objection to expressivism (along with some scepticism about whether 
there is a genuine objection here owing to Hussain and Shah, §4.2); I will link this objection 
up with one of the important challenges facing expressivism – the Frege-Geach problem -  
(§4.3) and consider traditional expressivist solutions to this problem (§4.31-4); these 
attempted solutions are unsatisfactory, I will argue, and motivate an examination of so-
called hybrid metaethical theories – accounts that combine elements of cognitive and non-
cognitive semantics to exploit each position‟s strengths (§4.4-5); I will argue that these 
hybrid accounts fail on their own terms – they cannot provide a solution to the problems 
plaguing expressivism whilst leaving the rest of the terms of metaethical debate standing; 
finally I will look at what we can say about the Neo-Kantian‟s reaction to expressivism 
based on these considerations (§4.6).  
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4.1 Expressivism 
 
Expressivism is  a non-descriptive semantic project86. It holds that “to make a normative 
judgement is to express a non-cognitive attitude” (Gibbard, 1990, 84)87. This contrasts with 
cognitivism which holds that normative judgements are entirely descriptive, and that to 
make a normative judgement is to express a belief. Moral realism is a subset of cognitivism 
– the realist holds that normative judgements express beliefs, evaluable in terms of truth or 
falsity, and – sometimes at least – those beliefs are true: there are normative facts „out there‟ 
in the world for our normative practices to attempt to latch on to. It is also possible to be a 
cognitivist non-realist: you could hold that moral judgements express beliefs, but that those 
beliefs are systematically false, a la the error theorist88; or, you could claim that moral 
judgements express beliefs, which are true when their truth conditions are met, but give an 
anti-realist account of those truth conditions (a position I will offer as part of the effort to 
get clear on the Neo-Kantian‟s own metaethical position in the next chapter). What‟s 
important here is the distinctive expressivist claim – that we can give an adequate semantics 
for moral terms using non-cognitive, desire-like, attitudes.  
                                                             
86 Non-descriptive in the sense that it doesn’t use beliefs or truth-conditions to characterise the meaning 
of moral terms. In another sense, expressivism is entirely descriptive – it attempts to give a descriptive 
rather than revisionary characterisation of every day moral thought and talk. 
87 This is one way of carving up the terrain. Instead, one could reserve ‘expressivism’ for the view that 
normative judgements are to be given an analysis in terms of the mental states that they express. This 
has the side-effect of meaning that for anyone who embraces a broadly Lockean picture of semantics 
(where the meaning of terms is given by the mental states they express, even in the case of declarative 
sentences where the relevant mental states are beliefs) even a realist, who holds that normative 
judgements express beliefs which are in turn straightforwardly truth-evaluable, will turn out to be an 
expressivist. This is not how the term ‘expressivist’ has typically been used, and I will use it to mean a 
view which combines something like the Lockean picture with a non-cognitive characterisation of the 
content of normative terms.  
88
 Mackie (1977), Joyce (2001), and fictionalist analyses will fall into this position if they are 
revolutionary rather than hermeneutic, see Hussain’s (2010) for the distinction. 
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What are the motivations for this project? Expressivists are typically seen as following in 
the footsteps of the emotivist analysis of moral terms offered by A.J. Ayer (1936).89 Ayer in 
effect took up Moore‟s open-question argument against the naturalist, but (in part because 
of his verificationist commitments) also rejected Moore‟s non-naturalism. The non-
naturalist involves herself in the sort of metaphysical pronouncements Ayer rejected as 
meaningless verbiage.90 But, if both naturalism and non-naturalism are ruled out what do 
we have left? Ayer claims that moral language is not literally significant at all. Instead, 
when we utter a sentence like „You acted wrongly in stealing that money‟ we have not 
literally asserted anything beyond „You stole that money‟. What the moral term does is 
express our disapproval of stealing. Thus, we should translate utterances like „Murder is 
wrong‟ as being akin to „Boo to murder!‟ This latter utterance does not assert anything 
about murder (that it instantiates the natural or non-natural property of wrongness as the 
naturalist and non-naturalist realist have it), in the same way that commands, cheers, and so 
on do not describe the world. Thus it is important to distinguish between emotivism (where 
moral judgements express approval or disapproval) and subjectivism (where moral 
judgements report that the subject concerned has the attitude of approval or disapproval in 
question). The difference is that the latter view makes moral judgement a matter of (a 
particularly self-centred) belief, straightforwardly apt to be evaluated in terms of truth and 
falsity. The emotivist, in contrast, holds that people don‟t report their non-cognitive 
attitudes of approval/disapproval, they express them.91 
 
                                                             
89 Though see Suikannen (2007) and comments for details on earlier progenitors of this type of view 
90 To put the point less polemically, for the non-naturalist moral judgements are synthetic but not 
empirically verifiable, and thus they violate the positivist’s criterion of literal significance. 
91
 Although see Jackson and Pettit (1998) for an attempt collapse this distinction. 
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Modern day expressivists typically lack the verificationist commitments that forced Ayer to 
reject non-naturalist realism. However, they have other motivations for not taking it up: 
non-naturalism incurs heavyweight metaphysical and epistemological commitments – we 
need to add strange, non-natural, properties to our ontology; and once we do that we will 
need some epistemology for how we find out about the instantiation of those properties (if 
we are to avoid full-blown moral scepticism). If we can give an expressivist treatment of 
moral discourse, then we will have traded some semantic complications for some 
metaphysical and epistemological solvency – the expressivist requires an ontology of only 
natural properties; and we might think that because moral judgements are accounted for as 
expressions of mental states we will not need a special epistemology for them. As far as 
naturalism is concerned an expressivist is particularly moved by something like the revised 
open-question argument offered by Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992). The expressivist 
places great weight on the practical role that moral judgements have in our deliberation – in 
effect, they endorse some form of judgement internalism. Thus, they have a quick argument 
against most forms of realism: 
(1) Moral judgements are inherently motivating                                              
(Internalism) 
(2) Beliefs are not inherently motivating, and have no necessary connections to desire-
like motivational states.                                                 (Humeanism about 
motivation) 
(3) Therefore, moral judgements do not express beliefs. Instead they express non-
cognitive desire-like states.  
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The conclusion 3 is incompatible with the cognitivist semantic commitments of moral 
realism. We can say two things about the non-naturalist: either we can see them as falling 
prey to the above argument (this is the sense in which even Moorean non-naturalism falls 
prey to the revised open question argument from Darwall, Gibbard and Railton, which uses 
judgement internalism in a slightly subtler way than the quick argument above), or we can 
see their metaphysical position as offering a way to deny 2 – they could claim that the 
properties that moral judgements are beliefs about are so special that they violate the usual 
Humean restrictions. Just judging that they are instantiated is enough to move someone to 
action. But this will mean that the expressivist‟s earlier charge that the non-naturalist incurs 
significant metaphysical costs will start to have even more bite – we don‟t just have non-
natural properties on the scene, but non-natural properties with special connections to 
motivation. The expressivist then offers the realist a dilemma: either they account for moral 
judgement entirely in terms of naturalistically respectable properties, in which case they fail 
to explain the special motivational effects of moral judgements; or they start to invoke 
heavyweight metaphysical costs. This is what prompts the thought that it is really non-
cognitivism that benefits from the open question argument. 
 
Modern day expressivists differ from their emotivist ancestors in another respect. They have 
noticed that moral judgements behave a lot like ordinary declarative sentences. We not only 
say that „murder is wrong‟ we also say things like „it is true that murder is wrong‟, or 
„murder is really wrong‟ or „it‟s a fact that murder is wrong‟ or „I believe that murder is 
wrong‟. All of these utterances seem perfectly appropriate but they all seem in tension with 
the simplistic emotivist analysis of moral terms. Expressivists like Blackburn (1998) and 
Gibbard (1990, 2003) therefore engage themselves in the project of „quasi-realism‟ – the 
idea is to capture all the realist sounding things that we want to say using moral terms, but 
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starting from an expressivist starting point. It is Blackburn‟s hope that we will get to the 
point where we can perfectly sensibly talk about moral truth or moral belief, even though 
we start with the resources available to an expressivist – in short, we can construct those 
realist sounding notions out of the expressivist starting point plus a revision in what we 
(philosophers) think about the relevant notion of truth, or belief, for example. Thus the 
contemporary expressivist has ambitions to save the realist seeming appearances of moral 
discourse.92  
 
4.2 The Neo-Kantian Rejection of Expressivism 
 
So, what is Korsgaard‟s problem with expressivism? Pinning this down seems to be as hard 
as getting clear on her problem with realism. In her Realism and Constructivism in 
Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy she presents a barrage of complaints: expressivism 
does not leave a suitable place for Kantian moral philosophy; we gain nothing by 
introducing a non-cognitivist semantics; the cognitivist/non-cognitivist distinction depends 
upon a misleading picture of moral concepts and knowledge (I borrow this list from 
Hussain and Shah‟s 2006b). The verdict Korsgaard offers is also quite mixed – she claims 
that, in a way, even if expressivism were true, it would be „boring‟. So, we have two 
difficulties: first getting clear on what precisely Korsgaard thinks is wrong with 
expressivism and, second, getting clear on the strength of her claim – does she think that 
expressivism is false, or true but unilluminating? What I am going to do here is first try to 
                                                             
92 Thus modern-day expressivism is conservative, in the sense explicated by Schroeder’s (2011) and 
Finlay’s (forthcoming).  
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extract from Korsgaard a clear complaint against the expressivist before going on to see 
how the expressivist might try to respond. 
 
Korsgaard argues that what lies behind the traditional distinction between non-cognitivism 
and cognitivism is a mistaken view about what our concepts are for – “that their cognitive 
job, so to speak, is to describe reality” (Korsgaard, 105). So a non-cognitivist agrees with 
the cognitivist that our cognitive concepts are for „describing reality‟, but says that our 
moral thought and judgement is not like that. Korsgaard wants to rid us of this assumption – 
instead, our normative concepts possess some cognitive job, but are not in the business of 
describing reality. Thus both the cognitivist and non-cognitivist are both right and wrong. 
The cognitivist is right that our normative concepts have a cognitive job, but they are wrong 
about what that job is. In contrast, the non-cognitivist is right to believe that our normative 
concepts are not cognitive in the sense used by both the cognitivist and the non-cognitivist, 
however, they are mistaken in assuming that this means that they have no cognitive job at 
all.  
 
So then, Korsgaard wants to give our normative concepts a cognitive job, although not one 
that is involved in describing reality. However, Hussain and Shah find it hard to make sense 
of this position. Cognitivism, they claim, must have something to do with knowledge: 
The point of calling a theory of normative concepts non-cognitive is that the theory 
rejects the assumption that the role of normative concepts is primarily that of 
helping with knowledge. (2006b, 34)  
This deserves a little qualification – modern expressivists will want to claim that they can 
give an account of moral knowledge. They might, for example, argue that there is a suitable 
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deflationary notion of truth, and minimal notion of belief, according to which holding a 
particular type of non-cognitive attitude counts as knowing something. However, they will 
argue that this sort of moral knowledge is built out of materials that are practical in nature – 
we don‟t start our explanation using the concepts of moral beliefs and moral knowledge, but 
we end up being able to talk of those things. This is one of the reasons why someone like 
Simon Blackburn is uncomfortable describing himself as a non-cognitivist (even though he, 
by standard definitions, obviously is one). But what Hussain and Shah are intending to flag 
up is essentially correct – non-cognitivists at least start by seeing normative concepts as 
essentially tied to practical deliberation and action, rather than being in the business of 
describing reality; and cognitivists are comfortable with starting their enquiries into 
normative concepts assuming that they are primarily in the business of describing reality. 
What all this means is that it is hard to see how we could give an account of the cognitive 
role of a normative concept that is not in terms of its ability to describe reality – to think of  
a cognitive concept is to think of one that is in the business of representing the world as 
being a certain way. This is what underlies our (philosophers) typical practice of explicating 
the content of beliefs in terms of their truth conditions. If you have this sort of view, 
Hussain and Shah point out, what Korsgaard is trying to do will look confused.  
 
Hussain and Shah trace this confusion to a misunderstanding about what non-cognitivism 
involves. Korsgaard says that “A conclusion of practical reasoning is not obviously a 
description of a fact about the world, but it hardly seems like some sort of emotional 
expletive either.” (Korsgaard 2003, 105). Hussain and Shah suggest that the term 
„emotional expletive‟ does not cover the quite complicated views about what moral 
judgements are, held by non-cognitivists. To them, it appears as if Korsgaard is confused 
between cognition and cogitation: 
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A non-cognitivist theory is not a non-cogitative theory. All the major non-
cognitivists – Stevenson, Hare, Blackburn, Gibbard- have complex theories about 
how practical reasoning proceeds in its complexity. (Hussain and Shah 2006b, 35) 
On this Hussain and Shah seem to be right on the money – if we look at the details of the 
accounts put forward by expressivists like Blackburn and Gibbard we see that the non-
cognitive attitudes that are used to characterise moral judgements are fairly sophisticated, 
and play a role in structures of attitudes that are extremely complicated. You can imagine 
them complaining to Korsgaard that although they do, ultimately, explain moral thought 
and talk in terms of non-cognitive states, the expressions of these states is nothing like an 
„emotional expletive.‟ For example, as Neil Sinclair puts it “Modern expressivists eschew 
the idea that this state [ the one the expressivist uses to characterise a moral judgement] has 
a distinctive phenomenological hue.” (2009, 137). What he means is that to the modern 
non-cognitivist the state that moral judgements express does not feel just like a 
paradigmatic desire or emotive state. Instead the non-cognitivist is more likely to talk about 
plans, intentions, or practical stances.  
 
In addition, they demonstrate sophistication about what the targets of these non-cognitive 
attitudes are. Mark Schroeder, for example, has argued in Being For that the expressivist is 
well-advised to use attitudes of being for praising or blaming a particular action, rather than 
attitudes directed towards that action itself. For Gibbard (1990) the relevant attitudes are 
directed at feelings of guilt or resentment. These positions show how the non-cognitivist 
can give an account that is emotionally ascended (Blackburn 1998). What this means is that 
the attitudes in question are not much like bare emotional expletives (a characterisation 
more fitting of the earlier emotivist non-cognitivists). On these grounds Hussain and Shah 
dismiss Korsgaard‟s complaints against expressivism as confused. 
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However, things are not quite plain-sailing for the expressivist if they go down this quasi-
realist route to try to capture our intuitions about the seriousness of moral discourse. There 
is a problem labelled creeping minimalism by Jamie Dreier (2004).93 The basic problem is 
that if the expressivist succeeds in capturing the cognitivist appearances of moral discourse 
then they end up finding it hard to differentiate their position from cognitivism. For 
example, it looks as though people say things like not only „Murder is wrong‟ but also „It‟s 
true that murder is wrong.‟ As the quasi-realist brand of expressivism does not want to 
convict moral discourse of being in bad faith or in radical error they cannot simply agree 
with early non-cognitivists that moral utterances, because they lack literal significance, are 
not truth apt. Instead they are more likely to give a lightweight characterisation of the truth 
predicate.94 What these views have in common is a rejection of a robust conception of truth, 
where truth is thought of in terms of correspondence to reality, or an epistemic 
characterisation in terms of what we have evidence for. Instead, these views give a central 
role to disquotational schema in their explication of truth: to understand the truth predicate 
(at least in part) is to understand that „„p’ is true‟ iff p’95 for each instance of p.96 This means 
that the expressivist can quite easily recover a notion of moral truth – grasp of the truth 
predicate allows you to see that „Murder is wrong‟ and „‟Murder is wrong‟ is true‟ are 
                                                             
93 But see also the earlier debate on a similar issue between Michael Smith, and Alex Miller and John 
Divers (Smith 1994b,c, Divers and Miller 1994, 1995) and for an exploration of ‘disciplined syntacticism’ 
see Lenman’s (2003). 
94 There are a number of views of truth that are ‘lightweight’ in this sense – deflationism, minimalism, 
redundancy theories and more. Another distinction to bear in mind is between minimalism about truth 
aptitude and minimalism about truth. In order for the expressivist to use the strategy suggested in the 
text they will have to claim that moral utterances are truth apt (available to be evaluated for truth or 
falsity) which they can then combine with a lightweight characterisation of truth.  
95
 Or, alternatively, the equivalence schema: S is true iff p. The differences between the two types of 
view do not matter here.  
96 The views then diverge on what other roles the truth predicate has – for example the minimalist 
argues that it also has a role as a generalising device. What they agree on is that truth is transparent. 
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equivalent – a competent speaker‟s familiarity with the relevant disquotational schema will 
allow them to disquote the second to derive the first, and travel in the opposite direction if 
necessary.  
 
But now, if moral judgements can be true even on an expressivist account, there seems to be 
a problem. We could give a rough characterisation of a belief as something like „holding 
that a particular content is true‟. Well, on expressivism plus a lightweight characterisation 
of truth, it turns out that when people sincerely express moral judgements they can be 
thought of as holding some content to be true – to do that is just to have the relevant attitude 
and to understand the truth predicate. Hence we can define a minimal notion of belief on 
which moral judgements express beliefs. We can then use this to explicate related notions of 
moral facts, moral properties and moral knowledge. The problem is that the expressivist 
intended to characterise moral judgements as being un-belief-like, and now they seem to 
have lost that contrast. To put it extremely schematically, it looks as if there is some tension 
in the quasi-realist project – if the expressivist ends up explaining the cognitivist-looking 
features of moral discourse too well then they threaten their right to claim expressivism as a 
distinctive position. However, the quasi-realist project was well-motivated in the first place 
– if they don‟t try to save those features of moral discourse then they will have to argue that 
moral discourse is in radical error: whenever we say things like „It is true that murder is 
wrong‟, „Murder is really [stamp-foot] wrong‟, „I know that murder is wrong‟. „You should 
believe that murder is wrong‟ we are just making mistakes. They also open themselves up 
to something like Korsgaard‟s initial charge: that on the expressivist account moral 
judgements are like mere emotional expletives.  
 
The first problem is particularly severe because it threatens to force the expressivist to 
dispense with plausible principles of charitable interpretation. The expressivist‟s semantic 
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programme is (in part) driven by extra-semantic considerations – they, being thoroughly 
naturalistic, cannot countenance admitting robust moral properties to their ontology; and 
they think that moral judgements are inherently motivating. But the first is a motivation 
shared by an error-theorist who takes the step of saying that moral discourse is in radical 
error. There are two problems with the error theory though – first, because it is cognitivist it 
has trouble explaining the intrinsic motivational effects of moral judgements97; but secondly 
it is extremely uncharitable – on the error theorist‟s account we make gross errors a lot of 
the time. But why should we, the expressivist can claim, saddle ordinary speakers with the 
charge that they are massively confused if we can instead give a slightly different 
theoretical analysis of what they are saying where it turns out that they are not in massive 
error? This approach is vastly more charitable, and on that ground has much to commend it. 
However, if the problem of creeping minimalism threatens quasi-realist expressivism, then 
not only does Korsgaard‟s charge start to bite, but expressivism loses the advantage it had 
over something like error theory.  
 
Expressivists do have some ways to try to respond to the problem of creeping minimalism 
though (Sinclair, 2009 gives a short survey). One approach is to try to retain a contrast 
between minimal and robust senses of beliefs – the expressivist can then claim that moral 
judgements are beliefs in the minimal sense whereas non-moral beliefs are beliefs in a 
robust sense. They could then co-opt something like Wright‟s pluralism about truth – where 
                                                             
97 This is a problem for them from the expressivist’s perspective. I’ve argued earlier that there is no 
pressing reason to accept internalism, so the error theorist gets a clean bill of health from me at least on 
this count. In fact, the problem with the error theorist in my view is that they are too much under the 
spell of internalism in that they think that moral discourse aims to ascribe properties that are 
intrinsically-motivating, before moving on to argue that such properties are, from the standpoint of 
naturalism, irredeemably queer. I argued that if we reject internalism properly, we don’t have to view 
moral discourse as purporting to be internalist, but failing to find the right sorts of properties to latch on 
to – instead moral discourse is externalist, and we explain the reliable connection between moral 
judgement and motivation in terms of contingent psychological connections in normal human beings.  
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we distinguish between minimalist truth (where all that matters is satisfying certain 
platitudes and displaying syntactical discipline) and robust truth (where we are talking 
about something more like genuine correspondence) and tie each type of belief to the 
relevant notion of truth. However, this sort of strategy runs into problems with so-called 
mixed-inferences – arguments involving both moral and non-moral sentences look to be 
valid, but if we are using two notions of truth then these arguments actually turn on 
something like a form of equivocation and are thus invalid (see Christine Tappolet‟s 1997). 
This problem though can be resisted if we adopt a functionalist account of truth, where truth 
is indentified by its functional role in certain sorts of inferences, a role which can be 
realised in multiple ways (minimally or robustly).  
 
Another approach is to start from an inferentialist framework (where the meaning of a term 
is tied to the inferential role it has) and to distinguish between theoretical and practical 
inferential roles. Moral concepts would be those that have a practical inferential role where 
“a practical inference is one whose premises provide practical support for a conclusion that 
can constitute practical knowledge about how to live”; non-moral concepts in contrast 
possessing a theoretical influential role: “a theoretical inference is one whose premises 
provide evidential support for a conclusion that can constitute theoretical knowledge about 
the world” (Sinclair 2009, 141). This is the view take up by Matthew Chrisman‟s (2008). 
Sinclair commends the view for the fact that it takes up a distinction between practical and 
theoretical reason  already acknowledged by competent users of moral discourse. However, 
this position is not so much a way of fleshing out the distinction between expressivism and 
descriptivism as a way of changing the terms of the debate. We no longer would offer a 
characterisation of non-moral beliefs in terms of truth-conditions (except derivatively), so 
we would again lose the relevant contrast. Instead we have a method for distinguishing 
between moral and non-moral utterances within an inferentialist framework. This is not to 
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argue against the view though – instead I am merely suggesting it is not going to help the 
typical expressivist, even if Chrisman‟s own view is interesting and illuminating.  
 
The final approach to the problem is to differentiate moral from non-moral beliefs in terms 
of the type of explanation we offer of them – whether they are explicated in terms of 
tracking worldly properties or not. This is the approach offered by Allan Gibbard (2003). 
As you can see, I have not been able to give anything like a comprehensive survey of these 
approaches to the problem of creeping minimalism. However, that is unrelated to the point I 
wish to make: Hussain and Shah dismiss Korsgaard as confused on the grounds that 
expressivist analyses of moral concepts are actually fairly sophisticated – however, when 
we look at the detail of these analyses it turns out to be very hard for the expressivist to 
secure that sophistication. 
 
This is linked to the main thrust of what I‟d like to say: Korsgaard draws our attention to the 
fact that moral judgements are not like „emotional expletives‟. One of the most fundamental 
problems with expressivism is that moral utterances are not like other expressions of non-
cognitive states – they can be embedded in various ways (in conditionals, within the scope 
of modal operators, negated and so on) and this causes a problem for expressivist analyses. 
Korsgaard is drawing our attention to differences between moral utterances and mere 
expressions of non-cognitive states, and one of the differences we find is that moral 
utterances obviously embed in various ways that causes problems for the expressivist – a set 
of problems that travels under the banner of „the Frege-Geach problem‟ which I now turn 
to.  
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4.3 The Frege-Geach Problem  
 
Consider this argument: 
(1) Bullying is wrong. 
(2) If bullying is wrong, turning a blind eye to bullying is wrong. 
So 
(3) Turning a blind eye to bullying is wrong.  
 
This argument looks perfectly valid – the truth of its premises guarantee the truth of its 
conclusion. It‟s also the sort of argument which is a pervasive feature of moral reasoning – 
one way to get someone to come to accept that something is wrong (or right) is to get them 
to accept that it‟s being wrong (or right) follows from some moral claim that they already 
accept. You can imagine someone who, although they accept that bullying is wrong, doesn‟t 
accept that turning a blind eye to bullying is wrong. If you get them to accept that if 
bullying is wrong, then turning a blind eye to bullying is also wrong then they face two 
options – either they can come to accept that turning a blind eye to bullying is wrong; or 
they can change their mind about the wrongness of bullying. This looks like a perfectly 
rational case of moral reasoning, underwritten by the validity of the above argument. 
What‟s not on for them to do is to say anything like „Well, I accept that bullying is wrong, 
and I accept that if bullying is wrong then turning a blind eye to bullying is also wrong, but 
I think turning a blind eye to bullying is perfectly fine.‟ Such a person would be guilty of 
some sort of inconsistency.  
 
What does this have to do with expressivism? Well, the expressivist has trouble explaining 
the validity of the above argument. This is because they give an account of the meaning of 
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„Bullying is wrong‟ as it features in 1 in terms of some non-cognitive sentiment – 
something like, very roughly, „Boo to bullying!‟.98 However, it doesn‟t look like they can 
characterise the meaning of „Bullying is wrong‟ as it features in the antecedent of the 
conditional in 2 in the same way. Why not? This is because 2 can be accepted by someone 
who does not disapprove of bullying. We can see this in a number of ways – we can 
imagine an alien anthropologist who is interested in investigating the structure of 
humanity‟s moral thought and talk but who themselves does not make any moral 
judgements. Or, we can make our example more mundane and simply consider someone 
who does not disapprove of bullying at all – a consistent bully perhaps – they might agree 
that if bullying is wrong then turning a blind eye to it is also wrong, and so assert 2 with 
perfect propriety, whilst lacking a sentiment of disapproval towards bullying.  
 
This is the point most famously made by Geach (1958) when he says  
 
There arises here a difficulty for what may be called performatory theories of the 
predicates “good” and “true” – that to predicate “good” of an action is to commend 
it, and to predicate “true” of a statement is to conform or concede it. For such 
predications may occur within “if” clauses; the predicates “good” and “true” do not 
then lose their force, any more than other predicates used in “if” clauses do; but “if 
S is true” is not an act of conforming S, nor “if X is good” an act of commending 
X‟. 
                                                             
98
 For the sake of exposition I will take the relevant sentiment to be disapproval of the action involved. 
Different expressivists characterise the attitude expressed by moral judgements in different ways, but, 
for now, these differences should not matter 
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(Geach 1958, 54 fn.)99 
(The point remains unchanged if we substitute an attitude of disapproval for one of 
commendation in the above). 
 
The reason why this is a problem is that now the argument from 1 and 2 to 3 turns on 
equivocation – „bullying is wrong‟ as it features in 1 means something different from what 
it means in the antecedent of 2. This means the valid-looking argument we started with 
comes out as invalid, and we end up attributing massive error to everyday users of moral 
discourse – every time they offer an argument like 1-3 they are committing a fallacy of 
equivocation.  
 
This is the Frege-Geach problem as traditionally posed against simple expressivist 
semantics – moral judgements retain their inferential and logical properties even when not 
used with the same force: „bullying is wrong‟ is unasserted in 2 and yet 2 still licenses the 
move from 1 to 3. The point is far more general than merely explaining the validity of 
moral modus ponens arguments however. We encounter the same problem when moral 
terms are used in other complex constructions. Take the question „Is x wrong?‟ This 
question does not typically express disapproval of x. However, an utterance of „x is wrong‟ 
answers the question, which the expressivist claims does express disapproval of x. But how 
can this be the case, if „wrong‟ in the question means something different to „wrong‟ in the 
                                                             
99
 The point is developed further in Geach (1960) and (1965) and a similar point is made in Searle’s 
(1962). The broad outline of my brief exploration of the history and point of the Frege-Geach problem is 
indebted to Schroeder’s (2008a) and (2008b) and discussion with Jussi Suikkanen. See Suikkanen’s 
(2007) and comments for a good discussion of the history of precursors to the Frege-Geach problem, 
and also James Urmson’s (1968).  Daniel Boisvert’s (2004a), (2004b) and (2004c) give a more 
comprehensive survey of the issue than I have time for here. 
201 
 
answer? On this sort of expressivist account it looks like „x is wrong‟ is an irrelevant 
response to „is x wrong?‟, and this cannot be correct. The same point too holds for other 
complex constructions such as negation. In „bullying is not wrong‟, „wrong‟ is not used to 
disapprove of bullying. In fact, if anything the opposite attitude is being expressed. 
However, again this will mean that „wrong‟ as it appears in „bullying is not wrong‟ means 
something different to what it means in „bullying is wrong‟. This then makes it hard to see 
how „bullying is wrong‟ contradicts „bullying is not wrong‟, if the words involved mean 
different things.  
 
The lesson to be drawn is that the Frege-Geach problem illustrates a more general problem 
with non-cognitivist semantics. In order to underwrite the validity of modus ponens 
arguments and explain how negations contradict unnegated statements and so on, the 
expressivist has to offer us an account of how the meaning of complex utterances is 
composed out of the meaning of simpler utterances. In order for 2 to license the move from 
1 to 3 above „wrong‟ must have the same meaning throughout, and the meaning of 2 as a 
whole must be built out of its simpler parts. We can understand Geach and Searle as arguing 
that the resources available to the expressivist are unsuitable for the job. 
 
The centrality of compositionality to the Frege-Geach problem is acknowledged by modern 
attempts to give an expressivist solution to it. R. M. Hare (1970) argues that explaining 
compositionality is a genuine task even for the cognitivist who analyses meaning not in 
terms of the mental states expressed by utterances, but in terms of the truth conditions of 
those mental states. „Bullying is wrong‟ does not have the same truth conditions as „If 
bullying is wrong, then turning a blind eye to bullying is wrong‟. So the cognitivist is forced 
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to tell a story about how the truth conditions of complex utterances is built up out of the 
truth conditions of their simpler components. The expressivist is simply faced with a similar 
task, except that they have at their disposal different elements – their job is to explain how 
the mental state expressed by 2 (remember, the expressivist gives the meaning of an 
utterance in terms of the mental state it expresses) is a function of its simpler constituents. 
Modern day expressivists thus view the Frege-Geach problem as presenting a challenge – to 
offer a compositional non-cognitivist semantics that underwrites the semantic or inferential 
properties of utterances containing moral terms. If they can do this then they have an 
answer to Geach and Searle‟s charge that on the expressivist account „wrong‟ has different 
meanings in the different constructions it features in.  
 
I will now briefly survey three approaches to this task before we move on to see what the 
hybrid-expressivist has to offer.  
 
 
4.31 Higher Order Attitudes 
 
Simon Blackburn (1973, 1984) suggests that we explain the inconsistency involved with 
accepting 1 and 2 and not accepting 3 by having 2 express a higher-order attitude. 2 on this 
account expresses the attitude of disapproving of a certain combination of other attitudes – 
namely disapproving of bullying and not disapproving of turning a blind eye to bullying. 
Thus, if you accept 1 and 2 but fail to accept 3 then you are guilty of inconsistency – in 
virtue of accepting 1 you disapprove of bullying; in virtue of accepting 2 you disapprove of 
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disapproving of bullying and not disapproving of turning a blind eye to bullying; in virtue 
of rejecting 3 you do not disapprove of turning a blind eye to bullying. This is inconsistent 
because given you accept 1 and 2 you should also disapprove of turning a blind eye to 
bullying, and yet your rejection of 3 shows you do not disapprove of turning a blind eye to 
bullying.  
 
The chief worry with this approach is that it over-generalises validity100. This problem is 
most clearly stated by Mark van Roojen‟s (1996)101. Compare: 
(1) Bullying is wrong. 
(2) If bullying is wrong, turning a blind eye to bullying is wrong. 
So 
(3) Turning a blind eye to bullying is wrong.  
To:  
(4) Bullying is wrong. 
(5) It is wrong to disapprove of bullying and not disapprove of turning a blind eye to 
bullying. 
(6) Turning a blind eye to bullying is wrong. 
 
According to Blackburn, 5  expresses the same attitude as 2. We are looking for an account 
that underwrites the validity of the argument 1-3, so if this account does that, and 5 
                                                             
100
 Other difficulties are found in Bob Hale’s (1986), (1993a, 1993b); Nicholas Zangwill’s (1992) 
101
 Here I use a modified version of Schroeder’s (2008a, 709-10) presentation of the problem.  
204 
 
expresses the same attitude as 2 then the argument 4-6 should also be valid. However 4-6 is 
not valid. The lesson we can draw from the failure of this higher-order approach is, as 
Schroeder puts it:  
If expressivists are to be able to explain validity, they are going to need to appeal to 
a kind of incoherence among attitudes that is of a more specific type than the broad 
kind of incoherence to which Blackburn initially appealed. They are going to have 
to appeal to incoherence among attitudes that is of the very same type as the 
incoherence involved in both believing that p and also believing that ~p. (2008a, 
710).  
 
We will see this desideratum reflected in the hybrid expressivist‟s respect for the 
inconsistency constraint I present below.  
 
 
4.32 Inconsistency in Content 
 
The most obvious way to try to respect this desideratum is to find a way in which the 
mental states deployed by the expressivists in their semantics have the right kind of 
inconsistency, that the attitudes they invoke are, as Schroeder puts it „inconsistency 
transmitting‟, where for an attitude to be inconsistency transmitting is for it to be 
inconsistent to bear that attitude towards inconsistent contents (2008b, 577).  Belief seems 
like a paradigm case of an inconsistency transmitting attitude (it‟s inconsistent to believe p 
and also believe not-p). Supposing, or wondering might be non inconsistency transmitting 
(wondering whether p is not inconsistent with wondering whether not-p). The expressivist 
can now claim that something like disapproval, or intention is inconsistency transmitting, 
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and use that attitude to construct their semantics.102 The picture would look something like 
this – we explain the contradiction between „bullying is wrong‟ and „bullying is not wrong‟ 
by claiming that these two utterances express attitudes with inconsistent contents: on the 
one hand disapproval of bullying and on the other disapproval of not bullying.  
 
However, this approach fails as it is because it fails to provide enough attitudes to 
characterise all the meaningful utterances we can make using moral terms. This is seen in 
the discussions of the „negation problem‟ sparked by the work of Nick Unwin (1999, 2001). 
The problem is that the attitude of disapproval of not bullying is not the one expressed by 
„bullying is not wrong‟, instead it is expressed by „not bullying is wrong‟. And now we 
have no attitude remaining to characterise the meaning of „bullying is not wrong‟. To see 
the lack of a suitable attitude, consider the following set of utterances from Schroeder:  
 
(7) Bullying is wrong                                         (disapproval of bullying) 
(8) Bullying is not wrong                                   (disapproval of x) 
(9) Not bullying is wrong                                   (disapproval of not bullying) 
(10)Not bullying is not wrong                            (disapproval of y) 
 
7 and 8 are inconsistent, and this inconsistency should be explained, on this suggested 
approach, by inconsistency in the content of those attitudes. Similarly, 9 and 10 are 
inconsistent. So, 8 has to express disapproval of something inconsistent with bullying. But 
10 has to express disapproval of something inconsistent with not bullying. Thus, on this 
approach 8 and 10 will end up being assigned inconsistent contents, and thus 8 and 10 will 
contradict one another. However, 8 and 10 are not inconsistent – we can see this most 
                                                             
102 This is the approach taken by Gibbard’s 2003, although see footnote 103 below on the issue of 
whether this mischaracterises Gibbard’s position 
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clearly see this if we take a less morally loaded example: clasping your hands three times 
every time you wake up is neither morally required nor impermissible, so it can be the case 
that clasping your hands three times in the morning is not wrong and not doing it is also not 
wrong. Explaining the compositional properties of moral terms in this way threatens to 
eliminate the category of the merely permissible.  
 
 
4.33 Hierarchy of Attitudes 
 
This happens when we try to characterise the inconsistency between an utterance and its 
negation in terms of the contents of the attitude expressed – using the same attitude 
(disapproval) but which takes a different content. Another approach is to posit a distinct 
attitude for each utterance. Unwin (1999, 2001) illustrates the pressure in this direction by 
considering the case of reports of the relevant attitudes. Take a construction like „James 
thinks that bullying is wrong‟. In such a sentence there are three places to place the negation 
operator: „James doesn‟t think that bullying is wrong‟; „James thinks that bullying is not 
wrong‟; „James thinks that not bullying is wrong‟. The expressivist has the resources, when 
restricted to using the same attitude (say, disapproval), for explaining the meaning of at 
most two of these utterances (they have a lack of disapproval of bullying, and disapproval 
of not bullying at their disposal). In order to provide the meaning for the missing negation 
they will have to posit a distinct attitude.  
 
Unwin‟s and Schroeder‟s diagnosis of this problem is that the expressivist‟s account lacks 
the right kind of structure to find a place for the negation operator. But, if this is the case, 
then the problem can be extended – similar problems arise for modal operators, conjunction 
and disjunction, tenses, and other complicated constructions. This means that given the 
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complexity of moral sentences we can construct which are still meaningful, the expressivist 
is forced to posit an increasingly large number of distinct attitudes for each complex 
utterance. It could be that the expressivist can provide the right attitudes with the right 
inferential and semantic properties to complete this project. However, the problem is now 
that the expressivist semantics looks fairly ad hoc – they end up characterising the relevant 
attitudes in terms or the inferential relations they have to sustain, which looks to be 
equivalent to saying “that complex sentences express that state of mind, whatever it is, that 
would ensure that they have the right semantic properties” (Schroeder, 2008a p. 714, see 
also his 2008c and 2008d).  
 
 
4.34 Adding Structure to the Attitude 
 
So it looks like an expressivist cannot rely on inconsistency in the content of attitudes to 
explain the semantic properties of moral terms, nor posit distinct attitudes to play the right 
sort of role. Another way forward might be to follow Schroeder in introducing an attitude 
with the right amount of structure to play the role demanded from it in explaining 
compositionality. The problem for the expressivist is that they assume that for each moral 
predicate (right, wrong, etc) there is a distinct attitude that is expressed by sentences 
predicating that term of some object – for „wrong‟ there is the attitude of disapproval: 
thinking that bullying is wrong is to have an attitude of disapproval towards bullying. What 
would happen if we introduced such a constraint into a cognitivist semantics, and posited a 
different attitude of belief for each descriptive predicate? Schroeder, using the example of 
„believes-green‟ as the attitude towards grass expressed by „Jon thinks that grass is green‟, 
argues that the negation problem would emerge for ordinary descriptive discourse: 
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G Jon thinks that grass is green. 
 
N1 Jon does not think that grass is green. 
 
N2 Jon thinks that grass is not green. 
 
G∗ Jon believes-green grass. 
 
N1∗ Jon does not believe-green grass. 
 
N2∗ ??? 
 
Again, we have run out of places to put the negation operator. The reason why this problem 
does not emerge for the cognitivist is that no cognitivist takes „believes-green‟ to be a 
distinct propositional attitude. Instead, they can characterise this sort of belief as holding a 
more general attitude which combines with a particular property.  
 
 
The lesson for the expressivist is to use an attitude with a similar level of structure, so that 
they end up analysing moral utterances in terms of “a more general non-cognitive attitude 
and a descriptive property or relation” (2008b, 589). The details of which attitude we use 
aren‟t of much concern, but Schroeder suggests „being for‟. The idea is that we then analyse 
an attitude like disapproval as something like „being for blaming for‟103. So, „bullying is 
wrong‟ expresses the non-cognitive attitude of being for blaming people for bullying. What 
this account does is introduce the right level of structure to find an additional place to place 
                                                             
103
 Schroeder characterises Allan Gibbard as offering an approach like that surveyed under ‘hierarchy of 
attitudes’. I suspect the similarity between Schroeder’s analysis of disapproval in terms of being for 
blaming (a view inspired by Gibbard’s 1990) is what prompts Ralph Wedgewood (2010) to argue that 
Gibbard’s position is more like Schroeder’s own suggestion, and thus that Schroeder’s suggested 
semantic program for expressivism is not as novel as Schroeder claims. See Schroeder (2010) for a 
response. Whichever side is right in this debate, what I say about this sort of attempt is unaffected.  
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a negation operator. We could then offer an analysis of each way of negating „James thinks 
that bullying is wrong.‟: 
(11) James thinks that bullying is wrong – James is for blaming for bullying 
(12) James does not think that bullying is wrong – James is not for blaming for   
bullying 
(13) James thinks that bullying is not wrong – James is for not for blaming for 
bullying 
(14) James thinks that not bullying is wrong – James is for blaming for not 
bullying 
 
Schroeder then goes on to show how to build up a notion of inconsistency and an account of 
the logical connectives out of these building blocks (2008b, 2008d).  
 
However, although this approach looks to have gone the farthest in explaining the 
compositionality of moral language, it does face a problem (freely admitted by Schroeder). 
The notion of inconsistency and the account of the logical connectives it yields are distinct 
from the characterisations we give of those in the case of purely descriptive language. This 
yields a problem when we consider that we do not speak two distinct languages – one 
descriptivist and one evaluative. We make inferences across the two types of language, for 
example: 
(15) Fish can feel pain 
(16) If fish can feel pain it is wrong to go angling 
(17) It is wrong to go angling 
 
Now, someone might accuse anyone uttering 16 of committing the naturalistic fallacy – of 
inferring a moral judgement from a statement about how things are naturalistically speaking 
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– but that does not demonstrate that the above argument is invalid. Someone who wields the 
naturalistic fallacy in this blunt way is not impugning the validity of the argument, they just 
claim that statements like 16 are never true. But this does not mean that 17 does not follow 
from 15 or 16, nor, even more pressingly, that we can do without an account of the meaning 
of mixed utterances like 16 – even if 16 is always false, it is still the sort of thing that people 
can think, and surely there is something they think and assert using 16. We have to be able 
to give an account of the contents of these mixed utterances. And of ones of an even simpler 
form like: 
(18) Bullying is wrong and snow is white 
 
Which is inconsistent with both „bullying is not wrong‟ and „snow is not white‟. But now 
we face a dilemma: if we account for the meaning of something like 18 in terms of belief 
we can readily explain how it is inconsistent with „snow is not white‟ – but we will have 
trouble explaining its inconsistency with „bullying is not wrong‟, where, remember, we use 
a completely different notion of inconsistency. We‟d have another problem explaining 18 in 
terms of the relevant non-cognitive attitude. 
 
This leads Schroeder to conclude that:  
 
[T]he only way to apply the advantages of the account that I‟ve sketched here, on 
which we can reduce the explanation of the inconsistency of arbitrary sentences to 
the inconsistency of the contents of the attitudes that they express, is to allow that 
all sentences express the same general kind of attitude.               (2008b, p. 597). 
 
What this means is that Schroeder, if right about the implications of his view, has 
demonstrated the position outlined by Max Kölbel‟s (1997). Kölbel there argues that, 
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contrary to what has been thought, expressivism does not provide a way of giving a non-
cognitivist treatment of a part of language where that part of language interacts with the part 
we give a descriptivist treatment to. Expressivism is thus only viable for discourses that do 
not interact with descriptive discourse in any significant way. The problem for expressivism 
in ethics, then, is that ethical discourse does significantly interact with non-ethical 
discourse.  
 
If this is right, then the Frege-Geach problem in part illustrates the difficulties inherent in 
explaining the interface between the part of language we give a non-cognitivist treatment 
of, and the part we treat as cognitivist. Schroeder‟s suggestion on behalf of the expressivist, 
that they end up characterising all sentences as expressions of non-cognitive attitudes, is 
thus one way out of this bind – we can avoid the problems that come from explaining how 
moral and non-moral utterances interact by globalising our expressivism. This is, in fact, 
the line taken by a few expressivists.104  However, it is worth noting that taking up this line 
is not without its costs. Expressivism is typically inspired by the thought that there is 
something especially problematic with ethical discourse. Moral judgements are inherently 
motivating, while descriptive judgements are not, for example. But now if we globalise 
expressivism we lose at least this motivation – for there will be no difference between 
ethical and non-ethical judgements at this level. In fact, now the different motivational 
import that ethical and non-ethical judgements have (which the expressivist hoped to 
explain by invoking attitudes with an intrinsically motivational element) is actually an 
embarrassment to the globalised expressivist – at the very least a piece of data that far from 
supporting their position, needs to be explained away.  
                                                             
104
 See Stephen Barker’s (Ms), for example, and Huw Price looks set to explore similar themes in his 
(forthcoming). We can also see some of the work of Matthew Christman (2008 and 2010) as attempting 
to occupy this logical space 
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Another advantage usually offered on behalf of expressivism is its metaphysical and 
epistemological solvency – it does away with the need to invoke strange moral properties or 
a special epistemology for their study. But if we globalise, we may be worried that our view 
does too well in deflating our metaphysical commitments – we end up being anti-realist 
about not just moral properties, but also entities in the physical universe. 
 
Of course what I say here is very broad, and it could be that some expressivists are happy to 
globalise their expressivism. I can end this discussion with only two further points. First, it 
is a result of the work of people like Schroeder, Unwin and Finlay that now means that it is 
not enough to simply gesture at an alternative semantic picture anymore – we need to see 
the details worked out, and it is up to the globalised expressivist to give us a detailed 
account of their programme for evaluation. Second, as I have tried to briefly show, 
globalised expressivism is unlikely to attract the sort of expressivist who was motivated by 
seeing problematic and distinctive features in moral discourse.  
 
 
Where does this leave us? I‟ve canvassed three historically important approaches to the 
Frege-Geach problem, and have tried to show that they all face problems. This provides us 
with motivation to see if hybrid-expressivism fares any better at tackling the problem. To 
talk schematically, hybrid-expressivism attempts to combine elements of cognitivist and 
non-cognitivist semantics to solve the problems with both of these accounts individually. 
The impetus to look to hybrid expressivism for a solution to the Frege-Geach problem is 
two-fold: it may give us a way to make sense of Korsgaard‟s contention that both realism 
and expressivism are true, in a sense; and we have seen above that reflection on the Frege-
Geach problem leads one to suspect it arises as a result of the interaction between ethical 
and non-ethical discourse, and perhaps hybrid-expressivism, which uses elements of the two 
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distinct type of semantics that have been offered for each of these holds some promise of a 
solution.  
 
 
4.4 Hybrid Expressivism 
 
So-called hybrid meta-ethical theories attempt to combine elements of non-cognitivist and 
cognitivist semantics to solve the problems that attend each account individually. What I 
aim to do here is to look in detail at one version of a hybrid theory – Michael Ridge‟s 
ecumenical expressivism – to see what lessons can be learnt from it. I shall argue that 
Ridge‟s ecumenical expressivism fails to offer us a viable, distinctive, solution to the Frege-
Geach problem. In the course of this I shall also investigate another hybrid position Ridge 
delineates – ecumenical cognitivism, and argue that it too fails to match up to the hybrid 
theorists ambitions. I will then briefly look at two other types of hybrid theory: Copp‟s 
realist-expressivism, and Bar-On and Christman‟s neo-expressivism. Overall I will argue 
that the example of hybrid metaethical theories illuminates a constraint on metaethical 
theorising that has, up until now, tended to be respected – that accounts of moral semantics 
and moral psychology should be integrated in the right kind of way. Hybrid metaethical 
theories either do not meet this constraint, or are not properly classified as fully hybrid. I 
shall also then reconnect the material about hybrid expressivism back to Korsgaard‟s 
concerns. I will argue that hybrid expressivism does not give us a position that the neo-
Kantian would accept.  
 
One thing to note before I get into a characterisation of Ridge‟s views, is that hybrid 
metaethical theories are usually construed as attractive because they are minimally 
revisionary (this is most explicit in the case of Ridge). What I mean is that they attempt to 
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provide a solution to the problems bedevilling cognitivism and non-cognitivism that leaves 
most of the terms of metaethical debate standing. This is why Ridge, for example, 
characterises his solution to the Frege-Geach problem as „cheap‟. In particular, most hybrid 
theorists are attempting to keep in place the Humean theory of motivation – that beliefs and 
desires are distinct existences, and that there are no necessary connections between them. 
This desideratum is particularly pressing for the expressivist, as we saw above that they can 
use their commitment to the Humean theory of motivation to batter realism. After all, if 
mental states could have representational and motivational contents, judgement internalism 
would be less of a problem for the realist. This is also important for my criticisms, as I will 
mainly be arguing that Ridge‟s positions fail because they don‟t secure judgement 
internalism and the Humean theory together.  
 
 
4.41 Ecumenical Cognitivism vs. Ecumenical Expressivism 105 
 
 
Ecumenical views claim that moral judgements express both beliefs and non-cognitive, 
desire-like attitudes. At first glance, it might seem hard to see how we could distinguish 
different types of ecumenicism using the cognitivist/expressivist dichotomy. As stated, the 
view sounds like a synthesis of both views, so why should we expect there to be both a 
cognitivist and an expressivist version of ecumenicism? Ridge begins by offering us the 
following way of distinguishing between cognitivism and expressivism in general: 
Cognitivism: For any moral sentence M, M is conventionally used to express a belief 
such that M is true if and only if the belief is true. 
                                                             
105 The material in sections 4.41 to 4.45 is based on joint work between myself and Alex Miller (under 
review). This is an entirely collaborative work, with each author making an equal contribution. 
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Expressivism: For any moral sentence M, M is not conventionally used to express a 
belief such that M is true if and only if the belief is true (Ridge 2006, 307). 
With this distinction in place, Ridge offers the following on how to distinguish between 
cognitivist and expressivist versions of ecumenicism:  
Ecumenical cognitivism allows that moral utterances express both beliefs and 
desires and insists that the utterances are true if and only if one of the beliefs 
expressed is true. Ecumenical expressivism also allows that moral utterances 
express both beliefs and desires but denies that a moral utterance is guaranteed to be 
true just in case the belief(s) it expresses is (are) true (2006, 307-8). 
It is important to be clear about the role of “guarantee” here. Later in the 2006 paper Ridge 
says of ecumenical expressivism that “as long as the belief expressed by a moral utterance 
is not semantically guaranteed to provide the truth-condition for the utterance, the fact that 
the belief expressed contingently provides the truth-conditions for the token utterance is 
consistent with expressivism as characterized here” (2006, 312, emphases added); and he 
notes that a version of ecumenical expressivism that concedes that moral utterances are 
truth-apt would nevertheless “deny that their truth-conditions necessarily are provided by 
the beliefs they express” (2006, 316, emphasis added). Clearly, the mention of a semantic 
guarantee indicates that the modality involved is conceptual: the truth of the belief that 
Jones is an unmarried male semantically guarantees the truth of the belief that he is a 
bachelor, since, as a matter of conceptual necessity, all unmarried males are bachelors. It is 
the fact that the beliefs expressed by moral utterances are not semantically guaranteed to 
provide their truth-conditions that apparently allows the ecumenical expressivist to bypass 
the Moorean open-question arguments that challenge cognitivism (2006, 309).  
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With this much on board, we now have: 
Ecumenical Cognitivism: a moral judgement M expresses both a belief and a desire, 
and, as a matter of conceptual necessity, M is true iff the belief expressed is true. 
Ecumenical Expressivism: a moral judgement M expresses both a belief and a 
desire, but it is not conceptually necessary that M is true iff the belief expressed is 
true.  
 
The difference between the two views, then, is that for the ecumenical cognitivist the truth-
conditions of the belief expressed by a moral judgement give the truth-conditions of that 
judgement in the sense that if those conditions are met, then as a matter of conceptual 
necessity the moral judgement is true. The ecumenical expressivist, on the other hand,  
denies this: according to the ecumenical expressivist the truth-conditions of the belief 
expressed by a moral judgement do not give you the truth-conditions of that judgement in 
this way - even if the truth conditions for the relevant belief are met, it does not follow as a 
matter of conceptual necessity that the moral judgement is true. It is easy to see why the 
ecumenical expressivist should deny this conceptual link between the truth-conditions of the 
belief expressed by a moral judgement and the truth of that judgement – otherwise they 
would not be expressivists at all, ecumenical or otherwise, nor would they be able to 
sidestep the open-question argument.  
 
As thus far stated ecumenical expressivism may look like a purely negative thesis: 
ecumenical cognitivism, without the conceptual connection between the truth of the belief 
expressed by a moral judgement and the truth of that judgement. However, in order to 
remain truly expressivist the ecumenical expressivist will have to make the additional, 
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positive, claim that it is the presence of the relevant desire that makes a moral utterance a 
moral utterance. As Ridge puts it: “for the ecumenical cognitivist, belief has a kind of 
priority, in that which beliefs are candidates for counting as moral is fixed by their content” 
whereas “ecumenical expressivism instead gives logical priority to desire” (2006, 308-9). 
Another way to make the same point is that in their attempt to explain the nature of moral 
judgement ecumenical cognitivism and ecumenical expressivism adopt the same directions 
of explanation as their non-ecumenical cousins. The cognitivist assumes that our moral 
judgements express beliefs that possess truth conditions, and attempts to explain moral 
judgement by first identifying specifically moral truth-conditions before moving from them 
to the contents of moral beliefs, which in turn give us the sought for account of moral 
judgement. The explanation goes from truth-conditions to judgements. In contrast the non-
cognitivist, as touched on above, starts by taking our moral judgements to be expressions of 
non-cognitive attitudes, which in sophisticated versions of the view such as Simon 
Blackburn‟s quasi-realism feed into an account of moral truth and moral truth-conditions. 
For the expressivist we end up with an account of moral truth-conditions, while for the 
cognitivist they form the starting point of the account of moral judgement. The ecumenical 
expressivist and ecumenical cognitivist respect this distinction: for the ecumenical 
cognitivist, the content of moral judgement is given by the truth-conditions of moral belief, 
whereas the ecumenical expressivist sees the desire, and not the truth-conditions of the 
associated belief, as the determinant of the distinctive content of moral judgement.106  
 
                                                             
106 See e.g. Blackburn 1993a (chapter 3) and 1993b for the distinction between the two directions of 
explanation.  
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So, ecumenical cognitivism deserves to be called a form of cognitivism because it shares 
with non-ecumenical cognitivism the theses that a moral judgement expresses a belief, that 
if the truth-conditions of the relevant belief are met then the judgement is semantically 
guaranteed to be true, and that it is the fact that the relevant belief is expressed that makes 
the judgement a distinctively moral judgement . What makes it ecumenical is the additional 
claim that moral judgements also express desires (Ridge 2006, 307).  
 
Likewise, ecumenical expressivism deserves to be called a form of expressivism because it 
shares with non-ecumenical expressivism the theses that that moral judgements express 
desires, that the truth of the judgement is not semantically guaranteed by the truth of any 
belief expressed by the judgement, and that it is the fact that the relevant desire is expressed 
that makes the judgement a moral judgement (Ridge 2006, 307, 316). What makes it 
ecumenical is the additional claim that moral judgements also express beliefs.  
 
The distinction between the two types of ecumenicism should then be clear: ecumenical 
cognitivists claim that the truth-conditions of the belief expressed by a moral judgement 
give you the truth-conditions of that judgement in the sense that if those conditions are met 
then the moral judgement is conceptually guaranteed to be true. The ecumenical 
expressivist denies the existence of this conceptual link between the truth of the belief 
expressed by a moral judgement and the truth of that judgement, and suggests that it is the 
associated desire-like attitude that makes the judgement a moral judgement.  
 
With this distinction in hand I can now turn to how ecumenicists can attempt to solve 
problems that are the traditional bugbears of their non-ecumenical cousins.  
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4.42 Ecumenical Cognitivism and Judgement Internalism 
 
As we‟ve seen before judgement internalists claim that there is some sort of conceptual 
connection between making a moral judgement, and being motivated to act in accordance 
with that judgement, typically endorsing something like Smith‟s practicality requirement: 
PRAC: If an agent judges it is right to φ then she will be at least somewhat 
motivated to φ, unless she is practically irrational.  
We have also seen how non-cognitivists can cause trouble for cognitivists by combining 
judgement internalism with the Humean theory of motivation – if beliefs and desires are 
distinct existences, sustaining no necessary connections to each other, and moral judgement 
is a matter of belief, then there shouldn‟t be the conceptual connection between moral 
judgement and motivation posited by the internalist. Humeanism, cognitivism and 
internalism appear to be inconsistent. Suppose that Jane, a practically rational agent, makes 
a moral judgement. Assuming cognitivism for reductio, Jane‟s judgement expresses a moral 
belief. Given motivational internalism it follows as a matter of conceptual necessity that 
Jane is motivated to act in accord with her moral belief. Given Humeanism, Jane, since she 
is motivated to act, must have a desire that meshes with the belief. The connection between 
that desire and her moral belief is conceptually necessary, since there is a conceptually 
necessary relation between the moral judgement that expresses the belief and the 
motivational state that contains the desire. This contradicts the Humean assertion that 
beliefs and desires are “distinct existences”. 
 
Ridge claims that ecumenical cognitivism has a straightforward solution to this problem 
that allows it to consistently retain both Humeanism and motivational internalism. 
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According to the ecumenical cognitivist moral judgements express both beliefs and desires. 
It should not then be surprising that moral judgements can motivate: they express a desire-
like attitude, so there is no need to cite an additional desire-like attitude to explain why we 
are motivated to act in accord with them. So the ecumenical cognitivist can simply exploit 
the traditional expressivist explanation of the practicality of moral judgement – that moral 
judgements move us to act because they are expressions of desire-like motivational states – 
and in this way reconcile cognitivism with both Humeanism and motivational internalism 
(Ridge 2006,  309).  
 
With this in hand it is possible to explain the difference between ecumenical cognitivism 
and a view that is superficially similar. “Besire” theories claim that moral judgements 
express “a unitary mental state which has properties of both belief and desire” (Altham 
1984, 284): moral judgements are partly representational (like beliefs) whilst also partly 
motivational. Such a position seems bizarre since “intuitively any representation can exist 
without the motivation allegedly essential to that representation” (Ridge 2006, 304). 
Ecumenical cognitivism, on the other hand, has no need for such strange mental states. 
Ridge claims that unlike the besire theorist, the ecumenical cognitivist can, consistently 
with motivational internalism, hold on to a Humean moral psychology on which there are 
no unitary states with both belief-like and desire-like characteristics.  
 
However, it is not all plain sailing for the ecumenical cognitivist. Ecumenical cognitivism 
remains committed to the claim that moral judgements are semantically guaranteed to be 
true if the beliefs they express are true. We can ask what the content is of these beliefs. One 
possibility is that they are about the instantiation of natural properties. However if this is the 
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ecumenical cognitivist‟s position they face Moore‟s open question argument: for any 
proposed naturalistic analysis N of moral predicate M, somebody who asked whether 
something which is N really is M would not betray any conceptual confusion. The question 
“Is something which is N really M?” seems open. The Moorean then claims that the best 
explanation of the fact that the question seems open is that the proposed naturalistic analysis 
is false.107 
 
Moved by this argument, the cognitivist might argue that moral beliefs concern the 
instantiation of non-natural, sui generis, irreducible moral properties (as Moore does 
himself). If they take this line, then they face the task of explaining the supervenience of the 
moral on the natural. It does not seem possible for there to be bare differences in the 
instantiation of moral properties: if two things differ in some respect with regard to their 
moral properties, there must be some naturalistic difference between them too. If, as the 
non-naturalist cognitivist realist holds, moral properties are distinct from natural properties, 
the nature of this connection looks mysterious.108 
 
Thus, Ridge contends, the possibility of ecumenical cognitivism allows us to “transform” 
metaethical  debate. Through their ecumenicism these cognitivists gain an easy solution to 
                                                             
107
 Even if this argument goes through, the question then becomes whether a failure of any proposed 
naturalistic analysis of a moral terms has much force against naturalist cognitivism. It is a matter of 
some controversy whether there is a descendant of Moore’s argument that militates against synthetic 
versions of naturalism. See e.g. Horgan and Timmons 1992, and section 3.3 above. 
108 In fact, there are two possible worries for the cognitivist concerning supervenience. The first is the 
difficulty of accounting for the a priori supervenience of the moral on the natural (see Smith 1994: 21-
24), which specifically threatens the Moorean non-naturalist. However, Blackburn provides us with 
another worry concerning supervenience - his so called “ban on mixed-worlds” argument (1984: 182-6) - 
which threatens the naturalist and non-naturalist cognitivist alike.  
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the problem of combining cognitivism, motivational internalism and the Humean theory of 
motivation. They trade this problem for renewed interest in the ability of cognitivism to 
account for the supervenience of the moral on the natural whilst defusing the open-question 
argument.  
 
4.43 Ecumenical Expressivism and the Frege-Geach Problem 
 
The expressivist, on the other hand, does not have to face these particular problems. 
Expressivists deny that the truth of a belief expressed by a moral judgement conceptually 
guarantees the truth of that judgement. Therefore, asking “Is something which is N really 
M?” does not betray any conceptual confusion, and the open question argument simply fails 
to get a grip.109 Ridge also contends that the expressivist has a straight-forward explanation 
of the supervenience of the moral on the natural: 
 
[T]he expressivist needs only to explain the sensibility of adopting a supervenience 
constraint. Since the point of moral discourse is to recommend options on the basis 
of their natural properties, it is easy to see why such a constraint is sensible (Ridge 
2006: 306)110 
 
The major problem that expressivists face, as we saw above is the Frege-Geach Problem. 
Consider again: 
                                                             
109 Things are not quite this simple: it is possible to argue that even expressivists still have to answer a 
variant of the open question argument (see Miller 2003: 47-51, 88-94). 
110
 This is the line taken by Blackburn (see e.g. Blackburn 1984: 182-6).  
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(1) Bullying is wrong. 
(2) If bullying is wrong then turning a blind eye to bullying is wrong. 
So, 
(3) Turning a blind eye to bullying is wrong. 
 
We saw earlier that a straight expressivist explanation of the validity of the move from 1 
and 2 to 3 falls prey to a number of objections. As we saw before, for the reasons given by 
Van Roojen, any proposed solution to the Frege-Geach problem needs to meet the 
following constraint: 
Inconsistency Constraint: the account must explain why someone who accepts the 
premises of a valid argument involving moral terms, but who denies the conclusion, 
is making a logical mistake. This inconsistency must be logical, rather than the 
pragmatic inconsistency exemplified by “Moore‟s paradox” style sentences, e.g. “I 
believe that P, but not-P” (see Ridge 2006, 313). 
 
To see how a little ecumenicism would help the expressivist out with respect to the Frege-
Geach problem, we need two elements: the ecumenical expressivist‟s analysis of moral 
judgements, plus their revisionary account of validity. Take a moral judgement of the form 
“X is wrong”. The ecumenical expressivist claims that this expresses both a desire-like 
attitude and a belief. But which belief and which desire-like attitude? On Ridge‟s account 
this judgement expresses (a) an attitude of disapproval towards actions insofar as they have 
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a certain property N and (b) a belief that X has that property.111 Two points need to be 
stressed. First, the moral judgement does not inherit the truth conditions of the belief 
identified in (b); neither is the meaning of the utterance given by the truth conditions of the 
belief referred to in (b). Ridge needs to make these claims in order to differentiate 
ecumenical expressivism as a distinctly expressivist position. Second, the agent concerned 
is not required to know much at all about the property on the basis of which they disapprove 
of things. The belief identified in (b) refers to that property via “anaphoric pronominal 
back-reference” (Ridge 2006, 313-7). 
 
Given that ecumenical expressivists may want to claim that moral judgements are not truth 
apt112, they cannot make use of the standard notion of validity that says that an argument is 
valid when the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion. Instead Ridge 
offers the following revisionary account that he calls a “close cousin” of the traditional 
definition:  
Validity: An argument is valid just in case any possible believer who accepts all of 
the premises but at one and the same time denies the conclusion would thereby be 
guaranteed to have inconsistent beliefs (Ridge 2006, 326). 
                                                             
111 In fact, on Ridge’s preferred account, the attitude of (dis)approval is “a state of *dis+approval to 
actions in so far as they would garner the [dis]approval of a certain sort of advisor” (Ridge 2007a: 98). 
For the present purposes, nothing turns on the additional complexity introduced by this, so I simply 
ignore it in what follows.  
112 Expressivists who adopt a deflationary theory of truth-aptness may want to claim that moral 
utterances are truth-apt and have truth conditions that are contingently provided by the concomitant 
minimal belief. They could then follow Daniel Stoljar 1993 and Huw Price 1994 in arguing for a truth-
conditional treatment of moral modus ponens using expressivist resources. Ridge argues that it would 
be a bad move, dialectically, to tie the success of expressivist solutions to the Frege-Geach problem so 
closely to the success of deflationary theories of truth apt-ness. In addition, he contends that these 
deflationary solutions still run into problems respecting the various constraints on attempted solutions 
to the problem (Ridge 2006, 312-3). So, officially, ecumenical expressivism is supposed to be neutral 
with respect to deflationism about truth-aptitude.  
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With these elements in place, we can see how Ridge‟s ecumenical expressivist can attempt 
to solve the Frege-Geach problem. Take the modus ponens argument involving moral terms 
above. According to the ecumenical expressivist, in 1 “bullying is wrong” expresses (a) a 
non-cognitive attitude of disapproval towards things that have a certain property N; and (b) 
the belief that bullying has that property. 2 expresses the belief that if bullying has the 
property N then turning a blind eye to bullying also has N. 
 
Now, denying 3 would involve the belief that turning a blind eye to bullying doesn‟t have 
the property N. But now it would be inconsistent to accept 1 and 2 but reject 3: in virtue of 
rejecting 3 you‟d believe that turning a blind eye to bullying lacks N and in virtue of 
accepting 1 and 2 you would believe that turning a blind eye to bullying has N . This is a 
straightforward inconsistency of belief, so the argument turns out to be valid in such a way 
that the Inconsistency Constraint is respected.  
 
So, if Ridge is right the ecumenical expressivist can use cognitivist resources to obtain a 
relatively easy solution to the Frege-Geach problem. However, because the ecumenical 
expressivist denies that there is a conceptual link between the truth of the belief expressed 
by a moral judgement and the truth of that judgement, they also avoid the open question 
argument, and are not prevented from helping themselves to the standard expressivist 
explanation of supervenience. Again, ecumenicism helps to transform contemporary 
metaethics. Since ecumenical cognitivism can help itself to expressivist accounts of the 
practicality of moral judgements, the focus of the metaethical debate between cognitivism 
and expressivism moves away from the Frege-Geach problem and motivational internalism 
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and back towards the open-question argument and the supervenience of the moral on the 
natural.  
 
4.44  Ecumenical Expressivism Does Not Solve the Frege-Geach Problem 
 
The nub of the Frege-Geach problem for non-ecumenical expressivism is that it is unable, 
for example, to account for the appearances of moral sentences in unasserted contexts in a 
way that preserves the validity of simple inference patterns such as moral modus ponens. 
Ridge attempts to avoid the problem via the claim that the relevant moral sentences express 
beliefs, in such a way that an agent accepting the premises but not the conclusion of moral 
modus ponens would thereby be guilty of a straightforward inconsistency in belief – thereby 
securing the validity of the argument via the revisionary account of validity outlined above.  
 
However, Ridge‟s ecumenical expressivist does not provide an adequate reply to the Frege-
Geach problem. First, we should note that it is not enough merely to show that the argument 
from 1 and 2 to 3 comes out as valid on an adjusted conception of validity. The expressivist 
must also show that there is no equivocation involved between the appearance of  “Bullying 
is wrong” in 1 and in the antecedent of 2. If she cannot do this, then the alleged fact that the 
argument comes out as valid on the adjusted conception of validity constitutes a reductio of 
the conjunction of ecumenical expressivism with the adjusted conception of validity (since 
that conjunction appears to imply that an argument can simultaneously commit a fallacy of 
equivocation and count as valid): in which case, no plausible solution to the Frege-Geach 
problem will have been delivered.   
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So, what does the ecumenical expressivist have to do in order to speak to the concern about 
equivocation? He needs to show how the meaning of “Bullying is wrong” as it appears in 
the antecedent of 2 can be given in terms of the sentiment of disapproval it expresses in 1. 
Recall that it was the inability of the non-ecumenical expressivist to do this that constituted 
the Frege-Geach worry in the first place: the claim that “Bullying is wrong” expresses a 
belief in the antecedent of 2 by itself makes no progress on the original worry since that 
worry was generated not so much by the absence of a role for belief in the account of the 
meaning of “Bullying is wrong” as it appears in the antecedent in 2 but by the absence of a 
role for the noncognitive sentiment of disapproval.  
 
The ecumenical expressivist cannot speak to the worry about equivocation by invoking the 
belief he claims to be expressed by moral judgements, since he denies that the meaning of 
the judgements is given by the truth-conditions of the belief. If they were, from the fact that 
the truth-conditions of the belief are satisfied it would follow as a matter of conceptual 
necessity that the moral judgement in question is true: but denying this is a crucial part of 
what makes the ecumenical expressivist an expressivist. In other words, Ridge could only 
adopt this strategy – giving a role to belief in determining the distinctive content of 
“Bullying is wrong” – at the expense of losing the right to the distinction between 
cognitivist and expressivist versions of the ecumenical view.113 
                                                             
113 What if the ecumenical expressivist protests that the belief that bullying is N can be assigned a role in 
determining the meaning of “Bullying is wrong” in a manner consistent with ecumenical expressivism: 
the belief determines the referent of “Bullying” and thereby explains why “Bullying is wrong” has a 
different meaning from e.g. “Torture is wrong”? This is consistent with ecumenical expressivism, since 
although the belief contributes to the meaning of “Bullying is wrong” it does not determine its truth-
conditions. (I am grateful to Neil Sinclair for raising this point). In response to this, we can ask whether 
this is all the belief contributes to the meaning of “Bullying is wrong”. If it is, then this is unlikely to be of 
much help to Ridge – for although now we will have managed to guarantee that “Bullying is wrong” 
differs in meaning from “Torture is wrong” (since the belief fixes the relevant action type as the referent 
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So how might the ecumenical expressivist find a role for the sentiment of disapproval in the 
story about the meaning of the antecedent in 2? According to the ecumenical expressivist, in 
1 “Bullying is wrong” expresses a non-cognitive attitude of disapproval towards things 
insofar as they have a certain property N. In fact, Ridge‟s ecumenical expressivist takes “If 
bullying is wrong then turning a blind eye to bullying is wrong” to be expressing the same 
attitude of disapproval in terms of which we give the meaning of 1. Likewise for the 
appearance of “Bullying is wrong” in the conclusion 3: this expresses a non-cognitive 
attitude of disapproval towards things insofar as they have the property N. Now this may 
appear to solve the worry about equivocation: there is no equivocation because the desire-
like attitude in terms of which the meaning of moral utterances is to be given is the same 
across all three steps of the argument.  
 
However, it would do so only at a severe price. The original worry about the expressivist 
account of the appearance of “Bullying is wrong” in 2 was in part that someone could with 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
of the utterance) we haven’t yet ruled out equivocation, for the belief does not show how “Bullying is 
wrong” differs from “Bullying is right” or “Bullying is morally neutral”. If, however, the belief makes 
more of a contribution to the meaning of “Bullying is wrong” than merely fixing the referent of 
“Bullying” then Ridge owes us an account of what this additional role for the belief is and how it works. 
It seems unlikely that he could do this without ending up as a cognitivist. In addition, note that in any 
event the Frege-Geach point about the absence of equivocation can be run in terms of truth-conditions 
themselves rather than in terms of meaning. If “bullying is wrong” as it appears in 1 has different truth-
conditions from its appearance in the antecedent in 2, then the argument from 1 and 2 to 3 is still guilty 
of a fallacy of equivocation: if the belief is not the determinant of truth-conditions here, it is obscure 
how the ecumenical expressivist can avoid the charge of equivocation. Of course, the ecumenical 
expressivist may try to avoid this worry by denying that “Bullying is wrong” has truth-conditions: but 
officially ecumenical expressivism is supposed to be consistent with expressivist views that don’t deny 
that moral utterances are truth-apt, so this move would still involve a significant departure from Ridge’s 
account of ecumenical expressivism. Moreover, even waiving this point and granting the involvement of 
belief in determining meaning (though not truth-conditions), considerations relating to compositionality 
still scupper the view. See footnote 116 below.  
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perfect propriety utter 2 without thereby taking up an attitude of disapproval towards 
bullying. We no longer have that problem, but now we have another problem: someone 
could with perfect propriety utter 2 without thereby taking up an attitude of disapproval 
towards things insofar as they have a certain property N (imagine a Martian anthropologist 
using 2).114  
 
Moreover, the ecumenical expressivist who takes this line now seems pushed to account for 
the compositionality of moral sentences. The Frege-Geach problem, after all, amounts to 
more than just accommodating the validity of intuitively valid inferences. In its most 
general form it can be formulated as follows: give an account of the meaning of moral 
sentences (such as “Bullying is wrong”) in terms of which they contribute to the meanings 
of complex expressions in which they appear (such as the antecedents of conditionals) in 
such a way that intuitively valid inferences involving them are not impugned (by, for 
                                                             
114 For my purposes here, we can take a Martian anthropologist to be an agent who is a global agnostic 
about 1st order moral questions but who nonetheless uses conditionals like 2 to record facts about the 
structure of human moral practice. In an appendix to his 2006, Ridge in fact considers this potential 
counterexample to ecumenical expressivism but suggests that the ecumenical expressivist can deal with 
it by viewing non-atomic moral judgements as in a sense multiply realizable. There is the standard way 
in which ordinary agents make moral judgements – for example by disapproving of things insofar as they 
have some property N and believing that if bullying has N then turning a blind eye to bullying has N too. 
But there is another way, applying to the case of global agnostics about 1
st
 order moral questions: “it is 
most plausible within the framework of Ecumenical Expressivism to understand such an agent as taking 
a stand against the approval of certain sorts of observers – those observers who would simultaneously 
[disapprove of bullying] but at one and the same time [fail to disapprove of turning a blind eye to 
bullying+. In the Ecumenical framework, this will amount to the agent’s adopting a perfectly general 
noncognitive attitude, here an attitude of refusal – refusal to approve of an observer unless it has 
certain features (once again we have a belief with anaphoric reference back to the content of a 
noncognitive attitude) preclude simultaneously [disapproving of bullying] while [failing to disapprove of 
turning a blind eye to bullying+” (Ridge 2006, 335). It is not clear that this convincingly deals with the 
counterexample. For one thing, what justifies Ridge in saying that these are two ways of making the 
same non-atomic moral judgement rather than ways of making different types of judgement? And even 
if Ridge can answer this first question, can’t we just as easily imagine a Martian anthropologist who 
records facts about the structure of human morality while being globally agnostic about the moral status 
of combinations of attitudes as well as globally agnostic about 1
st
 order moral questions? 
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instance, committing fallacies of equivocation). So, in order to have a viable solution, the 
proposed account of the meanings of 1, 2 and 3 should be capable of yielding the result that 
the meaning of 2 is a function of the meaning of the conditional “If … then …” together 
with the meanings of 1 and 3. But since in all three it is the same desire-like attitude that is 
preserving meaning, compositionality simply goes by the board. Compare this with the non-
ecumenical expressivist attempt to solve the problem in terms of higher order attitudes: the 
meaning of 2 is given by B!([B!(Bullying)]; - [B!(turning a blind eye to bullying)]), which 
is a function of the sentiments that give the meaning of the antecedent and the consequent 
together with an account of the semantics of the conditional in terms of the expression of 
higher-order attitudes. Here we have at least an attempt at outlining a functional relationship 
between the meaning of the conditional 2 and the meaning of its constituents. In 
comparison, since there is only a single sentiment in play in the ecumenical expressivist 
story, there is simply no specification of a functional relationship of the sort that would 
potentially subserve an explanation of compositionality. Of course, since the beliefs 
involved, unlike the sentiments, have specific truth-conditions, they would be able to enter 
into an explanation of compositionality. But as noted above, the ecumenical expressivist 
cannot take the truth-conditions of the beliefs to give the meanings of the relevant moral 
judgements on pain of losing the distinctively expressivist component of his ecumenical 
view.  
 
On reflection, there seems to be something very odd about Ridge‟s proposed solution. On 
the one hand, Ridge wants to say that it is the relevant desire-like attitude that constitutes 
the distinctively moral content of “Bullying is wrong”. On the other hand however, as 
we‟ve just seen, the desire-like attitude plays no role whatsoever in explaining how the 
presence of “Bullying is wrong” contributes to the meanings of complex sentences in which 
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it appears: it is just an extra wheel.115 Here we might be reminded of Davidson‟s comment 
on meanings as entities: 
Paradoxically, the one thing meanings do not seem to do is oil the wheels of a theory of 
meaning – at least as long as we require of such a theory that it non-trivially give the 
meaning of every sentence in the language. My objection to meanings in the theory of 
meaning is not that they are abstract or that their identity conditions are obscure, but that 
they have no demonstrated use (Davidson 1967: 20-21). 
 
If the ubiquitous desire-like attitude in Ridge‟s account has no demonstrated use in the 
account of how the meaning of “Bullying is wrong” contributes to the meanings of more 
complex sentences that contain it as a constituent, does this not suggest that it is a mistake 
to see that attitude as playing a role in constituting the meaning of “bullying is wrong” in 
the first place?116,117 Ridge may retreat by suggesting that although the desire-like attitude 
                                                             
115 The “extra wheel” terminology comes from Mark Schroeder’s discussion of Daniel Boisvert’s 
“expressive-assertivism”. See Schroeder 2010, chapter 10. 
116 This consideration is relevant to the suggestion considered in footnote 113 above. Even if we waive 
the objection expressed there and allow the ecumenical expressivist the idea that the belief that 
bullying is N plays a role in determining the meaning of “bullying is wrong” as it appears in both 1 and 
the antecedent of 2, the ubiquitous desire-like attitude that is expressed along with the belief plays no 
role whatsoever in the account of how the meaning of 2 is determined by the meanings of 1, 3 and the 
conditional operator. (Independently, Neil Sinclair raises a similar worry about the account of negation 
that Mark Schroeder has developed on behalf of expressivism. See Sinclair 2011). Moreover, even if 
Ridge could overcome this problem and find a real semantic role for the desire-like attitude in the moral 
case, given the implausibility of involving such a desire-like attitude in an account of the semantics of 
non-moral conditionals, ecumenical expressivism would face a further problem. This is the problem of 
dealing with so-called mixed-inferences (where we are dealing with arguments with both evaluative 
premises and premises containing no evaluative language), similar to the problem affecting non-
ecumenical expressivist views identified in Hale 1986, by Schroeder above, and the problem affecting 
views which posit two different truth predicates for evaluative and non-evaluative discourse, identified 
by Christine Tappolet’s 1997 (although as seen above this particular version of the worry could be 
misplaced). Ridge could respond to this worry by arguing for an expressivist characterisation of the 
conditional operator in general, thus pushing his own position towards a more global expressivism. 
However, it’s arguable that this sort of view fails to mesh with the spirit driving evaluative expressivism 
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plays no role in compositionality, arguments in moral psychology independently license 
viewing it as a component of the meaning of “Bullying is wrong”. This position may not be 
logically inconsistent, but it is nonetheless problematic. Where a view in moral psychology 
implies that some feature is part of the meaning of an expression even though it plays no 
role in accounting for its contribution to the meanings of complex sentences containing it, 
what we have is effectively a reason for reconsidering the relevant claim in moral 
psychology. The retreat in effect takes us back towards a non-ecumenical cognitivist form 
of motivational externalism.  
 
It seems, then, that the mere invocation of beliefs that make “anaphoric pronominal back-
reference” in the manner envisaged by Ridge yields only the superficial appearance of a 
solution to the Frege-Geach problem, and that the ecumenical expressivist cannot repair this 
problem without relinquishing the distinctively expressivist part of his position. Once we 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
– to give a metaphysically and epistemologically solvent account of moral discourse which shows that it 
not committed to the kind of heavy-weight entities (properties, facts and so on) that our non-evaluative 
discourse is. The Frege-Geach problem puts this kind of contrast under pressure by pointing out that the 
two types of discourse interact in such a way that makes it difficult to give evaluative discourse this 
special treatment. To take this as a reason to offer a global expressivism (where even seemingly 
obviously non-evaluative utterances are interpreted as expressing commitments) means the expressivist 
arguably gives up on the contrast between the evaluative and non-evaluative they started with, as we 
saw above. Whether this sort of view is ultimately viable is, however, beyond the concerns of this 
section; for making such a move is not congenial to Ridge: global expressivism is not ecumenical 
expressivism. In addition, the fact that the mixed-inferences problem that afflicted non-ecumenical 
expressivism still threatens Ridge’s view shows how far the latter is from solving the Frege-Geach 
problem “on the cheap”. 
117 It would be no use for Ridge to distinguish between sense and tone (in the way familiar from Frege) 
and then to see the belief that bullying is N as determining the sense of “bullying is wrong” with 
“wrong” merely coming in at the level of tone. This view is effectively the same as the “Realist-
Expressivism” defended in Copp 2001, and Ridge categorises Copp’s view as a form of ecumenical 
cognitivism. Neither can Ridge insist on including both the belief and desire-like attitude as components 
at the level of sense: this would be to surrender the idea that there are cognitivist and expressivist forms 
of ecumenicism, and also appears to collapse into a form of anti-Humeanism.  
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are clear about what is required to solve the Frege-Geach problem, then, we see that the 
ecumenical expressivist solution offered by Ridge is in fact no solution at all.  
 
It might be worthwhile at this point to pause briefly in order to explain how this objection to 
Ridge‟s attempted solution of the Frege-Geach problem differs from an objection that has 
been developed by Mark Schroeder (Schroeder 2009, forthcoming).  
 
Schroeder‟s objection starts out from the observation that Ridge‟s account of moral 
sentences sees them as involving a kind of sentential anaphora. “Bullying is wrong”, for 
example, is held by Ridge to express (a) a desire-like sentiment of disapproval towards 
action-types insofar as they possess a certain property and (b) a belief that bullying 
possesses that property. The pronoun in (b) is anaphoric on the reference to the property in 
(b). Now consider the following: 
 
(19) Superman flies. 
(20) If Clark Kent flies then I‟m a walrus. So, 
(21) I‟m a walrus. 
 
This is truth-preserving but not logically valid: someone who isn‟t party to the substantive 
information that Superman and Clark Kent is the same man could rationally accept 19 and 
20 and deny 21. Likewise for: 
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(22) Superman – he flies. 
(23) But Clark Kent – if he flies then I‟m a walrus. So,  
(24) I‟m a walrus.  
 
This is truth-preserving given the preferred interpretation of “Superman” and “Clark Kent”, 
but for logical validity we require truth-preservingness in any model, not just in the 
preferred interpretation.  
 
According to Schroeder the moral modus ponens argument is akin to these because seeing 
that the moral modus pones argument is truth-preserving on Ridge‟s interpretation requires 
knowledge of the substantive assumption that moral sentences all express the same desire-
like attitude. Without that assumption there is no guarantee that the belief expressed in the 
first premise of the moral modus ponens is the same as that expressed in the antecedent of 
the conditional second premise. So Ridge has not captured the logical validity of moral 
modus ponens and so has failed to solve the Frege-Geach problem “on the cheap”.  
 
Schroeder‟s objection is subtle and deserves more careful scrutiny than can be given it here. 
However, it seems Schroeder‟s objection is somewhat narrower than that presented in some 
of the influential presentations of the Frege-Geach problem in its application to Blackburn‟s 
quasi-realism, such as Hale (1993a) and Wright (1988). There the objection seems to be that 
Blackburn cannot frame the moral modus ponens argument in a way that satisfies some 
expressivist surrogate of the notion of truth-preservingness. The moral modus ponens 
argument on Blackburn‟s account doesn‟t do this because it is no better than an argument 
that equivocates and which has true premises and a false conclusion – and which is 
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therefore a fortiori not truth-preserving (or possessed of a surrogate thereof). The objection 
raised against Ridge in the text concerns this more general worry: the moral modus ponens 
argument on Ridge‟s interpretation is not even truth-preserving (because of its failure to 
deal with the worry about equivocation) and is therefore not logically valid (since being 
truth-preserving is a necessary – though not sufficient – condition for logical validity).118  
 
 
4.45 Ecumenical Cognitivism Does Not Capture Judgement Internalism 
 
According to Ridge, ecumenical cognitivism can yield a form of cognitivism that 
simultaneously respects judgement internalism and the Humean theory of motivation. 
According to ecumenical cognitivism (i) moral judgements express beliefs, (ii) there is a 
conceptual guarantee that if the truth-conditions of the belief are met, so are the truth-
conditions of the judgement, and (iii) moral judgements express desires. The position is 
distinct from ecumenical expressivism in virtue of (ii) – which the ecumenical expressivist 
denies – and in virtue of its denying that the desire that is mentioned in (iii) is what makes 
                                                             
118 In a sense, then, I am suggesting that although the Frege-Geach problem suggests that the 
expressivist cannot capture the logical validity of e.g. the standard moral modus ponens example, it 
does so via suggesting that the expressivist cannot account even for the fact that such arguments are 
truth-preserving. Note, too, that the Frege-Geach problem doesn’t appear to have anything to do with 
putatively deductively valid arguments. Consider the following argument. (i) It would be right to buy The 
Big Issue from Mark when one passes him. (ii) In the past, Jim has almost always done the right thing. 
So, (iii) Jim will buy The Big Issue from Mark when he passes him. This is surely a good, non-deductive 
argument, but the Frege point would still apply: on the face of it looks as though an expressivist would 
be unable to avoid the charge that there is an equivocation on “right” between (i) and (ii) and that the 
argument is therefore guilty of a fallacy. So the fundamental point of the Frege-Geach problem seems 
not to concern formal validity in the way envisaged in Schroeder’s objection to Ridge. (This is not to say 
that Schroeder’s objection to Ridge’s account of formal validity is not a good one, just that it is not the 
most fundamental problem in the vicinity).  
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the judgement a specifically moral judgement. The position is distinct from non-ecumenical 
cognitivism in virtue of (iii), and it is (iii) that makes the position a form of judgement 
internalism. Throughout, “belief” and “desire” are Humean in character: there is no 
postulation of necessary connections between beliefs and desires, and no postulation of 
“besire” like states that simultaneously display belief-like and desire-like characteristics. I 
shall argue that ecumenical cognitivism along these lines is not an attractive metaethical 
position.  
 
Recall that judgement internalism is the view that as a matter of conceptual necessity, an 
agent who makes a moral judgement will be motivated to act in accord with it. Since desires 
are motivational states, and since ecumenical cognitivism incorporates the claim that moral 
judgements express desires, it seems that ecumenical cognitivism is a form of judgement 
internalism: if moral judgements express motivational states, after all, it should be no 
surprise that there is a conceptual guarantee that an agent making a moral judgement is 
motivated to act accordingly.  
 
But what is meant by “express” as it appears in (iii)? There are two possibilities. Either the 
claim that moral judgement J expresses a desire D requires a conceptual connection 
between J and D or, alternatively, only a less than conceptual connection is required. 
Suppose that a conceptual connection is required. Then, judgement internalism certainly 
appears to have been captured: if the presence of a motivational state is a requirement on 
being able to make a judgement with moral content, there will be a conceptual guarantee, of 
the sort required by judgement internalism, that an agent who makes a moral judgement will 
be motivated to act accordingly. But note that in (i) “express” must involve a conceptual 
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connection between the moral judgement and the relevant moral belief: the ecumenical 
cognitivist is distinguished from the ecumenical expressivist in virtue of the fact that the 
former but not the latter postulates a conceptual guarantee that the truth-conditions of the 
belief give the truth-conditions of the judgement. But now we have a moral judgement 
simultaneously sustaining a conceptually necessary relation to a belief, on the one hand, and 
a desire on the other. But if the judgement is conceptually linked to a belief, and also 
conceptually linked to a desire, it follows that the moral judgement expresses a besire. This 
is precisely what the Humean theory of motivation disallows: the existence of this relation 
of necessary connection would effectively yield the existence of besire-like states that 
simultaneously display belief-like and desire-like characteristics. 119 
 
                                                             
119 It might be objected that this does not necessarily constitute a rejection of Humeanism. So long as 
there is no relation of necessary connection between beliefs of type-B and desires of type-D, a particular 
judgement may sustain an internal relation to both, because tokens of type-B can exist in the absence of 
tokens of type-D (and vice versa), in contexts where the relevant judgement is not being made. (this 
point comes from Neil Sinclair). It is not obvious that there is no departure from Humeanism here. 
Humeanism inter alia rules out the existence of “besires”, where a besire is “a unitary mental state 
which has properties of both belief and desire” (Altham 1984: 284). Granted, there may be no unitary 
psychological state with both belief-like and desire-like features, but there are still unitary contentful 
entities – moral judgements – that have intrinsically belief-like features and intrinsically desire-like 
features. Arguably, whatever problems beset Anti-Humeanism formulated in terms of psychological 
states will also beset Anti-Humeanism formulated in terms of judgements. For example, moral 
judgements would appear to have two incompatible “directions of fit” (Smith 1994: 117-118); and it 
would appear to be impossible to judge that X is right yet fail to be motivated to X, so that it would not 
be possible to accommodate the case of e.g. the depressive who is fully aware of the moral significance 
of a praiseworthy course of action but nevertheless lacks the motivation to pursue it (Smith 1994: 120). 
In addition, the argument against anti-Humeanism in chapter 1 of (Smith 1994: 7-8) – that on an Anti-
Humean view desires would be derivatively truth-assessable – could be reapplied to judgements that 
sustain internal relations to both beliefs and desires. Call a judgement with an internal relation to a 
belief a belief-implicating judgement and a judgement with an internal relation to a desire a desire-
implicating judgement. If some belief-implicating judgements are also desire-implicating judgements, 
then some desires would be derivatively assessable in terms of truth and falsehood: for we could count 
the desire implicated by the judgement as true whenever the belief implicated by the judgement is true. 
It thus seems that Ridge’s position rejects the spirit – if not the letter – of Humean views of motivation.  
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What if, on the other hand, the claim (iii) that moral judgements express desires does not 
carry connotations of a conceptually necessary relation between the presence of the desire 
and the judgement‟s having specifically moral content? Then there will be no imputation of 
the existence of besires or a clash with Humeanism about motivation. But now we appear to 
have lost the crucial claim made by judgement internalism: this was not that as a matter of 
empirical fact an agent who makes a moral judgement will be motivated to act accordingly 
but that as a matter of conceptual necessity such an agent will be motivated to act 
accordingly. If the notion of expression that appears in (iii) does not generate a conceptual 
relation between moral judgement and desire, therefore, it is obscure how the ecumenical 
cognitivist view can accommodate judgement internalism.  
 
Overall, then, the “ecumenical cognitivist” faces the following dilemma. If the notion of 
expression that appears in (i) and (iii) in each case generates a conceptual connection 
between moral judgement and the respective types of mental state, we get a relationship of 
conceptually necessary connection between beliefs and desires that is directly at odds with 
the Humean theory of motivation; if the notion of expression that figures in (iii) does not 
generate a conceptual relation between moral judgement and desire, we avoid a conflict 
with Humeanism, but are no longer well placed to embrace judgement internalism; while if 
the notion of expression that appears in (i) does not generate a conceptual connection 
between moral judgement and belief, it is no longer clear that we have a version of 
cognitivism. Either way, there appears to be no space for an ecumenical cognitivist view 
capable of combining (i), (ii) and (iii).  
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4.46 Diagnosis  
 
According to Ridge, ecumenical expressivism is an expressivist view capable of solving the 
Frege-Geach problem on the cheap, and ecumenical cognitivism is a cognitivist view 
capable of meshing judgement internalism and the Humean theory of motivation. Ridge 
suggests that this requires a transformation of metaethics in which the Frege-Geach problem 
and issues about moral motivation are moved off-stage and in which the focus is purely on 
the open-question argument and the supervenience of the moral on the natural. I have 
argued that there are no ecumenical views – expressivist or cognitivist – capable of 
neutralising the Frege-Geach problem on the cheap or squaring judgement internalism with 
the Humean theory of motivation.  
 
We have also seen above that Ridge‟s account severs a link between moral psychology and 
semantics – we end up with an account of the semantic properties of a moral term that does 
not use an element found in our account of the moral psychology. Arguably, metaethical 
theorising is in part the search for an integrated account of moral semantics and moral 
psychology. The position to which Ridge is imagined to retreat here would constitute an 
abandonment of this search for integration, and so a change in the terms of metaethical 
debate. It would be hard for Ridge to represent himself as joining the debate, leaving the 
terms of the debate in place, and showing how some of the thorny issues that arise within it 
can be solved “on the cheap”. Note that the other main metaethical views – non-ecumenical 
cognitivism, non-ecumenical expressivism, and anti-Humeanism – all aspire to the kind of 
integrated view the retreat would give up on: the moral psychology and moral semantics do 
not just sit side by side, but are integrated in the sense that the semantic features postulated 
in their moral psychologies actually play a role in their moral semantics. (We can thus see 
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metaethics as in part at attempt to respond to a kind of challenge of a piece with what 
Peacocke calls “the Integration Challenge”(Peacocke 2000), and the point here is that a 
retreat by Ridge of the sort canvassed in the text would in effect amount to an admission 
that the Challenge cannot be met). 
 
Drawing attention to this Challenge allows us to explain two features of metaethical 
theorising. First, the view most similar to hybrid views is the so-called „besire‟ theory 
(Altham, 1984). This view claims that moral judgements express unitary mental states with 
both representational and motivational content. This view may seem bizarre, but we can see 
why someone trying to incorporate the strengths of both expressivism and cognitivism 
would be drawn to it – it manages to secure those by respecting the desideratum that a 
metaethical account should offer a unified picture of moral psychology and semantics.  
 
Second, early metaethical views in the expressivist tradition (like Ayer‟s emotivism) 
acknowledged that something like the beliefs that Ridge claims are expressed by moral 
judgements along with the desire-like attitudes would be floating around in the moral 
judge‟s psychology. Ayer even claims that if we knew enough about the types of things that 
a particular agent judged to be bad (say that they typically thought that only green things 
were morally abhorrent) then you could work out at least some of their beliefs about an 
object from their moral judgements (if they tell you that X is evil, chances are that they 
believe that X is green). However, very few in the expressivist tradition sought to make use 
of these beliefs to solve the Frege-Geach problem until recently. It could be that Ayer and 
company did just overlook the fact that they had all the resources that they needed ready at 
hand. However, it could also be the case that they did not exploit this opportunity because 
they were trying to respect the desideratum that one‟s accounts of moral psychology and 
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semantics should be unified in the appropriate way. Taking this second line allows us to 
explain Blackburn‟s remark that:  
We can see that it does not matter at all if an utterance is descriptive as well as 
expressive, provided that its distinctive meaning is expressive. It is the extra import 
making the term evaluative as well as descriptive, which must be given an 
expressive role. It is only if that involves an extra truth-condition that expressivism 
about values is impugned (Blackburn 1984: 169-70).  
 
Why does Blackburn not simply help himself to the relevant descriptive contents to get a 
cheap solution to the Frege-Geach problem in such cases? One explanation would be that he 
anticipated the main point that  I made against Ridge: namely, that since the truth-
conditions of the associated belief are not viewed by the ecumenical expressivist as giving 
the distinctive meaning of the moral utterance, or as making the utterance evaluative, they 
cannot be invoked to defuse the worry about equivocation that takes centre-stage in the 
proper presentation of the Frege-Geach problem.  
 
I will now turn (briefly) to two other attempts to provide a hybrid metaethical account. 
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4.5 Realist-Expressivism and Neo-Expressivism 
 
Recall that hybrid metaethical theorists are on the lookout for a position that will allow 
them to secure judgement internalism whilst having a solution to the Frege-Geach problem, 
all whilst keeping the rest of the terms of metaethical debate mostly untouched (in particular 
retaining a commitment to the Humean theory of motivation). Ridge‟s ecumenical 
expressivism attempts to do this by claiming that moral judgements express beliefs as well 
as desires. However, because these beliefs are not properly used to characterise the meaning 
of the moral judgement in question the account doesn‟t secure a solution to the Frege-Geach 
problem that leaves everything else in place. Here I will briefly consider two alternative 
ways of hybridising: first, we could claim that having the right sort of motivational state is a 
conventional implicature of making a moral judgement, as in David Copp‟s realist-
expressivism120; second, we could claim it is the act of making moral claims that is 
expressive of a motivational attitude as in Dorit Bar-On and Matthew Chrisman‟s neo-
expressivism. 
 
The main point I wish to make about these theories is not so much that they are wrong 
(although we shall see shortly that each faces some problems), but rather that they are not 
properly hybrid. Both end up, in effect, giving something like a pragmatic explanation of 
the motivational import of moral judgements – being in the right kind of motivational state 
is not constitutive of making a moral judgement, instead being in the right motivational 
state is conversationally implicated by making a moral assertion, or expressed in the act of 
                                                             
120 See also Stephen Barker’s (2000). Stephen Finlay (2004, 2005) considers a similar account where the 
implicature is conversational rather than conventional.  
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making that assertion. What this means is that the motivational state does not have a role in 
characterising the meaning of a moral judgement. Instead it is an additional element on top 
of the semantic content. This means that the connection between moral judgement and 
motivation that realist-expressivism or neo-expressivism secures will be weaker than that 
secured by full-blown expressivism – because the motivational state is not a constituent of 
the meaning of the moral judgement, the connection will not be the strong conceptual one 
originally posited. This is why Copp is explicit that “realist expressivism is entirely 
compatible with externalism” (2001, 3, emphasis in original). All Copp is attempting to do 
is give an explanation of the intuitions that lead people to accept internalism.  
 
Thus, this type of hybrid view faces the opposite problem of Ridge‟s ecumenical 
expressivism – because the ecumenical expressivism doesn‟t really use the belief they claim 
is expressed by a moral judgement to characterise the meaning of that judgement they 
cannot offer a solution to the Frege-Geach problem. Because the realist-expressivist and 
neo-expressivist do not use the desire to characterise the semantic content of the moral 
judgement, they cannot secure full-blown judgement internalism. What they can try to do 
instead is offer an account that explains why there is typically a link between moral 
judgement and motivation by turning attention to the pragmatics of moral judgement. 
However, we have seen how this avenue is open to someone who characterises themselves 
as merely realist (Finlay‟s analytic naturalism above §3.31).  
 
This does not mean that Copp and Bar-On and Chrisman‟s views are without merit. It is one 
thing for the realist to claim that the motivational import of moral judgements can be given 
a pragmatic explanation, it‟s another thing to actually work out the details of that 
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explanation.121 All it means is that this is what Copp and Bar-On and Chrisman‟s proposals 
amount to – a fleshing out of how realists can use the pragmatics of making a moral 
assertion to explain away internalist intuitions, rather than a truly hybrid account that 
secures judgement internalism whilst keeping the resources needed to solve the Frege-
Geach problem. What examination of hybrid theories has revealed, I think, is that these 
theories are not truly hybrid in the sense of combining elements of cognitivist and non-
cognitivist semantics. Sure enough, they do borrow elements from both of these semantics, 
but do not use them as elements in a hybrid semantics. Instead one element or other plays 
little role in the semantic theory, merely featuring to secure the element of the non-hybrid 
semantic theory that cannot be captured by the other non-hybrid semantic theory. What this 
shows is that if you want to secure the advantages of the non-hybrid versions of these 
semantic theories (judgement internalism for expressivism and a simple solution to the 
Frege-Geach problem for the cognitivist) you have to actually buy fully into those semantic 
theories.  
 
One final point that is worth making before turning to the details of Copp and Bar-On and 
Chrisman‟s proposals is that if the above is right then the realist-leaning theories offered by 
Copp and Bar-On and Chrisman look to be in somewhat better shape than Ridge‟s 
ecumenical expressivism. This is because, as we saw in the discussion of van Roojen above 
(§2.25), most modern internalists loosen their internalism requirement enough that an 
explanation of internalist intuitions should be enough to satisfy most. However, the Frege-
Geach problem is not something that you can „cheat‟ in this way. We have seen how the 
Frege-Geach problem gets to the heart of how moral discourse interacts with non-moral 
                                                             
121 As Finlay (forthcoming) points out, it’s hand-waving towards pragmatic explanations that has given 
pragmatic explanations in general a bad name (Ch. 2). 
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discourse, and that if you do not use the truth-conditions of the belief you invoke in your 
hybrid theory to characterise the semantic content of moral judgements you are going to 
have a very hard time explaining the compositionality of moral language.  
 
Turning now to the details of the two proposals under consideration. Copp‟s realist-
expressivism is inspired by Frege‟s discussion of colouring. For Frege, “This dog howled 
all night” and “This cur howled all night” state the same thought – they have the same truth-
conditions. The differ, however, in what they imply about a speaker‟s attitude towards the 
dog in question – using „cur‟ implies I feel an attitude of contempt towards the dog, just as 
if I said „dog‟ with a contemptuous tone of voice122. This difference in implication Frege 
calls colouring. This provides Copp with a model for moral judgements – here we have a 
case where an utterance „expresses‟ (in the sense of conveys that a person has both) a belief 
and a non-cognitive attitude. Thus Copp introduces the notion of „Frege-expression‟. A use 
of a term Frege-expresses a state of mind when it is a matter of linguistic convention that 
using that term typically conveys that the user of the term is in that state of mind. Copp‟s 
proposal then is that moral judgements express a run of the mill belief (in the standard sense 
of „express‟) as well as Frege-express a non-cognitive desire-like state.  
 
How does this work? Copp‟s view, simply put, is that moral judgements express two 
propositions. Take the example „Bullying is wrong‟. This expresses both: that bullying is 
forbidden by a relevant set of standards; and that I am in the non-cognitive desire like state 
                                                             
122 Copp differs from Frege in that he wants to use ‘meaning’ to refer to what is communicated or 
conveyed, as a matter of convention, by the use of a sentence; rather than restricting ‘meaning’ to the 
semantic content of the utterance. On this way of doing things colouring becomes part of the meaning 
of an utterance. Nothing I say here turns on this different way of carving up the terrain, although I will 
continue to, as above, use ‘meaning’ to mean semantic content.  
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that is acceptance of a set of standards that forbids bullying. This second proposition is 
conventionally implicated, rather than being part of the semantic content. However, it 
allows competent speakers to convey that they are in the relevant non-cognitive desire like 
state, so that non-cognitive desire-like state is part of the „meaning‟ of the moral judgement, 
in the expansive sense of „meaning‟ introduced by Copp.  
 
This view has the advantage of offering a simple solution to the Frege-Geach problem – the 
first proposition expressed (in the standard sense of „express‟) by a moral judgement has the 
right kind of truth-conditions to feature in an explanation of the validity of moral modus 
ponens arguments, etc. What does the view say about internalism? Well, the second 
proposition, Frege-expressed by the moral judgement, implies that you are in the non-
cognitive desire like state of accepting a set of standards that forbids bullying. Thus, it is 
inappropriate to say that something is wrong when you don‟t accept a set of standards that 
forbids it. Thus, typically, when someone says that something is wrong they will be 
motivated to avoid that thing (as they accept a set of standards that forbids it, where 
accepting a set of standards is understood to mean being in a non-cognitive desire-like 
state).  
 
This provides Copp with a more sophisticated characterisation of the amoralist than is 
available to traditional internalism. Remember that the traditional internalist says that the 
amoralist is not making a genuine moral judgement  - they cannot grasp the meaning of the 
terms involved. Copp, in contrast, can say that when the amoralist judges that something is 
good without being motivated to pursue it they are saying something that is true, though 
inappropriate. It is inappropriate because it misleads their interlocutor into thinking that the 
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amoralist subscribes to a set of standards that mandates pursuing that object as this is what 
uses of the term „good‟ Frege-expresses. At this point we could object to Copp by saying 
that his characterisation of the amoralist really just collapse back into the old response – this 
is because on Copp‟s account the non-cognitive desire-like state Frege-expressed is part of 
the meaning of the judgement. However, this criticism seems to be a mere artefact of 
Copp‟s more expansive conception of „meaning‟ – what‟s important is that the amoralist 
can grasp the semantic content of the terms in question, it‟s just that they do something 
inappropriate when they put them together. 
 
Another criticism is that on Copp‟s account it looks like we don‟t ever get genuine 
disagreement. Suppose that you say „Bullying is wrong‟ and I say „Bullying is not wrong‟. 
On Copp‟s account the primary propositions expressed by these utterances are, respectively, 
<Bullying is forbidden on some set of standards> and <Bullying is not forbidden on some 
set of standards>. As long as there are two different set of standards available (one of which 
forbids bullying and another that doesn‟t) then what we have said is not inconsistent. 
Instead, if we disagree at all, then it‟s about which sets of standards we should adopt. But 
this disagreement looks like a normative one. Either we can posit ever ascending sets of 
standards that permit certain sets of standards and not others; or claim that some set of 
standards is more authoritative than another; or give something like an expressivist account 
of the inconsistency of sets of standards. The first option is not viable, and the last is not 
compatible with the motivations for realist-expressivism. The second suggestion might 
work, but it looks hard to see what work the notions of standards is now doing – it is 
inconsistency with the moral facts (about which set of standards is authoritative) which is 
explaining inconsistency rather than the standards themselves.  
 
248 
 
This discussion has been overly brief, but I hope this brevity will be of little concern, as we 
can note that this worry about Copp‟s position can be assuaged if we draw attention to the 
fact that it is a symptom merely of Copp‟s very particular analysis of the primary 
proposition expressed by the use of a moral sentence. There is nothing in the structure of 
Copp‟s account to rule out providing another analysis which does secure the right kind of 
disagreement. 
 
A more serious problem with Copp‟s account is that raised by Allan Gibbard against what 
he calls the „colouring model‟ (2003, 168-9). Suppose we are in a situation where you feel 
disgust towards a particular action – setting a cat on fire, say. Suppose then that you assert 
„That was cruel‟. I, being a reprehensible character, feel no such sense of disgust. Now, as 
our non-cognitive states do not enter into the truth-conditions of moral judgements, I should 
be able to (with perfect propriety) respond to your assertion with „That‟s true, but I 
wouldn‟t put it that way‟ (thus agreeing with the semantic content of the utterance, whilst 
cancelling the implicature).123 However, this looks odd. A more natural response would 
seem to be „That‟s not cruel‟. What I think this problem indicates is that the connection 
between moral judgements and motivation that realist-expressivism secures is too weak to 
satisfy the expressivist. We can see Gibbard‟s objection as a compressed argument for a 
                                                             
123 Typically conventional implicatures are not so easily cancellable, Chrisman and Bar-On suggest 
against Copp. Instead, they suggest, the realist-expressivist should claim that the relevant implicature is 
conversational. The problem with this move is it makes judgement internalism a mere artefact of 
conversation (Bar-On and Chrisman, 2009, 154). Copp, however, argues that conventional implicatures 
are cancellable, at least in a weaker sense than the one used by Grice, although recently he has 
developed the term simplicature (2009) to denote the kind of implicature that has the features needed 
to secure his account. At first blush the introduction of this notion strikes me as a little ad hoc.  
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strong form of internalism – one that makes my response to you semantically incorrect. This 
is the sort of strength of internalism that Copp‟s account cannot provide.124 
 
How does the neo-expressivist account fare? On this account we need to distinguish 
between two notions of expression. First, a linguistic product containing a moral term (like 
an utterance or sentence) s-expresses a proposition. Second, the act of making a moral 
utterance a-expresses a non-cognitive desire-like state (Bar-On and Chrisman, 2009). This 
distinction is inspired by Dorit Bar-On‟s account of avowals (Bar-On 2004). The way that 
this view accounts for the compositionality of moral terms is by using the truth-conditions 
provided by the proposition s-expressed by the product of an act of assertion (unlike Copp, 
Bar-On and Chrisman don‟t tie themselves to any particular analysis of this proposition). 
Internalism is respected because the act of making an assertion a-expresses a non-cognitive 
desire-like state. Amoralists, then, understand the meaning of the terms involved in their 
assertions (in the sense that the products of those acts of assertion – the sentences or 
utterances produced – can be true, and the thing that they wish to communicate). However, 
when they assert a moral judgement without feeling properly motivated the act of asserting 
that judgement is improper – they don‟t have the relevant state expressed by these acts of 
assertion. Thus the amoralist is semantically competent (as the externalist holds), yet they 
display more than a psychological or moral flaw – they do something improper at the level 
of assertion.  
 
                                                             
124 Although see Tim Henning’s (2011) for a response to this objection from Gibbard on behalf of a moral 
realist who exploits a two-dimensional semantic framework. 
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The first worry about this view is that it is inspired by an account of avowals. Avowals 
display some puzzling features – they are epistemically secure in a way that encourages 
something like an expressivist analysis of their contents, yet they are capable of being 
embedded in similar ways to moral judgements (thus raising parallels of the Frege-Geach 
problem). Bar-On and Chrisman‟s account or moral judgements explicitly exploit the 
structure of Bar-On‟s account in the case of avowals. However, moral judgements don‟t 
seem to exhibit anything like the epistemic security of avowals – why would this be if we 
give an analysis of the meaning of moral judgements that parallels that of avowals? Bar-On 
and Chrisman suggest this is accounted for by the different purposes of moral discourse and 
self-ascriptions of mental states. However, the worry then is that it is not this account that is 
actually doing the work of explaining the special features of avowals – some other factor 
needs to be invoked to explain their epistemic security. This is not a problem for their 
analysis of moral judgements per se, instead it merely indicates a difficulty with trying to 
underwrite that analysis with a comparison to the case of avowals.  
 
Another worry that you might have is that internalism is not just a constraint on the 
appropriate utterance of a moral judgement – that there is something wrong with an 
amoralist who thinks to themselves „torching a cat is wrong‟ without feeling any motivation 
to refrain from cat-torching. Bar-On and Chrisman can, however, deal with this problem by 
claiming that inner judgements also a-express motivational states. 
 
A more pressing worry, again, is that this version of hybridism doesn‟t capture judgement 
internalism. One way to express the worry is as follows: Bar-On and Chrisman‟s account, 
as it stands, has nothing to say about the direction of motivation of the motivational state a-
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expressed by a moral judgement. All we know so far is that moral judgements, to be proper, 
must be accompanied by some motivational state. But why should judgements of wrongness 
be associated with a motivation to avoid, and judgements of goodness with a motivation to 
pursue?125 It seems just obvious that judgements of goodness should be associated with 
positive motivations, but the obviousness of the point should not blind us to the fact that it 
still requires explanation. The expressivist has an answer to this question – it is part of the 
meaning of „bad‟, say, that it expresses some sort of con-attitude towards objects judged to 
be bad. However, the neo-expressivist (like the realist-expressivist and the ecumenical 
cognitivist) eschews the tight connections between the meaning of moral terms and 
motivation to give this sort of explanation.  
 
What I hope to have shown above is that these formulations of hybrid theories are not 
precisely that. They do not take onboard features from the semantic theories of their non-
hybrid cousins then combine them into a new hybrid theory. Instead they keep a cognitivist 
semantics, then add a non-cognitivist element at the level of pragmatics. This means that 
they cannot provide a tight enough connection between moral judgement and motivation to 
satiate the non-cognitivist. And once that ambition is junked, these hybrid positions are 
relegated to a role as merely more sophisticated fleshings out of cognitivism. Even on that 
level, we‟ve seen that they face a couple of problems. 
 
 
                                                             
125
 Another way to put the point is – what does the neo-expressivist have to say about not the 
amoralist’s practice, but about Joyce’s agent of pure evil (one who avoids the good and pursues the 
bad)? 
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4.6 Hybrid Metaethics and Neo-Kantianism 
 
Where does this leave us? We saw that Korsgaard argues that moral statements are neither 
like statements of fact, nor like „emotional expletives‟. In the previous chapter I explored 
Korsgaard‟s problem with the first characterisation of moral statements she rejects (that 
owing to the moral realist), where the problem was that moral realism fails to capture the 
practical significance of moral judgements. There I acknowledged that Korsgaard doesn‟t 
intend her remarks to refer merely to the motivational import of moral judgements, but 
argued that taking the complaint in this way allows us to get a grip on what might be wrong 
with moral realism. I  also argued that if we take the problem of practical significance in 
this way, there are good reasons for the moral realist to be unconcerned. However, suppose, 
like someone like Blackburn (see his (unpublished)) we were particularly concerned about 
the problem of practical significance. Then a natural place to look for a solution would be 
expressivism. However, here we run into a characterisation of moral thought and talk that 
Korsgaard rejects. Moral judgements are not like „emotional expletives‟. 
 
With the help of Hussain and Shah, I explained how this concern is misguided when stated 
in this robust way – it ignores the distinction Hussain and Shah bring out between cogitation 
and cognition. However, unlike Hussain and Shah, I think that Korsgaard was getting her 
finger on something important – that moral judgements don‟t seem to function in the same 
way as expressions of non-cognitive states. This merited discussion of the Frege-Geach 
problem where we saw there are good reasons to suspect that, taken this way, Korsgaard is 
right – we can‟t easily explain the compositionality of moral terms by taking moral 
judgements to be expressions of sentiments. This led me to an exploration of hybrid 
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metaethical theories. The idea was: suppose Korsgaard is right that moral judgements have 
features that are not accommodated by the realist (practical significance) or by the 
expressivist (the complicated semantic properties moral terms exhibit) then perhaps the best 
way forward is to have a view that combines elements of both these projects. Thus, we 
could offer a novel way of interpreting Korsgaard‟s own position (which has been hard to 
get a grip on), but even if the position we end up with is not one the neo-Kantian would 
accept, we would have at least a position which answers the concerns that might drive 
someone to neo-Kantianism. 
 
However, as we have seen, the type of hybrid theory that privileges moral discourse‟s 
practical significance over its realist-seeming elements (ecumenical expressivism) doesn‟t 
have the resources to solve the problems with pure expressivism. In contrast, the type of 
hybrid theory that gives a greater role to truth-conditions and beliefs in characterising the 
meaning of moral judgements (neo-expressivism and realist-expressivism) fail to sustain a 
connection between moral motivation and judgement that is tight enough to please someone 
bothered by the issue of practical significance (in effect, hybrid views of this type are 
merely sophisticated versions of the moral realisms we canvassed in the last section. There I 
argued that these views were adequate and could avoid the problems posed by the neo-
Kantian. However, if you were unmoved by that defence then the hybrid versions or realism 
seem to be no more advanced on this dimension).  
 
So this is how things look: I have attempted to show that moral realists should be 
untroubled by Korsgaard‟s criticisms. Expressivists, however, are put under more pressure 
by worries that could be underlying Korsgaard‟s criticism of their views. What we have yet 
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to do is take a look at Korsgaard‟s own, positive, metaethical position. Even if Korsgaard‟s 
complaints against realism and expressivism do not mark out a distinctive position for her 
to occupy, and even if they can be resisted, we should still consider her own view. It could 
be in the statement of that that we find a clearly delineated, novel, position. In addition, 
even if none of Korsgaard‟s rivals fail for the reasons she provides, we could still find that 
the neo-Kantian‟s position is preferable. We won't have a knock-down argument that it 
must be true (because its rivals do not fail as spectacularly as Korsgaard supposes), but 
perhaps neo-Kantian constructivism offers us an account of moral thought and talk that is 
better that its rivals in terms of theoretical virtues like simplicity, generality, and 
explanatory power. It is to consideration of the neo-Kantian‟s own position that I now turn.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: NEO-KANTIAN CONSTRUCTIVISM 
 
 
When we come to Korsgaard‟s own metaethical position we run into difficulties 
characterising her view. We saw before that she talks of wanting to transcend the distinction 
between cognitivism and non-cognitivism, and some problems with what that proposal 
could even mean. When she states her constructivist126 position most explicitly (2003) she 
ends up saying things that make little literal sense.127 What we do know is that she takes her 
view to be inspired by John Rawls‟s neo-Kantian constructivism in the case of justice. 
However, there are well known problems with trying to use Rawls‟s framework to give a 
metaethical account (see Brink‟s (1989) fourth appendix). What I try to do here is offer a 
novel way of characterising Korsgaard‟s view that both secures some of the features she 
wants from her metaethics but which is also clear enough to evaluate. I argue that we should 
construe neo-Kantian constructivism as a particular form of cognitivist anti-realism, along 
the model for judgement-dependent qualities offered by Crispin Wright (§5.1). I then argue 
that if we do things this way the viability of neo-Kantian constructivism depends upon 
being able to give a derivation of the categorical imperative, and I turn to Korsgaard‟s 
attempt to do this in §5.2, where we see how she attempts to show that the categorical 
imperative is binding for us in virtue of various claims about the nature of agency. This 
attempt, I argue, in turn depends on another doctrine – constitutivism – which I explore in 
§5.3. The viability of constitutivism depends upon claims about the inescapability of agency 
                                                             
126 There are other ways of characterising constructivism (for example, the work of Sharon Street (2008, 
2010) Lenman (2008, 27-8) also offers a clear framework on the constructivist’s behalf. In order to try to 
make at least some progress I have decided to concentrate on trying to get clear about Korsgaard’s own, 
distinctive position.  
127
 For example, she repeatedly states that “Concepts refer to solutions of problems” (e.g. 2003, 117). 
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(§5.4). Finally (§5.5) I consider whether Korsgaard has the resources for responding to a 
standard objection to Kantian moral theories. 
 
5.1 Neo-Kantian Constructivism and Judgement-Dependence 
 
Here I wish to suggest that we can generate a coherent view that provides some of the 
features that Korsgaard wants from a metaethical theory if we model neo-Kantian 
constructivism on the account of judgement-dependent128 qualities offered by Crispin 
Wright. What I think animates Korsgaard‟s search for a version of procedural realism that 
doesn‟t embrace substantive moral realism is a distaste for moral realism attempting to 
ground the normative force of obligations in a metaphysical way – in order to explain the 
normative force of an obligation the realist, she thinks129, has to cite the existence of a 
special kind of fact, one that is intrinsically normative130. What Korsgaard wants to do 
instead is give an account of the correctness of moral judgements that depends purely on 
our access to the right kind of procedure. I will now outline the Wrightian judgement-
dependence framework and try to show how it can secure for Korsgaard those two 
ambitions, whilst giving us a clear proposal to evaluate. 
 
Secondary qualities have been the target of a large degree of speculation in philosophy 
since the distinction between primary and secondary qualities was popularised by thinkers 
                                                             
128 Also called ‘response-dependent’.  
129 As we saw above in discussion of the anti-voluntarist argument it’s not clear that the moral realist is 
restricted to this type of explanation alone.  
130
 Which then opens up space for the generalised anti-voluntarist argument I looked at in (§3.2). 
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like Galileo and Locke. Secondary qualities are supposed to have some sort of intermediate 
metaphysical status – there is typically supposed to be a fact of the matter about whether 
something is red, say, even though redness as such does not belong to the objective fabric of 
the world. These qualities are „mind-dependent‟ in a particular way – whether a particular 
object is red or not does not depend upon an individual perceiver‟s judgements, but the 
existence of redness in general depends upon, in some way, our perceptual responses. In 
addition, secondary qualities possess strange features, that might make them apt for 
comparison to moral qualities. Against Mackie‟s complaint that there cannot be objective 
goodness in the world, for example, because it would be too metaphysically queer due to 
having to-be-pursuedness built into its nature, John McDowell argues that red things have 
to-be-seen-as-redness built into their nature. If this sort of comparison can be made to work 
then we look to have a view that would appeal to the neo-Kantian constructivist – in the 
colour case we have correct answers to questions like „is this object red?‟, but the truth of 
those answers is not grounded in purely mind-independent features of the world, but rather 
in the effects that objects in the world produce on our minds. 
 
What I‟ve offered above is rather vague and highly metaphorical. Such features have 
dogged the debate around secondary qualities since its inception. In an attempt to clear the 
area up Crispin Wright (1992) has suggested that we think not in terms of primary and 
secondary qualities but in terms of judgement-dependent and judgement-independent 
qualities. A quality is judgement-dependent when our best judgements about that quality 
play an extension-determining role for that quality. Our best judgements about judgement-
independent qualities, in contrast, play an extension-tracking role. In other words, the truth 
about the extension of a judgement-dependent quality is constituted by our best judgements 
about that quality – the truth in that area cannot outstrip our best judgements. In contrast in 
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the case of judgement-independent qualities it is always possible for the truth of that area to 
go beyond our best judgements. By thinking of qualities in this way we get to see why we 
can view secondary qualities as somehow less real than primary qualities – the secondary 
qualities are judgement-dependent (and thus the truths about their instantiations cannot go 
beyond our best judgements), the primary judgement-independent (where the relevant truths 
can go beyond our best judgements). This could then feed into a Dummettian-inspired 
characterisation of the distinction between realism and anti-realism where realism is 
identified by the claim that truth in a particular discourse can outstrip what we have 
evidence for, and anti-realism by the denial of that claim.131  
 
Wright goes on to provide a framework for telling when a quality is judgement-dependent 
or –independent. He sets up the framework by considering the qualities of colour and shape. 
The idea here is that any adequate methodology for telling apart judgement-dependent and 
judgement-independent qualities should place colour on one side and shape on the other, 
given that these are paradigmatic instances of secondary and primary qualities. How it 
works is this: we first try to discern the ideal conditions (C) under which a suitable subject‟s 
(S) judgement about the extension of some particular term are maximally credible. What we 
are looking for is the best conditions for making judgements of the relevant type. In the case 
of colour, for example, it‟s unlikely that the judgements of someone who is colour-blind 
looking at colour samples in a darkened room would play an extension determining role. 
                                                             
131
 In fact, The connections between judgement-independence and evidence transcendent truth is, 
according to Wright, potentially more complicated than this. I offer this loose, potentially false 
characterisation to give more of a flavour of the way in which judgement-dependence is anti-realist 
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What we then do is use those C conditions to generate a provisional equation of the 
following form:132 
PERed: S were in C → (x is red ↔ S judges that x is red) 
PESquare: S were in C → (x is square ↔ S judges that x is square) 
 
Once we have done this we check whether these provisional equations pass four tests (in 
addition to being true and hence extensionally adequate). In order to think that the quality in 
question is judgement-dependent the provisional equation must be: a priori; substantial; 
fulfil an independence condition; and an extremal condition. Looking at these in turn. 
 
If the truth of the relevant provisional equation were only a posteriori, then we‟d have no 
license for claiming that the truth of the discourse in question conceptually depends upon 
our best judgements regarding that discourse. The provisional equation will be merely a 
posteriori in cases where we are in such a favourable epistemic position that we get things 
right all the time. This could be the case even where the states of affairs we are thinking of 
are constituted entirely independently of our best judgements. For the truth of the 
provisional equation to be any evidence in favour of a judgement-dependent account of the 
quality in question it must be knowable a priori. (114-7). 
 
 
                                                             
132 Wright moves away from the basic equations of his (unpublished) towards casting things in terms of 
provisional equations to avoid Robert K. Shope’s conditional fallacy (see Wright 1992, 117-120).   
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The C-conditions characterised in the provisional equation must be substantial in the sense 
that they are “specified in sufficient detail to incorporate a constructive account of the 
epistemology of the judgements in question”(112). This is to rule out construing the 
conditions so that the subject has “whatever it takes” to come to the correct judgement, 
instead we need a “concrete conception... of what it actually does take.” (112). 
 
We also must be able to characterise the relevant C-conditions without using the concepts 
that feature in the relevant judgements (the independence condition).133 This is not to avoid 
a kind of circularity in the proposed equation, for the equation is only designed to tell us 
about the dependence of the truth of the discourse in question on our best judgements. It is 
not a attempt to give an analysis of the associated truth conditions. However, if we did 
invoke the very concepts we were trying to give a judgement-dependent account of, it 
would be open to an opponent of the account to ask the judgement-dependence theorist to 
show that their invocation of those concepts is compatible with the thesis that they are 
trying to prove – that the extensions of those concepts is determined by our best 
judgements. In order to avoid this worry we should try to characterise the C-conditions so 
that we do not assume anything about the extension of the relevant concepts.134 (120-123) 
 
Finally, our provisional equation should respect the extremal condition. In effect, our 
proposal that truth in the relevant area is judgement-dependent should be the best 
explanation of the truth of the provisional equation. This condition, like a prioricity one, is 
                                                             
133
 In fact, for Wright at least, we must not use them in a way that presupposes facts about the details of 
their extensions. It’s OK, however, to use them if they are used in other ways – within the scope of 
intensional operators for example.  
134
 Although some accounts of judgement-dependence dispense with this condition: see Pettit’s (1991).  
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needed to distinguish between judgement-dependence and infallibility. Take the example of 
God. Presumably God, in ideal conditions(!), only judges that something is the case when it 
is the case. This connection could also be a priori (in fact, if the concept of God is the 
concept of an omniscient being then it could also be analytic), respect the independence 
condition and the substantiality condition (God can do this because She has special 
epistemic powers). But, in this case, we would not want to say that the truth of everything is 
judgement-dependent. Instead we‟d have a better explanation of the a priori truth of the 
relevant provisional equations – God‟s omniscience (similar considerations might hold for 
the case, pain, that Wright considers, 123-4).  
 
How do things look for PERed and PESquare (recall that if this framework is going to be at all 
plausible red should come out as judgement-dependent and square as judgement-
independent)? Wright argues that we can characterise the C-conditions for PERed in the 
appropriate way. We will have to mention factors like: the subject is attending to the object 
in question and is free from distraction; they have a normal (in a statistical sense of 
„normal‟) nervous system; the object is viewed at 12 noon, outside, on an overcast day in 
Fife135; etc. All of these conditions can be stated without assuming anything about the 
extensions of colour concepts, and they are substantial. In addition the resulting provisional 
equation is plausibly a priori true and we have no other, better, explanation of its a priori 
truth than that redness is judgement-dependent.  Given that the PERed passes the relevant 
tests we can conclude that colours are judgement-dependent qualities. 
 
                                                             
135
 Perhaps, if we could provide the extensive argumentation needed, we should be open to the 
possibility that there are places in England as well that are suitable locations for making good colour 
judgements.  
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What about PESquare? Here we face a difficulty, Wright argues. It‟s obvious that shapes can 
appear to be different from different angles – a square can look like a diamond or some 
other quadrangle depending on the angle of viewing. So, in order to come up with plausible 
C-conditions we have to include the subject viewing the object in question from a number 
of angles. But, if this is going to work we have to assume that the object‟s shape stays 
constant throughout this process. Thus we have to assume facts about shape constancy to 
get the PE off the ground, and thus violate the independence condition.136 Thus, we have to 
conclude that shape is a judgement-independent quality. Thus the framework yields the 
desired results, at least in paradigm cases of primary and secondary qualities.137 
 
My positive proposal is to explicate neo-Kantian constructivism by using Wright‟s 
framework. The basic idea is that there is nothing, in principle, to stop us building a 
procedure into the C-conditions for making our best moral judgements. We have already 
seen that Korsgaard wants to be a mere procedural realist, in the sense that she thinks that 
there are right and wrong answers to moral questions, but this is only because we have a 
suitable procedure for answering those questions. Tying the truth of moral judgements to 
the outcomes of such a procedure using the judgement-dependence framework would 
secure this result for Korsgaard – remember that this framework gives an anti-realist gloss 
                                                             
136 What if the subject in question had eyes on the ends of their fingertips, such that they could view an 
object from multiple angles at the same time? Then we would not run afoul of the independence 
condition. What this example demonstrates, however, is that in the shape case the PE is not a priori 
true.  
137 Of course a number of objections have been raised against this way of doing things. For example 
Wright’s motivation for including the extremal condition could be challenged by McDowell’s argument 
against the common sense view of pain (1998, however the motivation for it I provide would still stand). 
However, I do not have the space to consider all of these. What I want to get clear on instead is how it 
would work using this framework to investigate morality, in particular whether it can be used to usefully 
explicate neo-Kantian constructivism, although I will briefly touch on the ‘missing explanation argument’ 
below.  
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on judgement-dependent qualities, whilst retaining the possibility of giving truth-conditions 
for judgements about those qualities (it‟s just that the relevant notion of truth will be 
similarly anti-realist). What would such an account look like? Korsgaard is, as well as a 
constructivist, a neo-Kantian, so the relevant procedure for her is applying the categorical 
imperative to the maxim underlying an action. We would thus end up with a PE looking 
something like this: 
PEPermissible: S were applying the test of the categorical imperative
138 → (x is 
permissible ↔ S judges that x is permissible)139 
 
I have also noted that Korsgaard seems to be animated, in part, by a distaste for trying to 
ground the normativity of morality in metaphysics. However, we saw that when she tries to 
give an argument against moral realism (a position which at least seems to try to explain the 
normative force of moral obligations using metaphysics) the argument seems to fail. We 
have also seen that in her more recent work (2003) she complains not so much that moral 
realism is false, just that it doesn‟t get to the heart of what matters. Thinking about 
constructivism on the model of Wright-style judgement dependence gives the constructivist 
a way to express their antipathy towards metaphysics in a coherent way. We can see this if 
we consider the so-called „missing explanation argument‟ (MEA).  
 
                                                             
138 We would, of course, have to build in other conditions concerning factors like the agent attending to 
the task, being suitably informed of the non-moral facts, and so on.  
139
 Being sanctioned by the categorical imperative means that an action is permissible. If an action fails 
the test it is forbidden. Actions will be obligatory when their omission is forbidden. The content and 
Korsgaard’s derivation of the categorical imperative will be returned to later.  
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We can see this best if we consider the following consequence of the judgement-
dependence framework:140 
RED: It is (non-trivially) a priori necessary that: if x is red then x is disposed to 
appear deep red to standard subjects under standard conditions. (Miller, 2001, 81)141 
 What the framework gives us is a relationship of semantic dependence between truth about 
a particular subject matter and our best judgements about it. That is, when read left to right 
the bi-conditional in the BE and PE tells us that the truth of colour judgements is 
conceptually tied to our best judgements. However, there seems to be a problem with this. 
Mark Johnston argues (1989, 1993a, 1993b, 1998)142 that on the Wright framework a true 
empirical explanation goes „missing‟. In effect, Johnston points out that in addition to 
wanting to claim a relationship of semantic dependence between colour judgments and the 
truth of those judgements, we also want to be able to say that people judge things to be red 
because they are red. The because in this statement looks to be explanatory. However, on 
the Wright framework this empirical explanation goes missing. One way to see what‟s 
going on here is to consider the following three claims (this reconstruction of the argument 
is taken, with some modification, from Miller‟s 2001, 80-1): 
(i) x is red 
(ii) When an object has some colour then standard subjects under standard 
conditions are disposed to see it as having that colour; i.e. they are disposed 
to have its colour appear to them. 
                                                             
140 Here I have put the claim in terms of objects appearing red to subjects under standard conditions. 
These are the terms the argument is put in by Johnston and Miller. However, the difference does not 
matter as, presumably, subjects judge things to be red on the basis of their appearing red.  
141 This is derived from reading the relevant BE right to left.  
142 See Pettit (1991), (1996), Menzies and Pettit (1993), Wright (1989), (1992), Miller (1995), (1997), 
(2001), Blackburn (1993), McFarland (1999) and Haukioja (2006) for responses.   
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(iii) Standard subjects under standard conditions are disposed to see x as red, i.e. 
they are disposed to have its redness appear to them.  
The problem is this – with RED we can derive (iii) from (i), as an a priori and necessary 
matter, without using (ii). (ii) is entirely redundant. However, (ii) looks like an empirical 
generalisation that does have some explanatory relevance to the truth of (iii). Thus Wright‟s 
account of judgement-dependence makes a perfectly good empirical explanation go 
missing.  
 
The best way to respond to this argument is to follow Miller in arguing that the contingent 
generalisation from which Johnston derives (ii) above is too strong. Johnston derives (ii) 
from: 
A. : Standard subjects (with respect to a family of qualities had by a range of 
objects) have a disposition which in standard conditions issues in the appearing 
of an object having some of the qualities just when the object has these qualities. 
(Johnston, 1998, 17). 
 
The motivation for holding A is that it is supposed to explicate the sense in which we think 
of standard subjects as responding to, or perceiving the qualities of coloured objects. 
However, Miller argues that we can makes sense of subjects responding to the colours of 
objects in the right way by merely embracing: 
A*: Standard subjects (with respect to a family of qualities had by a range of 
objects) are such that: if conditions are standard, and they view an object, then 
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the object will appear to have one of those qualities just when it has that quality. 
(Miller, 2001, 82). 
 
By plugging in A* instead of A, instead of getting (i)-(iii) above we get: 
(i*) x is red 
(ii*) If S is a standard subject, conditions are standard, and S views an object, then 
the object will appear to have a particular colour when it has that colour. 
(iii*) x appears red to S (82) 
 
In contrast to (iii), we cannot derive as an a priori and necessary matter (iii*) from (i*) and 
RED alone. Thus there is space for an empirical explanation of the following form: 
EX1: If S is a standard subject and S views x in standard conditions then (x appears 
red to S because x is red). 
The explanation that does go missing is: 
EX2: (If S is a standard subject who views x in standard conditions then x appears 
red to S) because x is red.                                                 (Miller, 2001, 83) 
But this should be of little concern – EX2 explains why a conditional linking objects 
appearing red to viewings of an object in the right conditions is true in virtue of that object 
being red. In contrast EX1 explains why the object appears to be red in virtue of the 
object‟s being red. It is EX1 we want, and it is this empirical explanation that does not go 
missing.  
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What this material suggests is that on the judgement-dependence model claiming a 
relationship of semantic dependence between our best judgements about a quality and the 
truth about that quality‟s extension is compatible with giving an empirical explanation of 
why we make those particular judgements. Another way to think about it is this. Suppose 
that we found that all red objects have a particular primary quality in common – the same 
surface-reflectance properties, say. Then, on the judgement-dependence model we could, as 
a contingent matter of fact, claim that objects look red because they possess that particular 
property. What is important is what we would say in the case where we find that there is no 
single primary quality that all red objects possess – red objects are wildly heterogeneous, 
from the standpoint of primary qualities. In that case we would still be able to hold on to the 
claim of semantic dependence made by the judgement-dependence theorist, we would 
merely give up hope of being able to offer an empirical explanation of things looking red in 
terms of their primary qualities.143 
 
Similar considerations apply in the debate between Korsgaard and the moral realist. 
Suppose that all right actions share in common some natural property (that they promote the 
greatest balance of pleasure over pain, say). Then we can, on this framework, offer the 
following true empirical explanation „Actions are right because they promote the greatest 
                                                             
143 Incidentally, with the compatibility of the judgement-dependence theorist’s semantic claim and the 
right kind of empirical explanation demonstrated we can see why D J Bradley’s recent (2011) recasting 
of judgement-dependence in functionalist terms is unmotivated. Bradley argues that we can avoid the 
explanation going missing if instead of claiming a relationship of dependence between the judgement-
dependent quality and judgements about that quality, we claim one between the quality and being in a 
state that is disposed to lead to best judgements about that quality. This move is unnecessary if there 
are no missing explanations to be accounted for. Bradley complains that responses to Johnston’s MEA 
like Blackburn (1993); McFarland (1999); Haukioja (2006); Pettit and Menzies (1993); Miller (1995), 
(1997), (2001); disappointingly “criticize non-essential details of Johnston’s exposition” (Bradley, 2011, 
299). If the material I exposit above is right, then it is clear that this is one of those, very many, cases 
where attention to the details reaps rewards.  
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balance of pleasure over pain‟. However, this does not threaten the constructivist claim that 
the truth of judgements about rightness depends upon our following the correct procedure. 
We can see this in the case where there is no such natural property uniting right actions – in 
that case the constructivist can still make their claim of semantic dependence. 
 
What this means is that the type of metaphysical positions Korsgaard tries to argue against 
are simply irrelevant to her concerns (if this model can be made to work). She can say to the 
realist – „I simply do not care whether all right actions share some natural property in 
common, for whether they do or not is only relevant for our attempts to give an empirical 
explanation of our judgements about the rightness of actions in terms of those actions being 
right. Whether or not there is some property that all right actions share, my claim that the 
truth about rightness depends solely upon us having a correct procedure for evaluating 
claims about rightness still goes through‟. 144 
 
So, if we cast neo-Kantianism constructivism in this light we can explain why Korsgaard 
has a distaste for the kind of metaphysical explanation of normativity given by the realist, 
and why her arguments against it seem to misfire. She should not be arguing that moral 
realism is false but, instead (as she starts to do in her later work), that it is irrelevant to her 
                                                             
144 There may appear to be some tension between what I say here and in chapter 1. There I argued that 
if all right actions shared one or a few natural properties in common that would be good prima facie 
evidence that we can reduce rightness to that property or those properties, and if right actions were 
wildly heterogeneous in that respect this would block the naturalistic reduction. However, this tension is 
only apparent: there I freely admitted that the evidence the homogeneity of right actions would provide 
is only prima facie, and that it could be defeated with further argumentation. What this exploration of 
judgement-dependence tells us, I think, is that one way to show that that evidence is irrelevant is to 
take on board a judgement-dependence framework and demonstrate that it can be made to work with 
rightness.  
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concerns. The cognitivist anti-realism provided by the judgement-dependence framework 
gives us a clear way of fleshing this out. 
 
However, this framework cannot secure all of Korsgaard‟s ambitions. She also wants to 
transcend the cognitivist/non-cognitivist division. We saw in chapter 4 how the attempt to 
do this looks problematic, and above that when Korsgaard is explicit on this issue that she 
says things that are hard to get a grip on. What the judgement-dependence framework can‟t 
do is provide an easy way for Korsgaard to express this concern. This is because the 
framework, as usually stated, is cognitivist. It provides a link between the truth conditions 
for particular area and our best judgements about that area. However, the truth conditions 
provided are anti-realist in flavour – they don‟t outstrip our best judgements. Perhaps 
Korsgaard (or other neo-Kantian constructivists) could be happy with this kind of 
constructivism – where moral judgements end up with truth conditions, but not ones of a 
substantial, realist bent. To put things very schematically Korsgaard seems to be worried 
that moral realism distances morality from our own standpoint – it makes being obligated a 
matter of facts existing out there in the world, and it‟s hard to see how these facts can get a 
grip on us if that is the case. On the cognitivist anti-realism underwritten by the judgement-
dependence model we end up with moral judgements being belief-like in that they have 
certain truth conditions, but these truth conditions are given by our best judgements about 
morality in question. Thus there isn‟t the kind of distance between ourselves and the truth 
about morality that Korsgaard seems to be worried about. This gives us a sense of how 
putting moral qualities together with secondary qualities makes their special features (their 
normativity) look a bit less troubling, and explains the popularity of the type of companions 
in guilt strategy that could be built off the back of these observations.  
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Adopting the judgement-dependence framework also gives us a clear way of evaluating the 
constructivist‟s proposal. On my account, constructivism becomes a kind of cognitivist anti-
realism with a suitable procedure built into the C-conditions for best moral judgement. If 
this is to work then the PEs we end up with (e.g. PEPermissible above) need to obey the four 
conditions outlined. It‟s truth must be knowable a priori, the C-Conditions must be 
substantive and respect the independence condition, and construing moral qualities as 
judgement-dependent must be the best explanation of the truth of the equation. We won‟t 
need to worry about the extremal condition – morality does not seem to be a place where we 
should be worried about the a priori truth of the equation being an artefact of our infallible 
access to the mind-independent moral facts. Wright himself, though, argues that moral 
qualities are not suitable candidates for a cognitivist anti-realist treatment because the C-
conditions for best moral judgements violate the suitability and independence conditions. 
This is because when we state the conditions under which moral judgements are maximally 
credible, we cannot eliminate reference to S being a „morally suitable subject‟. This then 
creates a problem, which Callum Hood puts succinctly enough to be worth quoting at 
length: 
The moral suitability condition cannot amount to having whatever-it-takes to form 
correct moral judgements on pain of violating the substantiality condition. The 
alternative is that the satisfaction of the moral suitability condition depends upon an 
anterior determination of the extension of „morally suitable‟. Now an analogy can 
naturally be drawn between shape discourse and ethical discourse. Just as 
satisfaction of the stability condition in the case of shape was not logically 
independent of the extension of „square‟, likewise it seems that the satisfaction of 
the moral suitability condition is not logically independent of the extension of 
„morally suitable‟.                    
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                                                                                               (Hood, unpublished, 
2010)  
Wright himself puts the main point this way: “S‟s moral suitability, in particular, is itself, 
presumably, a matter for moral judgement” (Wright, 1988, 23). Thus a judgement-
dependent treatment of moral qualities fails to meet the four conditions required, and thus 
moral qualities can‟t be judgement-dependent. 
 
However, this is where the positive proposal I have made starts to have some bite. There 
seems to be nothing, at least in principle, blocking us from giving a characterisation of the 
neo-Kantian‟s preferred procedure for settling moral questions that does not violate the 
independence condition. It is, at least, a matter worth investigating. In addition, if we could 
characterise the C-conditions as following a certain procedure (where this procedure is 
applying the categorical imperative) we are unlikely to run into problems with the 
substantiality condition. What my proposal does do is shift focus on to the aprioricity 
condition. We have to attend closely to whether the truth of the connection between moral 
truth and following the categorical imperative is knowable a priori (and whether they are so 
connected, of course).  
 
Fortunately, we can find in Korsgaard an engagement with just this sort of question, in her 
attempt to give a derivation of the categorical imperative and an explanation of its 
normative force over us. Constructivism, I have urged, is best thought of as a variety of 
Wright style cognitivist anti-realism where the relevant conditions for best moral judgement 
are construed as following a certain procedure. Whether Korsgaard‟s position works, and 
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provides us with a genuine metaethical alternative, depends on whether her derivation of the 
categorical imperative works. This is the issue to which I now turn.  
 
 
5.2 The Derivation of the Categorical Imperative  
 
In The Sources of Normativity Korsgaard attempts to show how Kant‟s categorical 
imperative is binding on us. Kant offers a number of formulations of the categorical 
imperative, but only two will be relevant here: that we should act only on maxims that we 
could, without contradiction, will to be universal laws (the Formula of Universal Law – 
FU); and that we should act only on maxims that we could will to be universal laws as an 
equal legislator in the Kingdom of Ends (FKE) (Korsgaard 1996, 98-9). The interrelations 
between these two formulations and the others that Kant gives, along with the best way to 
explicate their content, has been a vexed issue in the study of Kant‟s thought. I will not get 
into those debates here. Instead I will just explain how Korsgaard understands these 
formulations a little before going on to how she attempts to derive them. 
 
In Korsgaard‟s terminology, she labels the FU the categorical imperative145. What the FU 
tells us, she argues, is that any maxim that we act on must have the correct form to be able 
to be willed as a universal law. In other words: “nothing determines what the law must be. 
                                                             
145 In fact, in her later work she uses ‘categorical imperative’ to stand for the principle that guides our 
action which, in contrast to the FU, does have moral content. Throughout this thesis I have used 
‘categorical imperative’ to stand for this principle, what Korsgaard calls in her (1996) ‘the moral law’. 
Outside of this paragraph I will revert to using ‘categorical imperative’ to mean the principle with moral 
content, and FU to stand for the weaker constraint.  
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All it has to be is a law.” (98, emphasis in the original). In addition, whether a maxim is 
suitable to be a law depends upon its form. Its form must be such that it can be willed to be 
a universal law. Now, there are some notions here that need unpacking. First, a maxim. A 
maxim, for Korsgaard, is the principle underlying my „action‟, where an action is my act 
together with the purpose for which that act is performed. So, if I lie to you to get you to 
lend me money then the maxim of my action (which is a combination of the act of lying 
together with the purpose of getting money) is something like „lie in order to get money‟. 
What form does it have to have? To be suitable as the kind of thing that we can will the 
maxim must be universal, in that it is applicable as a guide to behaviour in all similar 
circumstances. Why is this? Well, Korsgaard thinks that if you adopt a principle (maxim) to 
guide your behaviour and you then discard it for no reason, then you will have obliterated 
the distinction between the person willing an act and the incentive for which that act is 
performed.146(2010, ch. 4). So, when deciding whether to perform a particular action, if the 
FU is binding on us, we have to check whether the maxim that that action embodies has the 
right form to be universalisable in the right sort of way.  
 
As this stands though, it does not look like the FU will be able to give much content to a 
moral theory given how weak its content is. It just tells us that the principles we act on have 
to have a suitable form to be treated as universal, in the sense that I would see them as 
giving reasons to act in similar ways in similar circumstances. But this test permits all kinds 
of immoral maxims – I can, presumably, will an action that embodies the maxim „murder 
people in order to steal their possessions when you want them‟. The FU just tells us that this 
maxim is only appropriate if we would treat it as providing us with reasons to act in a 
                                                             
146
 At the moment this sounds rather too quick, but once I get onto explaining the particular role 
Korsgaard posits for the constitution of agency in her theory the motivation for some of these claims 
should look a little clearer.  
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similar way in other similar circumstances. So, every time someone has something I want I 
murder them to get it. And this is sanctioned by the FU. Korsgaard acknowledges this 
deficiency in the FU, but argues that the Kantian has the resources to work towards a 
stronger constraint on our actions. (1996, 98-99). 
 
In order to get any moral content we need what Korsgaard calls the „moral law‟. This is the 
Formula of the Kingdom of Ends (FKE). It tells us to only act on maxims that we could 
will to be universal laws as an equal legislator in the Kingdom of Ends. There is quite a lot 
packed into this principle, not all of which I can explicate. For the purposes of trying to get 
a grip on Korsgaard‟s derivation of  this principle we can give it a quite simple gloss. What 
the FKE is getting at is that when we test our maxims we have to take other members of the 
Kingdom of Ends into account. What is the Kingdom of Ends? For Kant this is quite a 
complicated matter, but for Korsgaard it simply includes all rational agents. To be a 
member of the Kingdom of Ends is to be such that you must be treated as an end in 
yourself, rather than as a mere means.147 What about the equal legislator business? What 
Korsgaard is getting at is that the principles that we choose to express in our behaviour must 
be ones we would rationally agree on in a Kingdom of Ends where everyone is taken into 
consideration.148 We can see, roughly, how this formulation is more stringent than the FU – 
it‟s unlikely to permit the maxim of killing others to take their possessions, for example. 
                                                             
147
 Again, a lot of ink has been spilled over what it means to treat someone as a mere means. To get into 
this issue would take us far away from the task I’ve set myself. For the purposes of this thesis we can 
just try to run with the intuitive notion we get from the phrase as it stands.  
148
 Here we can see affinities with Rawls’s neo-Kantian constructivism in the case of justice. For Rawls 
we are looking for the principles we would choose to co-ordinate over from behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ 
where facts about who you are are unavailable to you. The veil of ignorance is, of course, a mere literary 
device. What is doing the work is the ideal that justice should be impartial, so that a system is only fair if 
we do not favour it because of particular facts about what kind of person we are. We can, to get our 
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What I have given here is in many respects inadequate – I haven‟t been able to fully explain 
what a maxim is, in what sense the FU tests its „formal‟ properties, what it is for an action 
to embody a maxim, and the details of how we would get full blown moral content out of 
the FKE. In some cases these lacunae are shared by Korsgaard‟s own work, but aside from 
that all I‟ve tried to do is give a rough and ready characterisation of the ideas involved in 
order to be able to evaluate Korsgaard‟s arguments for her claims.  
 
Korsgaard‟s main argument (from The Sources of Normativity) for the categorical 
imperative is something like the following:149 
(1)  As human beings, we are faced with the necessity of acting, of making choices. 
 
(2) Being self-reflective, we make these choices on the basis of reasons. 
 
(3) Therefore we must have some reasons available to us to make choices.  
 
(4) In order to have reasons, you must have some conception of yourself under which 
you take your life to be worth living (some practical identity).  
 
(5) For the reasons that flow from this identity to be binding upon you, you must take 
that identity to be valuable.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
heads round what Korsgaard is doing, think of Korsgaard’s proposal as trying to explore that intuition in 
the case of morality more generally.  
149
 This formulation of the argument is borrowed, in part, from William FitzPatrick (2005, 662-3). 
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(6) But your reason to have some practical identity is not a reason that flows from any 
particular practical identity. 
 
(7) It is a reason you have in virtue of your human nature. In particular, in virtue of 
your capacity for rational agency.  
 
(8) To see this reason (that you need some practical identity, because of your rational 
nature) as binding, you need to see your identity as a rational agent as valuable. 
 
(9) Therefore, because of the necessity of acting, it is also necessary that you see your 
rational agency (your „humanity‟) as valuable. 
 
(10) It is not possible to value your own humanity without valuing humanity in 
general. 
 
(11) Therefore, because of the necessity of acting, it is also necessary that you 
value humanity in general. 
 
(12) And this just is Kant‟s categorical imperative.  
 
 
What support is available for these claims? 1 is the claim that for beings like us agency is 
inescapable (I will return to this issue below). 2 is a claim about the nature of agency – that 
when we are faced with making choices we, if we are to be considered as agents at all, must 
make the choice on the basis of reasons, rather than acting randomly. I will not challenge 
this claim here, but see Jonathan Way‟s (2010, §5.1) for a way you could launch such a 
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challenge. We can construe 3 as a claim following from a transcendental argument – agency 
is possible (some of us are, at least some of the time, properly considered agents), and we 
know from 2 that for agency to be possible there must be reasons available to us, therefore 
there must be reasons available for us to make our choices. 
 
 4 is based on Korsgaard‟s conception of what it is to be an agent - that the point of action is 
to constitute yourself as an agent with a particular identity. From this she thinks it follows 
that in order to make choices (given that the point of making choices is to build and 
reinforce an integrated identity for yourself) you need to have some practical identity which 
you aim to preserve. A practical identity is, for Korsgaard, „a conception under which your 
life is worth living‟. Her point seems to be that in order to think of the reasons you act upon 
to have some force, they must be related to something that you think is valuable (5). Let‟s 
take a concrete example – one practical identity is a teacher. As a teacher you are faced with 
making choices about how to conduct your behaviour. One way to settle these questions is 
to reflect on what it makes sense to do, given your practical identity as a teacher. Thus, if 
you treat your identity as a teacher as valuable, you will see that you have reason to stay in 
grading work, rather than going out on the lash. Staying in, then, looks like a choice-worthy 
action because it is bound up in the practical identity of being a teacher.150 
 
However, that you need some practical identity in particular is not a reason that stems from 
any particular practical identity (6). It‟s not because you are a teacher that you need to be a 
teacher. Instead you need to adopt some identity or other because you need some 
conception of your life as worth living to make certain actions (because they are suited to 
the identity in question) present themselves as choiceworthy. This reason you have for 
                                                             
150 What I’ve said here, particularly about self-constitution, is apt to sound fairly vague and perhaps 
paradoxical. We will return to this issue below.  
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valuing your practical identity is one that flows from the fact that you must have some 
identity or other, because you are an agent (7). In addition, practical identities conflict – 
your duties as a teacher might clash with your duties as a drinking partner. When this 
happens, you will need some basis for choosing among these competing practical identities, 
and that‟s where the demands inherent in merely being a rational agent might be able to 
help.151 
 
8 relies upon the idea that for rational agency to provide reasons for you (in this case, a 
reason to have some practical identity or other) you need to value your own rational agency. 
Thus we reach 9 where we are told that all rational agents must value their own rational 
agency (their „humanity‟). At this point Korsgaard will argue that this commits every 
rational agent to the FU. The reasoning here is not entirely clear, but the idea seems to be 
that rational agency requires that you cannot treat something as a reason for acting without 
treating it as a reason for so acting in other, similar circumstances (and this gets us the FU). 
To treat a consideration as a reason for action in a particular case only is to think that there 
is nothing about the consideration itself that makes it a reason for action, and so it‟s hard to 
see, Korsgaard argues, how we can then treat it consistently as a reason even in that 
particular case.152 Treating considerations as reasons requires considering them to be 
universally binding. 
 
Claim 10 is supposed to be a consequence of what Korsgaard calls „the essential publicity‟ 
of reasons. She argues that Wittgenstein‟s private language argument shows that reasons 
                                                             
151 This claim seems questionable – how would the requirements of agency help to solve this case, for 
example? However, we do not need to be too concerned about this as it’s not essential to Korsgaard’s 
argument.  
152 See Raymond’s Geuss’s (1996) for a convincing case, building on Schlegel’s criticism of Kant, that this 
move of Korsgaard’s severely underestimates the human capacity of freedom.  
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cannot be „private‟ in the sense that they apply only to us. It then follows, she claims, that if 
I have to see my humanity as valuable I have to see everyone else‟s humanity as valuable. 
This yields 11 which tells us that we have to value everyone else‟s humanity. And, 
Korsgaard thinks, this is just to treat people as ends in themselves and take them into 
consideration when choosing principles to act upon, which is just (according to Korsgaard) 
the categorical imperative in its FKE formulation.  
 
There are a number of problems with this argument. The first is the move I‟ve outlined in 
the last paragraph. Korsgaard‟s reasoning for the essential publicity of reasons is extremely 
hard to follow (see 1996 Ch. 4). Trying to get clear on what she is doing would take a whole 
thesis. All I can do here is simply assert that Korsgaard seems to confuse the question of 
whether a reason is public with the question of whether a reason is self-directed. She may 
be able to show that reasons have to be public, but not that their content cannot be self-
directed. If so, then it‟s perfectly consistent for me to value my own humanity (and thus be 
forced to respect the, quite weak, FU) without valuing anyone else‟s, and thus the step to 
the full-blown categorical imperative fails. 
 
Another difficulty is that Korsgaard, in a number of places, relies on the claim that in order 
for you to have reasons you must think that these are reasons because acting in accord with 
them secures something that you take to be valuable. This seems to commit one to quite a 
strong anti-realism about reasons.153 A realist about reasons, who claims that whether some 
consideration is a reason for action does not depend upon our taking the thing procured by 
that action to be valuable, but instead on whether that thing really is valuable, could block 
                                                             
153
 If I thought that certain ends were intrinsically valuable, independent of me, then I could think that 
that an act would further those ends is a good reason to do it, whether or not I regard myself as 
valuable – this criticism comes from FitzPatrick (2005), and Hussain and Shah (2005) repeat the claim. 
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the moves up to 8. They would claim, in effect, that whether you have a reason to act in a 
particular way does not depend on your seeing your practical identity as a source of value, 
nor on you seeing your rational agency as valuable. You just have reasons, and being a 
rational agent involves responding to them in appropriate ways. 
 
However, running the criticism this way seems to be off beam. If reasons claims are 
normative claims themselves, then we should expect Korsgaard to be anti-realist about 
them. Of course a realist would not accept this position, but if they just baldly assert a 
realism about reasonhood or value against Korsgaard this would simply beg the question 
against the constructivist framework. What it does mean is that Korsgaard cannot rely upon 
a realism about any of the normative claims in her derivation of the categorical imperative, 
but if cognitivist anti-realism is viable then this should not be a worry.  
 
Instead what we should be worried about is whether, in doing things this way, Korsgaard 
violates the independence condition on the relevant provisional equations. Taking this 
strategy, Korsgaard does not build conditions that violate the independence condition 
directly into the C-conditions for best moral judgement, however she does make claims that 
violate the independence-condition in the course of explaining the a priori truth of the 
relevant equations. Korsgaard could then argue that she is not violating the independence 
condition at all – the truth of the link between the truth values of claims about the extension 
of „permissible‟ (for example) and our best judgements of permissibility (when we apply 
the categorical imperative) can be stated without assuming any facts about the extension of 
„permissible‟. It‟s just that getting you to see that this link exists does require assuming 
facts about the extensions of moral concepts (that not considering yourself as valuable in 
virtue of your rational agency is impermissible, say). 
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Suppose though, that we think that this is illegitimate, and that Korsgaard does violate the 
independence condition. At this point the neo-Kantian constructivist can try to argue that 
violating this condition is not necessarily lethal to their programme. As we saw above the 
provisional equations are not meant to give an analysis of the truth conditions in question, 
so there is no direct charge of circularity available. Instead, violating the independence 
condition means you don‟t have an easy way of demonstrating the success of your account. 
The constructivist might be happy with this, but it would certainly be a weakening of their 
dialectical position – it would make it hard for them to convince anyone else of the truth of 
their position. What I think this means is that the criticisms from FitzPatrick (2005) and 
Hussain and Shah (2006) do have some bite, but not where they expect them to. Instead of 
the problem being that Korsgaard relies on anti-realism about value (which, if the 
constructivist project can get off the ground, is not a problem) the problem is that 
Korsgaard, in her derivation of the categorical imperative, makes normative claims and that 
this threatens to violate the independence condition on the provisional equations I am trying 
to reconstruct a constructivist position from.  
 
Another concern that we might have is that Korsgaard tries to build up to the categorical 
imperative by making various claims about what is necessitated by rational agency – what 
you have to do to be a rational agent. What is the status of these claims? In addition we 
might worry that the above argument does not secure us the right result – we learn that we 
are bound by the categorical imperative if we are to be a rational agent, but couldn‟t we 
dodge the requirements of the categorical imperative by opting out of being a rational 
agent? In order to answer these questions Korsgaard has recently developed a type of 
constitutivism, the last piece of Korsgaard‟s view I have left to explain.  
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5.3 Constitutivism 
 
Constitutivism tries to ground the claims about agency Korsgaard uses in her argument for 
the categorical imperative by arguing that they are constitutive standards for being an agent 
at all. The idea is that the „teleological organisation‟ of something supports normative 
judgements about it. Korsgaard deploys the example of building a house. A house has a 
certain function – it is for providing stable shelter. In order for a house to provide shelter it 
has to meet certain standards – the walls must be solid, the roof must be above rather than 
under the walls etc. These standards provide guidance for the activity of house-building. If 
you are not at least trying to put the roof on top of the walls, and build walls that stand up, 
it‟s not the case that you are just building a house badly; you are not building a house at all. 
From this we get the idea of a constitutive principle of an activity. You cannot build a house 
without building walls that support a roof, in the same way that you are not walking unless 
you are putting one foot in front of another. If, unless you are performing an activity in line 
with these constitutive principles you are not performing that activity at all, how is it 
possible to perform an activity badly? Korsgaard argues that you must at least be guided by 
the constitutive principles in question – they must be what you take to be directing your 
activity. At a certain point, however, if you fall away from the constitutive principles in 
question badly enough we will say that you are no longer performing the activity at all. A 
shoddy builder is one who builds a house that doesn‟t stand up for very long. A child who 
throws a load of bricks together in such a way that they are not even trying to create a 
structure that stands up is not house-building. (This is a summary of Korsgaard‟s (2009), ch. 
2).  
 
Constitutive principles, Korsgaard claims, are able to meet sceptical challenges quite easily. 
Suppose you are building a house, and someone asks you „well, why are you putting up 
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walls strong enough to support that roof, why don‟t you just build the walls out of twigs?‟, 
then you have a reasonable response to them: because if I did that then I wouldn‟t be 
building a house at all. The idea is that if you have reason to be engaging in an activity, then 
you must be guided by the constitutive principles that constitute that activity or you won‟t 
be doing that activity at all. This view has traces in her earlier (2003) where she argues that 
what constructivism tells us is the way to solve a problem when we acknowledge that it is a 
problem we share. For example, the problem of distributive justice is one of how we 
distribute goods fairly. What Rawls‟s principles tell us, Korsgaard claims, is which 
principles a system of distribution must embody to be a system of distribution at all.  
 
How does this apply to action? Well, Korsgaard claims that the function of actions is to 
constitute ourselves as agents. It is by acting on the basis of reasons that we make ourselves 
into rational agents with the right level of „psychic unity‟ to have our own personal identity. 
The principles that are constitutive of the activity of self-constitution are, Korsgaard 
contends, the hypothetical and categorical imperatives. So, in order to be agents at all we 
must be guided by the hypothetical and categorical imperatives. By taking up 
constructivism with this constitutivist element we have an answer to the normative sceptic 
we encountered in chapter 1. The normative sceptic asks why they should be moral. The 
constitutivist constructivist tells them that if they are to be a rational agent at all they must 
be guided by the categorical imperative.  
 
There is a lot to this claim, resting, as it seems to, on the history of existentialist notions of 
character. I shall not go into it in detail, however it is necessary to spend some time trying 
to dispel the notion that Korsgaard‟s idea of self-constitution is paradoxical (she deals with 
this „paradox of self-constitution‟ in her (2006) ch. 2). The puzzle is this: Korsgaard wants 
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to claim both that it is as a possessor of an identity that you are the author of your actions, 
and that by acting you create your own identity. But how can you create your identity 
through your actions, and choose your actions on the basis of your identity? If you are 
already there to choose your actions, why would you need to make yourself? And if you 
make yourself through your actions, how can the actions depend on the identity they are 
creating?  
 
Korsgaard hopes to dissolve this paradoxical appearance through a comparison with living 
things in general. To be a living thing is to engage in the activity of constantly making 
yourself into yourself. For example, being a giraffe and being a good giraffe are the same 
thing – it is constituting yourself as a giraffe (by digesting nutrients, repairing your body) 
that makes you into a giraffe at all. But this is not paradoxical (so Korsgaard claims). It only 
looks paradoxical if you look at one particular time-slice of the giraffe‟s life, and ask „is it 
constituting itself now?‟. From the point of view of a particular time this question makes 
little sense – if the giraffe exists, it is a giraffe, and doesn‟t need to do anything more to be a 
giraffe. But this point of view is misleading. All it shows is that being a giraffe, or any 
living thing, is not an event or state, instead it is an activity. To be a living thing is to 
engage in the activity of being that living thing. As it is with living things, so it is with self-
constitution. To be a person is just to be engaging in the activity of making yourself one. 
This only sounds paradoxical because we automatically envisage the situation from the 
time-slice perspective. This time-slice view forces us into a dilemma – either we are already 
made, in which case we do not need to do anything else (and have a full and determinate set 
of practical identities) or we have not yet been made, in which case making ourselves into 
ourselves would be of no help (we have no practical identities from which to start the 
process). But, again, this ignores the point that self-constitution is an activity, just as being a 
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living thing is. Choosing between the picture of ourselves as either full or empty selves 
leads to all sorts of problems. It seems as if we must be full, otherwise we will have nothing 
upon which to base our choices. However, if we are full, then we will not really be free – 
there will be something forcing our hand: our pre-existing determinate self. Instead we 
should see a person as a thing that is engaged in the activity of constituting themselves in 
action, rather than taking a particular stage of that person‟s life and asking how it got made 
a person – looking at things from this perspective does lead to the appearance of paradox, 
but it is the perspective that is at fault, not Korsgaard‟s view, she argues. 
 
There are other questions we might have with Korsgaard‟s view: why are the hypothetical 
and categorical imperatives the constitutive principles of the activity of self-constitution?154 
Is her appeal to teleology metaphysically kosher? However, the main problem with 
Korsgaard‟s constitutivism, I think, is that it does not deliver the result she wants from it. 
We can see this if we consider one claim that Korsgaard needs to get the whole framework 
going. In order for constitutivism to provide a response to sceptical challenges we must 
have a reason for engaging in the activity in question. What Korsgaard needs to claim, then, 
is that for beings like us rational agency is inescapable. The reason why the categorical 
                                                             
154
 For Korsgaard’s answer to this, see (2009, ch. 3). It’s fairly easy to see how we might ground the 
hypothetical imperative in this way – it does look like there is something defective with an action which 
does not connect the means employed to secure an end and the end in the right kind of way: such a 
bodily movement might not count as an action at all. What Korsgaard needs, however, is the claim that 
actions which fail to embody the categorical imperative are defective qua actions. Korsgaard thinks her 
argument against particularistic willing above (which we will return to when we come to Geuss’s 
criticism of her view) is enough at least to secure the FU. However, the move from that to the full-blown 
categorical imperative is, again, obscure. However, this does not matter much for our purposes. The 
criticism I shall make against Korsgaard will still hold even if she could give a principled argument for the 
claim that being guided by the categorical imperative is constitutive of action. The other way of 
attacking constitutivism (claiming that the constraints the constitutive principles of action place on 
agents are too weak to derive the requirements of morality) is taken up by Kieran Setiya (2003), (2007).  
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imperative has force over us is because it is one of the constitutive principles governing 
rational agency, and you can‟t stop yourself being a rational agent. 
 
5.4 The Inescapability of Agency 
 
David Enoch objects to constitutivism by challenging the inescapability of agency:  
Classify my bodily movements and indeed me as you like. Perhaps I cannot be 
classified as an agent without aiming to constitute myself. But why should I be an 
agent? Perhaps I can‟t act without aiming at self-constitution, but why should I act? 
If your reasoning works, this just shows that I don‟t care about agency and action. I 
am perfectly happy being a shmagent – a nonagent who is very similar to agents but 
who lacks the aim (constitutive of agency but not shmagency) of self-constitution. I 
am perfectly happy performing shmactions – nonaction events that are very similar 
to action but that lack the aim (constitutive of actions but not shmactions) of self-
constitution.                                                                     (Enoch, 2006, 179) 
 
Turning to Korsgaard‟s example of house-building, Enoch asks us to imagine a builder 
who, when we point out to him that he‟s falling short of the constitutive standards 
governing house building by doing such a shoddy job, replies by saying something like 
„Fine, you‟ve proved to me that I don‟t care about house-building. But this just means I‟m 
really a shmouse builder‟ and carries on regardless. Enoch is making the point that 
Korsgaard‟s argument only establishes the conditional: If you care about being an agent, 
then you should follow the categorical imperative. But this opens up space for the 
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normative sceptic to raise their scepticism in a different form. They can agree that the 
conditional is true, and then go on to ask why they should care about being agents. The 
position we are left in is this – if shmagency is a genuine possibility for someone to take up, 
then the constitutivist attempt to ground the categorical imperative fails. 
 
Enoch then outlines Connie Rosati‟s response to this problem. In brief, she argues that the 
standards constitutive of agency are in a way self-vindicating. This is because the challenge 
raised by the sceptic above depends upon the exercise of these capacities. In the same way 
that we can dismiss scepticism about logic due to the fact that the sceptic will have to use 
some logic to get their argument going, we can also dismiss the sceptic‟s concerns about the 
status of rational agency. Enoch, however, contends (following Wright, 1991) that this sort 
of response gets the dialectical status of sceptical challenges all wrong. When the sceptic 
uses the very tools they are undermining, we should treat their challenge as a sort of ad 
hominem argument. They are arguing that, even with the tools you have at your disposal 
(the laws of logic, or facts about rational agency), your position collapses into a form of 
scepticism. They are allowed to use our claims against us to launch their challenge. Thus 
Rosati‟s response won‟t do (Enoch, 2006, 182).  
 
Enoch raises another problem that looms even if the constitutivist can show that agency is 
inescapable and shmagency impossible. Enoch asks why we should think of the necessity of 
agency as being a kind of normative necessity. Ok, the sceptic can say, I see that I have to 
be an agent, but why is this not simply a causal necessity? Enoch drives the point home 
against David Velleman‟s and Rosati‟s constitutivism by pointing out that they argue 
against views that try to ground normativity in terms of fulfilment of our desires. Velleman 
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and Rosati reject this sort of view because basing normativity on the desires that we happen 
to find ourselves forced to have seems unacceptably arbitrary. But how is grounding 
normativity in the fact that we find ourselves forced to be agents in any better shape? 
(Enoch 2006, 179). I think that this concern is particularly pressing for Korsgaard. Recall 
(from ch. 1) her argument against an evolutionary-based theory of morality. Such a theory 
of morality would be inadequate because even if we showed that as a matter of our 
evolutionary heritage we felt ourselves forced to act in accord with the dictates of morality 
by inner drives that had been selected for, this does not yet answer the normative question, 
because we can still ask whether we should allow ourselves to be carried away with those 
drives, even if, as a matter of psychological fact, we cannot avoid it. If Enoch is right, we 
can now run the same objection against Korsgaard‟s own theory – suppose, we can say, as a 
matter of fact I have to be an agent, and thus have to perform actions which are governed by 
the categorical imperative. That still does not show that the categorical imperative really is 
normative, even if I can‟t avoid being guided by it.  
 
What the constitutivist needs to do to respond to this is tell us more about the type of 
necessity involved in their claim that we are forced to be agents. If it is mere causal 
necessity then we can run Korsgaard‟s own arguments against her. But it‟s hard to see what 
form of necessity would do the job. Enoch argues that if the necessity in question is 
normative Korsgaard is left with one unexplained normative claim, which can only be given 
a realist treatment, in which case constitutivist constructivism fails as both constitutivism 
and constructivism and collapses into a complicated form of normative realism. This 
neglects one possibility open to the constitutivist – to give this normative claim, again, a 
cognitivist anti-realist treatment. However, the constitutivist has given us no clue how we 
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might do this, and even if we can do it concerns about respecting the independence 
condition are likely to loom even larger.  
 
Enoch‟s first problem, however, can be solved if we follow the line offered by Luca Ferrero 
(2008). Ferrero basically argues that even if shmagency is possible, choosing shmagency is 
impossible. The idea is this: Enoch underestimates the strength of the constitutivist‟s 
position by putting his points in a linguistic way. It‟s not that we can‟t properly be classified 
as agents if don‟t follow the constitutive standards governing action, instead we won‟t be 
agents if we don‟t follow those standards. What ignoring the constitutive standards of 
agency involves is trying to choose to be nonagents, but such a choice is still a choice and 
hence governed by the relevant principles. We cannot choose to be unbound by them. 
 
This position, for one thing, has the counterintuitive consequence that no-one ever chooses 
to commit suicide. That aside, the argument invites an obvious response from the anti-
constitutivist: „ok, you‟ve shown me I can‟t choose my way out of agency. But that just 
means I will have to shmoose my way out of it, where shmoosing is a lot like choosing (in 
that it reliably brings about changes in future behaviour on the basis of the consideration of 
reasons) except that shmoosing is not bound by the principles constitutitive of choosing.‟. 
The constitutivist‟s response is equally obvious – if you are weighing up considerations as 
reasons you are choosing, not shmoosing. And then the anti-constitutivist says „ok, I will 
weigh up shmondsiderations as sheasons then‟.  
 
I think that we can break into this deadlock by considering what the constitutivist has to say 
about people who violate the categorical imperative on at least some occasions – people 
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who just ignore its demands from time to time. Such people seem to be possible. In fact, all 
of us are such people, to some extent. But few of us are, presumably, nonagents because of 
it. What Korsgaard seems to think is that our practical identities are robust enough to allow 
some violations of principles which stem from them. This claim seems to be required just 
by the bald facts of how humanity acts. However, if we continually fall short of the 
constraints placed on us by our practical identities then we will no longer embody the right 
level of „psychic unity‟ and our identities will dissolve. This might be the right way of 
thinking about things, but it leads to problems for Korsgaard. 
 
Rather than thinking about a general normative sceptic, think about a sceptic who asks why 
they should perform a particular action. Korsgaard‟s reply seems to be „well, if you do too 
many things like that then your rational agency will dissolve away and you‟ll no longer be 
an agent‟. This invites the reply „ok, well in that case I won‟t do it too many times, but 
you‟ve provided me no reason to not do it in this case‟. The problem is not just that 
Korsgaard, in the face of the obvious facts, has to admit that sometimes we do things in 
violation of the categorical imperative without losing our agency. The problem is deeper – 
that in this particular case violating the categorical imperative is not even wrong: this is 
because violating the categorical imperative is forbidden because doing so threatens your 
rational agency. But the constitutivist has to admit that one violation of the categorical 
imperative doesn‟t stop you being an agent. So any particular violation of the categorical 
imperative doesn‟t dissolve your rational agency. And if conforming to the categorical 
imperative is only required because doing so preserves your rational agency, then you have 
no reason to follow it in this case.  
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The problem is even more pressing when we consider Korsgaard‟s ambitions. Korsgaard 
acknowledges that the burdens morality places on us can be quite severe – there are cases 
where morality requires that we give up our lives, for example. To explain this Korsgaard 
says (1996) we must explain why the consequences of violating the demands of morality 
can be as bad or worse than what morality demands from us, and on her picture we can do 
this – sometimes morality can demand we give up our lives, and this can be sensible 
because the alternative is dissolution of our practical identity, which amounts to a kind of 
death. However, I think the constitutivist has to acknowledge that the „psychic‟ impacts of 
violating the demands of morality can often be less bad than what morality demands of us 
(is it really always the case that ignoring a requirement to give up your life leads to a 
complete dissolution of identity, for example? Looking at humanity it‟s hard to see how it 
could be155).  
 
There are two possible responses here – Korsgaard could argue that her considerations 
against particularist willing above rule this out – the maxims we will have to be universal. 
Even if this is true, though, it doesn‟t yet give us the right result. We can imagine a maxim 
that, though universal (in that it prescribes the same action in the same circumstances) 
prescribes an immoral action. As long as the relevant circumstances for that action come up 
                                                             
155 Evidence for this claim might be found in looking at fictional portrayals of, and real-life stories about, 
criminals (who violate the demands of morality). Consider Marlo Stanfield from The Wire – a rum 
character who commits all manner of morally wrong acts. But Marlo seems to exhibit the strongest 
sense of personal identity of any character in the show, one that intimately involves morally wrong 
actions – when faced with the possibility of living the life of a reputable business man he finds himself 
compelled, by the very nature of who he is, to engage in criminal behaviour which has the potential to 
threaten this new lifestyle. Now it could be that Marlo is halfway towards complete dissolution as a 
person. But I am sceptical enough about human nature to not be convinced of that. This portrayal seems 
to me convincing, and if it is then this is evidence against the claim that violating the categorical 
imperative, as a matter of psychological fact, leads to dissolution of identity. We could give numerous 
other, similar, cases. 
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rarely enough, then we will not have to be worried about acting on that maxim leading to 
the end of our personality. 
 
The second response is to say that when people fail to be guided by the categorical 
imperative they are not really acting. So, again, it‟s not possible to choose to act in a way 
not guided by the categorical imperative. However, the people in question are still doing 
something wrong (even if that behaviour doesn‟t amount to a full blown action). If we 
follow this response then it makes it hard to see why we would blame people for the bad 
things they do. After all, on this line they aren‟t really freely choosing their action, because 
the things that they are doing are not really actions. What I‟m getting at is this: if we call 
these bodily movements that are not performed in accordance with the categorical 
imperative nonactions, that does not stop us wanting to say that they are wrong. We want to 
say that each particular bodily movement should have been an action, and hence performed 
in line with the categorical imperative. But it looks as if this avenue is no longer open to the 
constitutivist. 
 
What I think this shows is that we do not need to be concerned so much with the 
inescapability of agency. Instead we should ask the constitutivist what they say about 
people who fail to act in accord with the categorical imperative. If their constitutivism is 
strong enough that these bodily movements no longer count as actions then it‟s hard to 
make sense of why we think they are wrong – they aren‟t actions at all, so aren‟t really 
bound by the categorical imperative. If, however, we permit that people can act in violation 
of the categorical imperative without losing their identity, as long as they don‟t do it too 
much, then the constitutivist will not be able to get a moral theory with the strength they 
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want – they won‟t be able to answer the normative sceptic who asks of any particular 
obligation why they should fulfil it.  
 
There is another problem for the constitutivist constructivist to consider. 
 
 
5.5 The Standard Objection to Kant  
 
It is in response to what Korsgaard calls the „standard objection to Kant‟ (SOK) that she 
flags up the details of her way of thinking about a maxim; we touched on this above but is 
worth returning to now because I think her response to it generates a problem for neo-
Kantianism. For Kant, the morally virtuous agent is one who has a good will: they do their 
duty for duty‟s sake. When we consider a particular case though, this starts to look 
problematic. Imagine a daughter who goes to visit her mother who is ill in hospital. If we 
asked why she does this, imagine if she responded „Simply because it was my duty‟. This 
sounds shockingly cold. There are a number of reasons you could visit your mother – to 
make her feel loved, to brighten her day up, because you love her and want to see her, etc. 
In some cases, these reasons might not weight heavily for you, and your sense of duty 
intercedes and you visit the old bat anyway. But this shouldn‟t be the typical case. The truly 
virtuous person should visit her mother for the other reasons, not just because it is her duty. 
What has happened, in effect, is that Kant‟s theory makes the virtuous person fetishistic, in 
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the sense discussed in chapter 2, this is the SOK.156 Korsgaard is worried about this 
objection and thinks it can be surmounted by defending a particular thesis about action. 
 
She wants to contrast her own conception of action with a „Millian‟ one, where “All action 
is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their 
whole character and colour from the end to which they are subservient.” (Mill 1998, 2) On 
this model whether an action is good or not depends upon what effects it produces. This 
production conception of action is one that Korsgaard thinks is deeply ingrained in 
philosophers, even Kantians. Kantians sometimes put forward their moral principles as 
„side-constraints‟ – as restrictions on the right ways to realise certain ends. If we think of 
action as something that is judged on the basis of the ends it realises, then these side-
constraints will appear mysterious. If action is judged by what it brings about, how can the 
way in which it brings an end about matter to its moral value? 
 
Korsgaard wishes to overturn this state of play with a different conception of action (one 
she claims is also found in Aristotle and Kant). She argues that we need to distinguish 
between acts and actions. The act is what the Millian has in mind when they talk about 
actions. But, for Korsgaard an action is not merely performing an act, there is something 
else as well. In Kant (so Korsgaard claims) the description of an action is a maxim. The 
maxim has this structure: 
Act + Purpose 
└      Action      ┘ 
                                                             
156 And it looks as if things are worse than for the externalist who the fetishism argument was targeted 
against above. There it emerged that the externalist could dodge the worst of the fetishism charge by 
pointing out that having a de dicto desire to the right thing is compatible with having de re desires for 
the right-making features we’d expect a non-fetishist to be moved by. In this case it looks like Kant is 
claiming that all moral actions should be motivated by duty.  
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On this model, to perform an action is to perform an act for some particular purpose – to 
bring about some end. The categorical imperative test therefore applies to an act done for 
some particular purpose: you ask not whether it is permissible to lie, but whether it is 
permissible to lie in order to save someone‟s life. So, despite the traditional view of Kant, 
he has no time at all for general moral principles as far as they attach to act types. 
 
With this new conception of action we can hope to dissolve the SOK. Whether some action 
is good, and thus should be done out of duty, is determined not only by the act, but also by 
the purpose the act is intended to bring about. So, it is not the act of visiting your mother 
that you should do out of duty. As it stands, „visiting your mother‟ is just a description of an 
act, and so is not yet a candidate for moral judgement (this is why utilitarianism is not even 
a moral theory, according to Korsgaard, as it tries to judge acts, which Korsgaard claims 
just aren‟t the kind of things that can have moral statuses attached to them). Instead, what is 
up for evaluation is the action: „visiting your mother in order to show her you love her‟. 
Now this, the action described by a maxim with the structure of act + purpose, is what you 
should do out of duty. So acting out of duty is not some cold, fetishistic process. Acting out 
of duty involves doing an act for the sake of some purpose – and this purpose can be 
something warm and touchy-feely, like making your mother feel loved.  
 
There are two things we might wonder about this – whether this is an accurate 
representation of Kant; and whether this response to the SOK works. I am only concerned 
here with the second question. We can start to make problems for Korsgaard by asking what 
is supposed to be playing a role in motivation here, the duty or the purpose?157   
                                                             
157
 It should be possible to stay agnostic about what theory of motivation we are committed too – for 
the Humean, it won’t be the duty or purpose playing a motivational role, rather it will be the desire to 
do one’s duty, or the desire to fulfil that purpose which will. However, it should be possible to state the 
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So we can ask whether the duty (or desire to do your duty) plays any motivational role. 
Korsgaard could answer no. This means that the fact that something is your duty is in a way 
entirely epiphenomenal – it being the case that some action is your duty will not make a 
difference to anything you actually do. This makes it hard to see how Kant‟s claim that the 
morally virtuous person is one who acts out of duty is even a candidate for being true – if 
we take this option it makes little sense to say that anyone ever „acts out of duty‟, at least on 
an obvious reading of what this means (that the duty motivates you). Call this option (A) (I 
shall return to this later).  
 
So let‟s imagine instead that Korsgaard answers „yes, duty plays a motivational role‟. Now 
we can ask what would happen if somebody saw that something was their duty, but failed to 
be motivated by the purpose picked out by the description of the action. (So suppose I could 
see that it was my duty to visit my mother in order to show her I loved her, but that I didn‟t 
want to show her I loved her). What would happen in this case? Would I still perform the 
act (visiting my mother)? If we answer „no‟ then Korsgaard is claiming that you need both 
the purpose, and your duty to perform the action. Call this option (B). If we answer „yes‟ 
then we are faced with another question – what would happen if we wanted to fulfil the 
purpose, but we lacked the recognition that the action was part of our duty? Would we still 
perform the act then? It might seem obvious that the answer has to be „no‟ – remember we 
are considering the options for someone who thinks that duty has some motivational role, 
and we have already bracketed off the position that says you need both the purpose and the 
duty (B). The only thing left with motivational impact in this case would then be the duty, 
and if we take that away then it must be the case that we won‟t perform the action. 
However, this ignores a possible position that claims that duty has motivational force, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
objection in either Humean or anti-Humean terms. I shall just talk of ‘the duty’ and ‘the purpose’, a 
Humean could fill this in with ‘the desire to do your duty’ and ‘the desire to fulfil that purpose’ 
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purpose also has motivational force, but you don‟t need both together in order to perform 
the action. The way to make this claim is to say that you performing the action is in a way 
overdetermined. Call this option (C). The other option is to answer „no‟ to the last question 
– that is to say that it is that you only need the recognition of a duty to secure a morally 
virtuous agent doing the right thing (option D). I wish to claim that none of these possible 
accounts of the relationship between duty and motivation is attractive. 
 
D is the least helpful option. Here we are claiming that the morally virtuous agent is 
motivated by acting out of duty alone. This means that the purpose is entirely 
epiphenomenal, in the way the duty was on option A. This is straightforwardly fetishistic, 
and would mean that for all her new-fangled machinery Korsgaard has no response to the 
SOK. She can‟t mean to occupy this position. 
 
 
C claims that you would do the right act if you had the purpose, or if you had the duty, or if 
you had both. However, when you have both it is not the case that one or other‟s 
motivational force is switched off – they both still have full motivational force in the case 
where both are present. This view does at least seem to get us around the original problem – 
the morally virtuous person is one who acts out of duty. But this does not preclude them 
from also acting with a certain purpose in mind. So they can meet the Kantian standard of 
virtue without being fetishistic. However, the picture it gives us seems very strange – our 
actions (when we are acting virtuously) would be overdetermined, in the sense familiar 
from debates in the philosophy of mind. It seems difficult to understand how you could 
make sense of this view. In any case, if this is what Korsgaard intends, she needs to do more 
work to motivate it.  
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B claims that you need both the purpose and the duty in order to act. Either one on their 
own won‟t do, but together they are jointly sufficient. This also seems to solve the problem:  
you can have the touchy-feely purpose AND the duty – so you can be a good person on 
Kant‟s account and avoid fetishism. However, it seems false to claim that you need the duty 
and the right purpose in order to act well. In fact, the anti-Kantian could just reformulate 
their challenge: the morally virtuous person is someone who is motivated by the heart-
warming purpose of the act (e.g. to make their mother feel loved) on its own. If the duty is 
also necessary, then it means that the considerations about love would not be enough on 
their own, and this still seems too fetishistic. It is still true that you would not visit your 
mother unless it was your duty. What this reveals is that having duty play an essential role 
in motivation allows the anti-Kantian space to restate their argument. Having duty play this 
role appears to taint the whole action.  
 
There is something more that Korsgaard could say on option A. A says that the duty is 
motivationally inert. How then can we make sense of the claim that a good action is one 
done out of duty? One way might be to distinguish between explanatory (or motivational) 
and justifying reasons. So the fact that something would show your mother that you loved 
her explains your action (in that it explains your motivation) whereas the fact that it is also 
your duty merely justifies your action. So, to be a fully good agent is to be motivated by the 
warm cuddly features of the action you bring about, but to be justified by the fact that doing 
the action is your duty. You only become fetishistic when the duty functions as a 
motivational reason. 
 
This, though, can‟t be what Korsgaard intends. Korsgaard wants to defend an internalism 
about reasons, where having a reason is intrinsically motivational (1986). The only way for 
you to not be moved by a reason is for you to suffer some form of practical irrationality 
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(depression, fear, etc). So, if in order to respect the Kantian conception of a virtuous agent 
you must have a reason that doesn‟t motivate you (but merely justifies) then the only way to 
be virtuous would be to be practically irrational. This obviously can‟t be Korsgaard‟s 
intention. So, A is (on one reading) unavailable to Korsgaard  and on another a failure (it 
leaves us without a substantial account of what „acting out of duty‟ is). B seems to be only 
some improvement and leaves open the possibility for the anti-Kantian to refine the SOK. 
C solves the problem, but involves a strange metaphysical view that Korsgaard needs to do 
more work to motivate. And D straight-forwardly fails to tackle the SOK. My conclusion is 
that if the SOK is a problem, then Korsgaard‟s use of the distinction between actions and 
acts to try to dissolve it is inadequate as it stands.  
 
To sum up, then. We began this chapter wanting to be able to give a clear formulation of 
Korsgaard‟s positive metaethical suggestions. I‟ve argued that if we formulate neo-Kantian 
constructivism as a form of cognitivist anti-realism along the lines of Wright‟s account of 
judgement-dependent qualities we secure a number of benefits – we get a formulation of 
constructivism that gives the constructivist most of the features they want from a 
metaethical theory, but which is also clearer to evaluate. When formulated this way, the 
credibility of constructivism depends upon the constructivist‟s ability to give a kosher 
derivation of the categorical imperative. I then attempted to lay out Korsgaard‟s argument 
for the bindingness of the categorical imperative in terms which, again, make it easier to 
evaluate. This argument has a number of possible gaps, some of which I have not been able 
to investigate. Korsgaard tries to plug some of these gaps by invoking a type of 
constitutivism. This part of her view runs into serious problems accounting for what goes on 
the case of people who violate the categorical imperative. If, then (as I have argued) the 
credibility of neo-Kantian constructivism depends upon being able to give an argument for 
the categorical imperative, and that argument depends on an implausible form of 
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constitutivism, then I have to conclude that neo-Kantian constructivism fails. Finally I 
looked at whether Korsgaard could avoid the SOK and argued that her view, as it stands, 
does not.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
This thesis has been based on the presumption that Korsgaard‟s forays into metaethics are 
worth engaging with, even if ultimately her arguments against her metaethical competitors 
can be demonstrated to fail, and her own position faces serious difficulty. Reflection on 
neo-Kantian constructivism has enabled me to reach a number of, I hope, independently 
interesting conclusions. 
 
In the first chapter we saw that, in the process of making space for Korsgaard‟s argument 
against realism, that there are good reasons to think that our conception of metaethics 
should be more expansive than the one sometimes put forward, and that there are surprising 
connections between normative ethics and metaethics.  
 
To get clear on precisely what Korsgaard‟s complaint against realism is I suggested that we 
read her as concerned with the motivational import of moral judgements (this is not a 
characterisation she would rush to endorse herself, but the idea is that we could capture a lot 
of what might animate someone‟s concerns with realism by thinking about things in this 
way – even if Korsgaard wouldn‟t be happy with this reading, perhaps it would be useful to 
someone who, like Korsgaard, takes her normative question seriously). Putting things this 
way allowed me to reach conclusions about Smith‟s treatment of amoralism, his argument 
from fetishism, and van Roojen's battery of considerations in favour of internalism. There I 
argued that there are no compelling reasons to commit to internalism, and that if this 
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reading of Korsgaard is what was bothering us then the realist can surmount the difficulty 
by demonstrating there is a viable form of externalist moral realism available. 
 
Chapter three considered another way of reading Korsgaard – as offering a generalised anti-
voluntarism argument. This argument afflicts both realism and Korsgaard‟s own position, 
and thus reveals something interesting not about realism but about the nature of normative 
explanations. To avoid this argument the realist needs a form of reductionism. I then 
considered whether Cornell realism and Finlay‟s reductivism are tenable positions for the 
moral realist. Finlay‟s position has a number of strengths, but reflection on the account of 
analyticity he appeals to opens up problems for his methodology. Cornell realism can 
defend itself against the attack launched on its semantic programme by Horgan and 
Timmons by getting clear on what that programme is doing. In addition, it‟s not obvious 
that the Cornell realist‟s strategy for earning ontological rights for moral properties fails, 
despite the objections it faces. The upshot of all this is that there are two viable versions of 
realism that survive one of both ways of construing Korsgaard‟s argument.  
 
Korsgaard‟s complaints against expressivism prompted an investigation of the main issue 
with that metaethical position – the Frege-Geach problem. We saw there how careful 
attention to what the Frege-Geach problem is getting at (explaining the compositionality of 
language using only elements available to an expressivist) militates against at least Ridge‟s 
version of hybrid expressivism. We also saw how other versions of hybrid expressivism are 
more properly construed as sophisticated types of moral realism. The outcome of this 
discussion is that hybrid expressivism offers little hope to the expressivist, and the fortunes 
of expressivism then seem to depend on how much complexity we are willing to permit in 
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our semantic theory to secure expressivism‟s great metaphysical and epistemological 
benefits.  
 
Finally (chapter five) I‟ve tried to offer a new way of understanding Korsgaard‟s own 
positive position. Neo-Kantian constructivism is best thought of as a version of cognitivist 
anti-realism for two reasons: this way of doing things secures most of the features a neo-
Kantian constructivist wants from a metaethical theory; and it gives us a clear way of 
presenting and evaluating the constructivist‟s claims. When we set things up this way 
attention shifts to whether the Kantian can give a viable argument for the categorical 
imperative. When we look at how Korsgaard gives that argument we learnt a number of 
things: that its viability depends upon a type of constitutivism; that constitutivism depends 
upon various dubious claims about the inescapability of agency; that the argument fails to 
respect the conditions on giving a judgement dependent treatment of moral qualities; that 
we need to be concerned with the truth of the psychological claims Korsgaard needs; that 
the argument depends upon a limited conception of what human freedom involves. In 
addition I argued that Korsgaard‟s argument against a standard objection to Kant is 
inadequate as it stands. For these reasons I conclude that her own positive metaethical 
position, though worth consideration, fails.  
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